overriding presumption in Massachusetts

2007This burden includes proving intent, which in murder in the first degree is defined as “malice.”* 11 A jury instruction that “a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts” improperly reheves the Commonwealth of that burden because it “conflict[s] with the overriding presumption of in nocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.” Sandstrom, supra at 523 , quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952).

1986No such artificial compelling force is permissible in a criminal case, Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 291-292 (1975), because such a presumption “would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,” DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 246, 250 (1980), quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979), but the evidence remains evidence throughout the trial and is probative on issues to which it is relevant.

2007This burden includes proving intent, which in murder in the first degree is defined as “malice.”* 11 A jury instruction that “a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts” improperly reheves the Commonwealth of that burden because it “conflict[s] with the overriding presumption of in nocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.” Sandstrom, supra at 523 , quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952).

1980As the Court stated in Sandstrom, supra, “a conclusive presumption in this case would ‘conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,’ and would ‘invade [the] factfinding function’ which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury.” Sandstrom, supra at 523 , quoting from Morissette, supra at 275 , and United States Gypsum Co., supra at 446.

2025These are considerations as to which the board has considerable discretion, see Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 358 Mass. 686, 706 (1971) ("fair net operating income" as used in rent control statute with identical language is flexible definition, "consistent with the overriding requirement of a reasonable return on investment"), but here the board did not explain its reasoning in including the charges.[8] There is the possibility, as well, that the board accepted the (incorrect) argument that the Attorney General regulations did not apply, and thus applied incorrect law.

2008The overriding principle applicable here is that “[t]he courts of the Commonwealth constitute a single system for .the administration of justice in conformity to law, promptly, and without delay.” Thayer v. Shorey, 287 Mass. 76, 80 (1934). 9 Absent statutory provisions that repose exclusive original jurisdiction over a claim in another court, “[w]here the parties have been brought before a court of competent jurisdiction, their controversy so far as practicable ought to be completely and finally disposed of.” Ibid.

2008The overriding principle applicable here is that “[t]he courts of the Commonwealth constitute a single system for .the administration of justice in conformity to law, promptly, and without delay.” Thayer v. Shorey, 287 Mass. 76, 80 (1934). 9 Absent statutory provisions that repose exclusive original jurisdiction over a claim in another court, “[w]here the parties have been brought before a court of competent jurisdiction, their controversy so far as practicable ought to be completely and finally disposed of.” Ibid.

2007See Commonwealth v. Moreira, 385 Mass. 792, 794 (1982) (citing Sandstrom, noting “it is constitutionally impermissible to shift to a defendant the burden of disproving an element of a crime charged”).

1999This is in keeping with the overriding principle that, beyond the statutorily-prescribed procedures, the mortgagee’s duties “are embraced under the general obligation to make reasonable efforts to prevent a sacrifice of the property.” Marcus v. Collamore, 168 Mass. 56, 57 (1897).

1986As we noted in Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405,417 (1923), “[t]he admission in evidence of the record of ... a fact made by a public officer pursuant to statutory obligation would be as likely to be accurate as many of the public records which have been held to be admissible.” The certificate of the Commonwealth’s chemist, therefore, constituted some evidence that the material in question was a controlled substance and did not cease to be evidence because the chemist’s testimony on cross-examination could be viewed as leaving open the possibility that the white powder was a synthetic fo

1986No such artificial compelling force is permissible in a criminal case, Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 291-292 (1975), because such a presumption “would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,” DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 246, 250 (1980), quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979), but the evidence remains evidence throughout the trial and is probative on issues to which it is relevant.

1986No such artificial compelling force is permissible in a criminal case, Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 291-292 (1975), because such a presumption “would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,” DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 246, 250 (1980), quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979), but the evidence remains evidence throughout the trial and is probative on issues to which it is relevant.