Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
36 New York opinions name it 7 courts 1956–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of Suffolkgreen2 sentences2016To that end, the overriding principle of SEQRA is the “maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this state” (ECL 8-0103 [1]), and “every citizen ‘has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the quality of the environment’ ” (Society of Plastics Indus., 77 NY2d at 777, quoting ECL 8-0103 [2]). 2016To that end, the overriding principle of SEQRA is the “maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this state” (ECL 8-0103 [1]), and “every citizen ‘has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the quality of the environment’ ” (Society of Plastics Indus., 77 NY2d at 777, quoting ECL 8-0103 [2]). | 3 | 3 |
Sandstrom v. Montanagreen2 sentences2005Such a result “conflicts with the defendant’s overriding presumption of innocence as to every element of the crime, and invades the jury’s fact-finding function” (People v Williams, 95 AD2d 866 [1983]; see Sandstrom v Montana, supra; People v Williams, supra at 136). 1983A mandatory presumption as to an element of a crime is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the defendant’s overriding presumption of innocence as to every element of the crime, and invades the jury’s fact-finding function (Sandstrom v Montana, 442 US 510;People v Gray, supra). | 1 | 3 |
Reed, Roberts Associates, Inc. v. Straumangreen2 sentences2005Under New York law, “negative covenants restricting competition are enforceable only to the extent that they satisfy the overriding requirement of reasonableness.” (Reed, Roberts Assoc. v Strauman, 40 NY2d 303, 307 [1976].) “An employee agreement not to compete will be enforced only if ‘it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee.’ ” (Scott, Stackrow & Co., C.P.A.'s, P.C. v Skavina, 9 AD3d 805, 806 [3d Dept 2004].) This general limitation of reasonableness “applies 1987The restrictive covenant between the plaintiff and the Franzeses falls within the general rule that "covenants restricting competition are enforceable only to the extent that they satisfy the overriding requirement of reasonableness” (Reed, Roberts Assocs. v Strauman, 40 NY2d 303, 307 , rearg denied 40 NY2d 918 ). | 1 | 2 |
The Matter of Sierra Club v. Village of Painted Postgreen1 sentence2016Those seeking to raise SEQRA challenges must establish both “an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and . . . that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA” (Matter of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, 112 AD3d 726 , 727-728 [emphasis added]; see Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post, 26 NY3d 301 , ___; Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 308-309 ; Matter of Barrett v Dutchess County Legislature, 38 AD3d 651, 653 | 1 | 1 |
Rumpff v. Schorppgreen1 sentence2016The best interests of the children may also be considered in a custody dispute between a parent and nonparent, but only if the nonparent demonstrates, insofar as is relevant here, extraordinary circumstances to overcome a parent’s overriding claim of custody to his or her child (see Matter of Rumpff v Schorpp, 133 AD3d 1109, 1110 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
Darweger v. Staatsgreen2 sentences2006The principle in effect in this case, as has been true in other cases, is that “legislative intent is the great and controlling principle” (see Matter of Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d 232, 244 [2003]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]; Stoats, 267 NY 290, 306 [1935], supra). 2006The principle in effect in this case, as has been true in other cases, is that "legislative intent is the great and controlling principle" ( see Matter of Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d 232, 244 [2003]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]; Staats, 267 NY 290, 306 [1935], supra ). | 1 | 1 |
MATTER OF THEROUX v. Reillygreen2 sentences2006The principle in effect in this case, as has been true in other cases, is that “legislative intent is the great and controlling principle” (see Matter of Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d 232, 244 [2003]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]; Stoats, 267 NY 290, 306 [1935], supra). 2006The principle in effect in this case, as has been true in other cases, is that "legislative intent is the great and controlling principle" ( see Matter of Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d 232, 244 [2003]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]; Staats, 267 NY 290, 306 [1935], supra ). | 1 | 1 |
Sutka v. Connersgreen2 sentences2006The principle in effect in this case, as has been true in other cases, is that “legislative intent is the great and controlling principle” (see Matter of Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d 232, 244 [2003]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]; Stoats, 267 NY 290, 306 [1935], supra). 2006The principle in effect in this case, as has been true in other cases, is that "legislative intent is the great and controlling principle" ( see Matter of Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d 232, 244 [2003]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]; Staats, 267 NY 290, 306 [1935], supra ). | 1 | 1 |
BDO Seidman v. Hirshberggreen2 sentences2005Under New York law, “negative covenants restricting competition are enforceable only to the extent that they satisfy the overriding requirement of reasonableness.” (Reed, Roberts Assoc. v Strauman, 40 NY2d 303, 307 [1976].) “An employee agreement not to compete will be enforced only if ‘it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee.’ ” (Scott, Stackrow & Co., C.P.A.'s, P.C. v Skavina, 9 AD3d 805, 806 [3d Dept 2004].) This general limitation of reasonableness “applies 2005Although the rule of reasonableness in cases involving professionals “giv[e] greater weight to the interests of the employer in restricting competition within a confined geographical area” because “professionals are deemed to provide ‘unique or extraordinary’ services” (id., quoting Reed, Roberts Assoc., 40 NY2d at 308 ), the Court of Appeals nevertheless requires strict scrutiny of “the particular facts and circumstances giving context to the agreement” in the learned profession cases. ( 93 NY2d at 390 ; see Gelder Med. | 1 | 1 |
Scott, Stackrow & Co., C.P.A.'S, P.C. v. Skavinagreen1 sentence2005Under New York law, “negative covenants restricting competition are enforceable only to the extent that they satisfy the overriding requirement of reasonableness.” (Reed, Roberts Assoc. v Strauman, 40 NY2d 303, 307 [1976].) “An employee agreement not to compete will be enforced only if ‘it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee.’ ” (Scott, Stackrow & Co., C.P.A.'s, P.C. v Skavina, 9 AD3d 805, 806 [3d Dept 2004].) This general limitation of reasonableness “applies | 1 | 1 |
Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitzgreen1 sentence2005Under New York law, “negative covenants restricting competition are enforceable only to the extent that they satisfy the overriding requirement of reasonableness.” (Reed, Roberts Assoc. v Strauman, 40 NY2d 303, 307 [1976].) “An employee agreement not to compete will be enforced only if ‘it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee.’ ” (Scott, Stackrow & Co., C.P.A.'s, P.C. v Skavina, 9 AD3d 805, 806 [3d Dept 2004].) This general limitation of reasonableness “applies | 1 | 1 |
P. J. Panzeca, Inc. v. Aliziogreen1 sentence2000We begin by noting that when originally enacted in 1957, the Legislature intended that the exemption from the “rules of the road” contained in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) “refer [ ] to those who build highways, repair or maintain them, paint the pavement markings, remove the snow, sand the pavement and do similar work” (1954 NY Legis Doc No. 36, at 35 [emphasis supplied]; see, Petosa v City of New York, 52 AD2d 919, 920). | 1 | 1 |
| Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Board of Assessorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eaton v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. De Bour
green
2 sentences2024"The overriding requirement of reasonableness in any event, must prevail" ( id. ). 1979The Court of Appeals in De Bour was clearly mindful of the necessity to avoid placing "unrealistic restrictions” on the authority of the police to approach citizens, and declared "reasonableness” to be "the overriding requirement.” Obviously, if the police may justifiably approach a citizen and address questions to that citizen based not on mere caprice, but because there is "some objective credible reason” to do so, albeit that objective reason is not necessarily indicative of criminality (People v De Bour, supra), the nature of those questions may be directed toward and based upon that very | 2 | 1979–2024 |
Long Island University v. J. Baranello & Sons
green
2 sentences2022The overriding principle espoused by Rothman is that "[d]efendants ha[ve] a constitutional right to notice of the charges on which they were to be tried' ( 117 AD2d at 535 ). 2022The overriding principle espoused by Rothman is that "[d]efendants ha[ve] a constitutional right to notice of the charges on which they were to be tried' ( 117 AD2d at 535 ). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Fink v. Lefkowitz
green
2 sentences1989In dealing with requests for disclosure pursuant to FOIL, the overriding principle is that the public is vested with an inherent right to know (Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567, 571 ). 1980In dealing with requests for disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law, the overriding principle is that "the public is vested with an inherent right to know” (Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567, 571 ). | 2 | 1980–1989 |
Caniglia v. Strom
green
1 sentence2024However, in Caniglia v Strom , the Supreme Court strongly signaled its disapproval of intrusions justified on so-called community caretaking grounds and suggested that Cady did not mark the introduction of a separate community-caretaking doctrine ( 593 US 194 [2021]). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v. Town Board of Town of Tuxedo
green
1 sentence2016Those seeking to raise SEQRA challenges must establish both “an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and . . . that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA” (Matter of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, 112 AD3d 726 , 727-728 [emphasis added]; see Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post, 26 NY3d 301 , ___; Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 308-309 ; Matter of Barrett v Dutchess County Legislature, 38 AD3d 651, 653 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Barrett v. Dutchess County Legislature
green
1 sentence2016Those seeking to raise SEQRA challenges must establish both “an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and . . . that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA” (Matter of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, 112 AD3d 726 , 727-728 [emphasis added]; see Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post, 26 NY3d 301 , ___; Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 308-309 ; Matter of Barrett v Dutchess County Legislature, 38 AD3d 651, 653 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council
green
1 sentence2016Those seeking to raise SEQRA challenges must establish both “an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and . . . that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA” (Matter of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, 112 AD3d 726 , 727-728 [emphasis added]; see Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post, 26 NY3d 301 , ___; Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 308-309 ; Matter of Barrett v Dutchess County Legislature, 38 AD3d 651, 653 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Sandoval
green
2 sentences2013As articulated in the well-known Court of Appeals decision in People v Sandoval ( 34 NY2d 371 [1974]), the overriding standard governing the “sound discretion” of the trial judge over the nature and extent of cross-examination (see id. at 374 ) is “whether the prejudicial effect of impeachment testimony far outweighs the probative worth of the evidence on the issue of credibility” — a standard “easy of articulation but troublesome in many cases of application” (see id. at 376 ). 2013As articulated in the well-known Court of Appeals decision in People v Sandoval ( 34 NY2d 371 [1974]), the overriding standard governing the “sound discretion” of the trial judge over the nature and extent of cross-examination (see id. at 374 ) is “whether the prejudicial effect of impeachment testimony far outweighs the probative worth of the evidence on the issue of credibility” — a standard “easy of articulation but troublesome in many cases of application” (see id. at 376 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2005Such a result “conflicts with the defendant’s overriding presumption of innocence as to every element of the crime, and invades the jury’s fact-finding function” (People v Williams, 95 AD2d 866 [1983]; see Sandstrom v Montana, supra; People v Williams, supra at 136). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In re the Accounting of United States Trust Co.
green
1 sentence2005(Matter of Fabbri, 2 NY2d 236 [1957].) Clearly, Henry N. Kamp knew his son Henry was retarded and intended to provide for him, even to the exclusion of his other children. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Riley v. County of Broome
green
1 sentence2002The overriding principle of statutory construction is determining legislative intent (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 ; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a]). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ann M. C. v. Orange County Department of Social Services
green
1 sentence2000C. v Orange County Dept. of Social Servs., 250 AD2d 190 , lv dismissed 93 NY2d 957 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Philips v. Belfi
neutral
1 sentence2000Furthermore, in Matter of Chaya S. v Frederick Herbert L. ( 259 AD2d 620 ) the Court specifically upheld the right of a biological mother who consented to a private placement adoption to seek visitation rights with the infant in her status as biological mother as long as the overriding standard in enforcing such rights is the best interests of the child (see also, Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M., 77 NY2d 651 ; Matter of Ann M. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Alison D. v. Virginia M.
green
1 sentence2000Furthermore, in Matter of Chaya S. v Frederick Herbert L. ( 259 AD2d 620 ) the Court specifically upheld the right of a biological mother who consented to a private placement adoption to seek visitation rights with the infant in her status as biological mother as long as the overriding standard in enforcing such rights is the best interests of the child (see also, Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M., 77 NY2d 651 ; Matter of Ann M. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lange v. Hoyt
green
1 sentence1997I charge you that such belief is a factor for you to consider, together with all the other evidence you have heard, in determining whether the plaintiff acted reasonably in caring for her injuries, keeping in mind, however, that the overriding test is whether the plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person, under all the circumstances confronting her.” The so-called "reasonable believer” charge (Pomeroy, Reason, Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: When Faith and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67 NYU L Rev 1111, 1145-1147 [1992]) has found some support in other jurisdictions (Lange v Hoyt, | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Christiansen v. Hollings
green
1 sentence1997I charge you that such belief is a factor for you to consider, together with all the other evidence you have heard, in determining whether the plaintiff acted reasonably in caring for her injuries, keeping in mind, however, that the overriding test is whether the plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person, under all the circumstances confronting her.” The so-called "reasonable believer” charge (Pomeroy, Reason, Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: When Faith and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67 NYU L Rev 1111, 1145-1147 [1992]) has found some support in other jurisdictions (Lange v Hoyt, | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Brearton v. Fina
green
1 sentence1996(Brearton v Fina, 3 Misc 2d 1 [Franklin County Ct 1956].) As 1 Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real Property § 4.9 (m) (5th ed 1991) explains, "[t]he dominant owner * * * has the duty to repair where he is the user”, in which event the servient owner’s "only obligation [is] to refrain from interfering with * * * proper use” of the easement; but the overriding principle is that "[t]he duty to repair * * * is on the user, being on the servient tenant when he is the user, and on both where the use is shared”. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Rowe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
green
1 sentence1992Tea Co., 46 NY2d 62, 68 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Kidd v. Merck & Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Williams v. Williams green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Park of Edgewater, Inc. v. Joy neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Mtr. of Abrams (John Anonymous) green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Politi yellow | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Bucksbaum green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Gray green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Gittelson green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Reynolds v. Sims green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Zurcher v. Stanford Daily green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Gittelson green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Service green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Rutigliano green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| United States Ex Rel. Maine Potato Growers & Shippers Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Commission green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage & Hour Division of the Department of Labor green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.