overriding principle in Montana

2020Co., 2010 MT 187, ¶ 22 , 357 Mont. 293 , 239 P.3d 904 (explaining a district court has broad discretion to formulate jury instructions, “limited by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law”).

2020Co., 2010 MT 187, ¶ 22 , 357 Mont. 293 , 239 P.3d 904 (explaining a district court has broad discretion to formulate jury instructions, “limited by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law”).

2018Co ., 2010 MT 187 , ¶ 22, 357 Mont. 293 , 239 P.3d 904 . "[W]hile a district court has broad discretion to formulate jury instructions, that discretion is limited by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law." Peterson , ¶ 22 (quoting Tarlton v. Kaufman , 2008 MT 462 , ¶ 19, 348 Mont. 178 , 199 P.3d 263 ) (internal quotations omitted).

2018Co ., 2010 MT 187 , ¶ 22, 357 Mont. 293 , 239 P.3d 904 . "[W]hile a district court has broad discretion to formulate jury instructions, that discretion is limited by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law." Peterson , ¶ 22 (quoting Tarlton v. Kaufman , 2008 MT 462 , ¶ 19, 348 Mont. 178 , 199 P.3d 263 ) (internal quotations omitted).

2010Tarlton v. Kaufman, 2008 MT 462, ¶ 19 , 348 Mont. 178 , 199 P.3d 263 . “[Wjhile a district court has broad discretion to formulate jury instructions, ‘that discretion is limited by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.’ ” Tarlton , ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Miller, 2008 MT 106, ¶ 11 , 342 Mont. 355 , 181 P.3d 625 ).

2010Tarlton v. Kaufman, 2008 MT 462, ¶ 19 , 348 Mont. 178 , 199 P.3d 263 . “[Wjhile a district court has broad discretion to formulate jury instructions, ‘that discretion is limited by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.’ ” Tarlton , ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Miller, 2008 MT 106, ¶ 11 , 342 Mont. 355 , 181 P.3d 625 ).

2017Co., 2010 MT 187, ¶ 22 , 357 Mont. 293 , 239 P.3d 904 . “[W]hile a district court has broad discretion to formulate 7 jury instructions, that discretion is limited by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” Peterson, ¶ 22 (quoting Tarlton v. Kaufman, 2008 MT 462, ¶ 19 , 348 Mont. 178 , 199 P.3d 263 ) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he party assigning error to a district court’s instruction must show prejudice in order to prevail, and prejudice will not be found if the jury instructions in their entirety state the

2017Co., 2010 MT 187, ¶ 22 , 357 Mont. 293 , 239 P.3d 904 . “[W]hile a district court has broad discretion to formulate 7 jury instructions, that discretion is limited by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” Peterson, ¶ 22 (quoting Tarlton v. Kaufman, 2008 MT 462, ¶ 19 , 348 Mont. 178 , 199 P.3d 263 ) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he party assigning error to a district court’s instruction must show prejudice in order to prevail, and prejudice will not be found if the jury instructions in their entirety state the

2017State v. Erickson, 2014 MT 304, ¶ 25 , 377 Mont. 84 , 338 P.3d 598 (“In 2009, ... the Legislature enacted legislation [§ 46-16-131, MCA] designed to shift the burden to the State to prove the absence of justification in self-defense claims.” (citation omitted)). “[W]hile the district court’s discretion is broad, it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” State v. Archambault, 2007 MT 26, ¶ 25 , 336 Mont. 6 , 152 P.3d 698 (citation omitted). ¶16 In light of the foregoing principles, we con

2017State v. Erickson, 2014 MT 304, ¶ 25 , 377 Mont. 84 , 338 P.3d 598 (“In 2009, ... the Legislature enacted legislation [§ 46-16-131, MCA] designed to shift the burden to the State to prove the absence of justification in self-defense claims.” (citation omitted)). “[W]hile the district court’s discretion is broad, it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” State v. Archambault, 2007 MT 26, ¶ 25 , 336 Mont. 6 , 152 P.3d 698 (citation omitted). ¶16 In light of the foregoing principles, we con

2014State v. Hovey, 2011 MT 3, ¶ 10 , 359 Mont. 100 , 248 P.3d 303 ; Bieber , *92 ¶ 22.

2011However, while the court’s discretion is broad, “it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” State v. Hovey, 2011 MT 3, ¶ 10 , 359 Mont. 100 , 248 P.3d 303 ; see also State v. Thorp, 2010 MT 92, ¶ 32 , 356 Mont. 150 , 231 P.3d 1096 . “[IJnstructions must prejudicially affect the defendant’s substantial rights to constitute reversible error.” Hovey, ¶ 10.

2011However, while the court’s discretion is broad, “it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” State v. Hovey, 2011 MT 3, ¶ 10 , 359 Mont. 100 , 248 P.3d 303 ; see also State v. Thorp, 2010 MT 92, ¶ 32 , 356 Mont. 150 , 231 P.3d 1096 . “[IJnstructions must prejudicially affect the defendant’s substantial rights to constitute reversible error.” Hovey, ¶ 10.

2011However, while the court’s discretion is broad, “it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” State v. Hovey, 2011 MT 3, ¶ 10 , 359 Mont. 100 , 248 P.3d 303 ; see also State v. Thorp, 2010 MT 92, ¶ 32 , 356 Mont. 150 , 231 P.3d 1096 . “[IJnstructions must prejudicially affect the defendant’s substantial rights to constitute reversible error.” Hovey, ¶ 10.

2018"We review the instructions as a whole to determine whether they fully and fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." State v Sanchez , 2017 MT 192 , ¶ 7, 388 Mont. 262 , 399 P.3d 886 (citing State v. Kaarma , 2017 MT 24 , ¶ 7, 386 Mont. 243 , 390 P.3d 609 ). "[T]he party assigning error to a district court's instruction must show prejudice in order to prevail, and prejudice will not be found if the jury instructions in their entirety state the applicable law of the case." Tarlton , ¶ 19 (quoting Murphy Homes, Inc. v. Muller , 2007 MT 140 , ¶ 74, 337 Mont. 411 , 162 P.3d 106 ). ¶ 11 Jury

2018"We review the instructions as a whole to determine whether they fully and fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." State v Sanchez , 2017 MT 192 , ¶ 7, 388 Mont. 262 , 399 P.3d 886 (citing State v. Kaarma , 2017 MT 24 , ¶ 7, 386 Mont. 243 , 390 P.3d 609 ). "[T]he party assigning error to a district court's instruction must show prejudice in order to prevail, and prejudice will not be found if the jury instructions in their entirety state the applicable law of the case." Tarlton , ¶ 19 (quoting Murphy Homes, Inc. v. Muller , 2007 MT 140 , ¶ 74, 337 Mont. 411 , 162 P.3d 106 ). ¶ 11 Jury

2018"We review the instructions as a whole to determine whether they fully and fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." State v Sanchez , 2017 MT 192 , ¶ 7, 388 Mont. 262 , 399 P.3d 886 (citing State v. Kaarma , 2017 MT 24 , ¶ 7, 386 Mont. 243 , 390 P.3d 609 ). "[T]he party assigning error to a district court's instruction must show prejudice in order to prevail, and prejudice will not be found if the jury instructions in their entirety state the applicable law of the case." Tarlton , ¶ 19 (quoting Murphy Homes, Inc. v. Muller , 2007 MT 140 , ¶ 74, 337 Mont. 411 , 162 P.3d 106 ). ¶ 11 Jury

2018"We review the instructions as a whole to determine whether they fully and fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." State v Sanchez , 2017 MT 192 , ¶ 7, 388 Mont. 262 , 399 P.3d 886 (citing State v. Kaarma , 2017 MT 24 , ¶ 7, 386 Mont. 243 , 390 P.3d 609 ). "[T]he party assigning error to a district court's instruction must show prejudice in order to prevail, and prejudice will not be found if the jury instructions in their entirety state the applicable law of the case." Tarlton , ¶ 19 (quoting Murphy Homes, Inc. v. Muller , 2007 MT 140 , ¶ 74, 337 Mont. 411 , 162 P.3d 106 ). ¶ 11 Jury

2017Radiological Assocs., P.C., 2012 MT 260, ¶ 17 , 367 Mont. 21 , 289 P.3d 131 .

2017Radiological Assocs., P.C., 2012 MT 260, ¶ 17 , 367 Mont. 21 , 289 P.3d 131 .

2017Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24 , 99 S. Ct. at 1808 ; In re J.S., ¶ 23.

2017Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24 , 99 S. Ct. at 1808 ; In re J.S., ¶ 23.

2017State v. Erickson, 2014 MT 304, ¶ 25 , 377 Mont. 84 , 338 P.3d 598 (“In 2009, ... the Legislature enacted legislation [§ 46-16-131, MCA] designed to shift the burden to the State to prove the absence of justification in self-defense claims.” (citation omitted)). “[W]hile the district court’s discretion is broad, it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” State v. Archambault, 2007 MT 26, ¶ 25 , 336 Mont. 6 , 152 P.3d 698 (citation omitted). ¶16 In light of the foregoing principles, we con

2017State v. Erickson, 2014 MT 304, ¶ 25 , 377 Mont. 84 , 338 P.3d 598 (“In 2009, ... the Legislature enacted legislation [§ 46-16-131, MCA] designed to shift the burden to the State to prove the absence of justification in self-defense claims.” (citation omitted)). “[W]hile the district court’s discretion is broad, it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” State v. Archambault, 2007 MT 26, ¶ 25 , 336 Mont. 6 , 152 P.3d 698 (citation omitted). ¶16 In light of the foregoing principles, we con

2016Payne v. Knutson, 2004 MT 271, ¶ 14 , 323 Mont. 165 , 99 P.3d 200 .

2016Payne v. Knutson, 2004 MT 271, ¶ 14 , 323 Mont. 165 , 99 P.3d 200 .

2013While the district court’s discretion is broad, it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” Goles v. Neumann, 2011 MT 11, ¶ 9 , 359 Mont. 132 , 247 P.3d 1089 (citing State v. Christiansen, 2010 MT 197, ¶ 7 , 357 Mont. 379 , 239 P.3d 949 ).

2013While the district court’s discretion is broad, it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” Goles v. Neumann, 2011 MT 11, ¶ 9 , 359 Mont. 132 , 247 P.3d 1089 (citing State v. Christiansen, 2010 MT 197, ¶ 7 , 357 Mont. 379 , 239 P.3d 949 ).

2013While the district court’s discretion is broad, it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” Goles v. Neumann, 2011 MT 11, ¶ 9 , 359 Mont. 132 , 247 P.3d 1089 (citing State v. Christiansen, 2010 MT 197, ¶ 7 , 357 Mont. 379 , 239 P.3d 949 ).

2013While the district court’s discretion is broad, it is ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.” Goles v. Neumann, 2011 MT 11, ¶ 9 , 359 Mont. 132 , 247 P.3d 1089 (citing State v. Christiansen, 2010 MT 197, ¶ 7 , 357 Mont. 379 , 239 P.3d 949 ).

2013State v. Daniels, 2011 MT 278, ¶ 38 , 362 Mont. 426 , 265 P.3d 623 .

2013State v. Daniels, 2011 MT 278, ¶ 38 , 362 Mont. 426 , 265 P.3d 623 .

2010State v. Kramp, 200 Mont. 383, 396 , 651 P.2d 614, 621 (1982); Dale v. Three Rivers Telephone Cooperatives, Inc., 2004 MT 74, ¶¶ 15-16 , 320 Mont. 401 , 87 P.3d 489 ; McAlpine , ¶¶ 25-26; Tarlton , ¶¶ 24, 28-30. ¶43 We conclude that the jury instructions given here as a whole did not fully and fairly inform the jury of the applicable law.

2010State v. Kramp, 200 Mont. 383, 396 , 651 P.2d 614, 621 (1982); Dale v. Three Rivers Telephone Cooperatives, Inc., 2004 MT 74, ¶¶ 15-16 , 320 Mont. 401 , 87 P.3d 489 ; McAlpine , ¶¶ 25-26; Tarlton , ¶¶ 24, 28-30. ¶43 We conclude that the jury instructions given here as a whole did not fully and fairly inform the jury of the applicable law.

2010State v. Azure, 2008 MT 211, ¶ 13 , 344 Mont. 188 , 186 P.3d 1269 (citing State v. Miller, 2008 MT 106, ¶ 11 , 342 Mont. 355 , 181 P.3d 625 ).

2010State v. Azure, 2008 MT 211, ¶ 13 , 344 Mont. 188 , 186 P.3d 1269 (citing State v. Miller, 2008 MT 106, ¶ 11 , 342 Mont. 355 , 181 P.3d 625 ).

2007Campbell then stated the overriding principle: “The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 , 123 S.Ct. at 1524 . ¶183 The subtleties in these ratio guidelines require us to examine the Supreme Court’s statements closely.

2007Campbell then stated the overriding principle: “The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 , 123 S.Ct. at 1524 . ¶183 The subtleties in these ratio guidelines require us to examine the Supreme Court’s statements closely.

2004Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522 , 99 S.Ct. at 2458 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 49 -50 (quoting the holding of Morissette, 342 U.S. at 274-75 , 72 S.Ct. at 255-56 , 96 L.Ed. at 306-07 ); see also Dillon, 668 P.2d at 716-17 (“[w]e start with the indisputable fact that if the effect of the felony-murder rule on malice is indeed a ‘presumption,’ it is a ‘conclusive’ one”); State v. Ortega (N.M. 1991), 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (by interpreting felony-murder rule to presume murderous intent from intent to commit underlying felony, “one runs headlong into Sandstrom”). ¶75 When this Court reviews the constitutionality of a

2004Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522 , 99 S.Ct. at 2458 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 49 -50 (quoting the holding of Morissette, 342 U.S. at 274-75 , 72 S.Ct. at 255-56 , 96 L.Ed. at 306-07 ); see also Dillon, 668 P.2d at 716-17 (“[w]e start with the indisputable fact that if the effect of the felony-murder rule on malice is indeed a ‘presumption,’ it is a ‘conclusive’ one”); State v. Ortega (N.M. 1991), 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (by interpreting felony-murder rule to presume murderous intent from intent to commit underlying felony, “one runs headlong into Sandstrom”). ¶75 When this Court reviews the constitutionality of a

2004Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522 , 99 S.Ct. at 2458 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 49 -50 (quoting the holding of Morissette, 342 U.S. at 274-75 , 72 S.Ct. at 255-56 , 96 L.Ed. at 306-07 ); see also Dillon, 668 P.2d at 716-17 (“[w]e start with the indisputable fact that if the effect of the felony-murder rule on malice is indeed a ‘presumption,’ it is a ‘conclusive’ one”); State v. Ortega (N.M. 1991), 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (by interpreting felony-murder rule to presume murderous intent from intent to commit underlying felony, “one runs headlong into Sandstrom”). ¶75 When this Court reviews the constitutionality of a

2004Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522 , 99 S.Ct. at 2458 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 49 -50 (quoting the holding of Morissette, 342 U.S. at 274-75 , 72 S.Ct. at 255-56 , 96 L.Ed. at 306-07 ); see also Dillon, 668 P.2d at 716-17 (“[w]e start with the indisputable fact that if the effect of the felony-murder rule on malice is indeed a ‘presumption,’ it is a ‘conclusive’ one”); State v. Ortega (N.M. 1991), 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (by interpreting felony-murder rule to presume murderous intent from intent to commit underlying felony, “one runs headlong into Sandstrom”). ¶75 When this Court reviews the constitutionality of a

2000“In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility, justify searches without prior recourse to authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 , 105 S. Ct. at 2070 . ¶41 As clarified by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, a warrantless search of an automobile does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the automobile is “readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband;” a further showing of exigent circums

2000“In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility, justify searches without prior recourse to authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 , 105 S. Ct. at 2070 . ¶41 As clarified by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, a warrantless search of an automobile does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the automobile is “readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband;” a further showing of exigent circums

2000Pennsylvania v. Labron (1996), 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.

2000Pennsylvania v. Labron (1996), 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.

2000Pennsylvania v. Labron (1996), 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (per curiam); Maryland v. Dyson (1999), 527 U.S. 465 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (per curiam) (summarily reversing Maryland Court of Special Appeals which had concluded that a warrantless automobile search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant). *468 ¶ 42 Officer Conrad certainly had probable cause to believe Elison's vehicle contained evidence of a crime after Elison informed Off

2000Pennsylvania v. Labron (1996), 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (per curiam); Maryland v. Dyson (1999), 527 U.S. 465 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (per curiam) (summarily reversing Maryland Court of Special Appeals which had concluded that a warrantless automobile search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant). *468 ¶ 42 Officer Conrad certainly had probable cause to believe Elison's vehicle contained evidence of a crime after Elison informed Off