42 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1982–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boykin v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Roykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). 1997Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). | 4 | 5 |
Vargas v. Stategreen2 sentences2010We said in Chambers v. State, “In cases reversed because of the State’s failure to establish the legitimacy of its explanations through voir dire questions, at least one of two other factors has existed[:] 1) the legitimacy of the State’s apprehension was not obvious and 2) there was other evidence of disparate treatment.”21 While we agree with Chambers and Justice Reyna that the lack-of-questioning factor may arise in conjunction with other factors, we do not find support in our cases for the State’s more extreme proposition that “basing reversal exclusively on a lack of questioning is wrong. 2010Id. | 3 | 9 |
Michael D. Lee v. the Rogers Agency, C. Michael Rogers, and New York Life Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2020“The overriding principle to be observed in construing a trust instrument is to ascertain the settlor’s intent with the view of effectuating it.” Lee v. Rogers Agency, 517 S.W.3d 137, 145 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied). 2019“When we construe a will, we focus on the testator’s intent.” Id. (citing San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 2000)); see Lee, 517 S.W.3d at 145 (“The overriding principle to be observed in construing a trust instrument is to ascertain the settlor’s intent with the view of effectuating it.”). | 3 | 3 |
Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Universitygreen2 sentences2018See Lee v. Rogers Agency , 517 S.W.3d 137 , 145 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) ("The overriding principle to be observed in construing a trust instrument is to ascertain the settlor's intent with the view of *817 effectuating it.") (citing Parrish v. Mills , 101 Tex. 276 , 106 S.W. 882 (1908) ); Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ. , 408 S.W.2d 269 , 273 (Tex. Civ. 2017Parrish v. Mills, 101 Tex. 276 , 106 S.W. 882 , 885-86 (Tex. 1908). “[I]t is the intention of the settlor at the time of the creation of the trust that is determinative.” Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. Civ. | 2 | 3 |
Samlowski v. Wootengreen2 sentences2017See id. at 272; see also Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 411 (Tex. 2011) (“The overriding principle guiding trial court discretion under section 74.351(c) [30–day extension] . . . is the elimination of frivolous claims and the preservation of meritorious ones. 2016Dallas, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); see also Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 411 (Tex.2011) (“The overriding principle guiding trial court discretion under section 74.351(c) [30-day extension] ... is the elimination of frivolous claims and the preservation of meritorious ones. | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Vargas v. State, 838 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Johnson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 284, 290-91 (Tex.App.–Dallas1997, pet. ref’d). 2009Vargas v. State, 838 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Johnson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 284, 290-91 (Tex.App.-Dallas1997, pet. ref'd). | 2 | 2 |
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wallinggreen2 sentences2004See id. 2004See id. | 2 | 2 |
Parrish v. Millsgreen2 sentences2018See Lee v. Rogers Agency , 517 S.W.3d 137 , 145 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) ("The overriding principle to be observed in construing a trust instrument is to ascertain the settlor's intent with the view of *817 effectuating it.") (citing Parrish v. Mills , 101 Tex. 276 , 106 S.W. 882 (1908) ); Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ. , 408 S.W.2d 269 , 273 (Tex. Civ. 2017Parrish v. Mills, 101 Tex. 276 , 106 S.W. 882 , 885-86 (Tex. 1908). “[I]t is the intention of the settlor at the time of the creation of the trust that is determinative.” Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 3 |
Broders v. Heisegreen2 sentences2011The overriding standard established in Broders was “whether the offering party [has] established] that the expert ‘has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education’ regarding the specific issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject.” Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153 . 2009The overriding standard established in Broders was “whether the offering party [has] established] that the expert has ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education’ regarding the specific issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular *876 subject.” Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Miller v. Fentongreen2 sentences2004App. 1996) (McCormick, P.J., concurring) (citing Miller v. Fenton , 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S. Ct. 445, 450-53 , 88 L. 2004App. 1996) (McCormick, P.J., concurring) (citing Miller v. Fenton , 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S. Ct. 445, 450-53 , 88 L. | 1 | 2 |
Huffman v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Huffman v. State, 267 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
San Antonio Area Foundation v. Langgreen1 sentence2019“When we construe a will, we focus on the testator’s intent.” Id. (citing San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 2000)); see Lee, 517 S.W.3d at 145 (“The overriding principle to be observed in construing a trust instrument is to ascertain the settlor’s intent with the view of effectuating it.”). | 1 | 1 |
Lesikar v. Moongreen1 sentence2019“We interpret trust instruments the same way as we interpret wills, contracts, and other legal documents.” Lee, 517 S.W.3d at 145 (citing Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)). | 1 | 1 |
Farishta v. Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals Dallas, Inc.green1 sentence2016Dallas, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); see also Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 411 (Tex.2011) (“The overriding principle guiding trial court discretion under section 74.351(c) [30-day extension] ... is the elimination of frivolous claims and the preservation of meritorious ones. | 1 | 1 |
Panelli v. Stategreen1 sentence2015This principle is reiterated in Delaney, and explicitly distinguishes the circumstances of Delaney’s waiver to those of Blanco and Monreal: 1 The first concern—premature motion for new trial and notice of appeal, respectively—were disposed of by the passage of art. 27(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Panelli v. State, 709 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
In Re JFCgreen1 sentence2014In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 305 (Tex.2002). . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Travisgreen1 sentence2010We said in Chambers v. State, “In cases reversed because of the State’s failure to establish the legitimacy of its explanations through voir dire questions, at least one of two other factors has existed[:] 1) the legitimacy of the State’s apprehension was not obvious and 2) there was other evidence of disparate treatment.”21 While we agree with Chambers and Justice Reyna that the lack-of-questioning factor may arise in conjunction with other factors, we do not find support in our cases for the State’s more extreme proposition that “basing reversal exclusively on a lack of questioning is wrong. | 1 | 1 |
Villarreal v. Stategreen1 sentence2004"The overriding principle, at least with respect to constitutional questions, is that where the trial court 'is not in an appreciably better position' than the appellate court to decide the issue, the appellate court may independently determine the issue while affording deference to the trial court's findings on subsidiary factual questions." Villareal v. State , 935 S.W.2d 134, 139 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Guzman v. Stategreen1 sentence1998While the matters included in the majority's "three part" test might enter into such inquiry, a Rule 901 question should not be narrowed to a fixed number of inflexible inquiries. [3] The majority says the standard of review "for a trial court's ruling under one of the rules of evidence is abuse of discretion." Majority opinion at 5 (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). | 1 | 1 |
McMann v. Richardsongreen2 sentences1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor 1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor 1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor | 1 | 1 |
| Keeton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roark v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| English v. Fischergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Bar of Tex. v. Heardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lawson v. Baker
green
2 sentences1986Lawson v. Baker, 220 S.W. 260 . 272 (Tex. Civ. -- APP. - Austin 1920. writ ref’d). 1986Lawson v. Baker, 220 S.W. 260 , 272 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1920, writ ref'd). | 2 | 1986–1986 |
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences2014The overriding standard for due process is “fundamental fairness.” McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543 , 91 S.Ct. at 1985 . 2014The overriding standard for due process is “fundamental fairness.” McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543 , 91 S.Ct. at 1985 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miller-El v. Dretke
green
1 sentence2010We said in Chambers v. State, “In cases reversed because of the State’s failure to establish the legitimacy of its explanations through voir dire questions, at least one of two other factors has existed[:] 1) the legitimacy of the State’s apprehension was not obvious and 2) there was other evidence of disparate treatment.”21 While we agree with Chambers and Justice Reyna that the lack-of-questioning factor may arise in conjunction with other factors, we do not find support in our cases for the State’s more extreme proposition that “basing reversal exclusively on a lack of questioning is wrong. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Babcock v. Northwest Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences2006Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 708 (citing Texas Employers Ins. 2006Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 708 (citing Texas Employers Ins. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
De Veau v. Braisted
green
2 sentences2001The overriding inquiry in such situations was enunciated by the Court in DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 , 80 S.Ct. 1146 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960): “The question in each case, where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation....” 363 U.S. at 160 , 80 S.Ct. 1146 . 2001The overriding inquiry in such situations was enunciated by the Court in DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 , 80 S.Ct. 1146 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960): “The question in each case, where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation....” 363 U.S. at 160 , 80 S.Ct. 1146 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Parker v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor 1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Menna v. New York
green
2 sentences1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor 1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Tollett v. Henderson
green
2 sentences1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). [8] Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers' concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin , the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the " Brady trilogy" is that a defendant's voluntary admission of guilt in open court "renders irrelevant" most constitutional deprivations occurring b 1998Tollett, 93 S.Ct. at 1608 ; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 90 S.Ct. 1458 , 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 8 Contrary to the position taken in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in this case and in his dissenting opinion in McGlothlin, the overriding principle expressed in Tollett and in the “Brady trilogy” is that a defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt in open court “renders irrelevant” most constitutional deprivations occurring befor | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Segovia-Slape v. Paxson
green
1 sentence1996Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 14.07(a) (Vernon 1986); Segovia-Slape v. Paxson, 893 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995) (orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Penry v. Lynaugh red | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Franklin v. Lynaugh green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Skipper v. South Carolina green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Carroll v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Chambers v. Maroney green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Sandstrom v. Montana green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Smith v. California green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.