overriding principle in New Jersey

28 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1953–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Davisgreen nj · 1975 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2014–2020 2 sentences 2020This approach requires analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a A-4570-18T1 9 conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [Id. at 33 (quoting State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 81 (1975)).] Moreover, "merger issues implicate a defendant's substantive state constitutional rights that are rooted in p 2014The overriding principle of merger analysis is that "an accused [who] committed only one offense . . . cannot be punished as if for two." State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (citing State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)).	2	2
Mattero v. Silvermangreen njsuperctappdiv · 1961 · cited in 3 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1989–2022 2 sentences 2022We added the necessary caveat, however, that "this rule is subsumed by the overriding principle that the statutory violation, to be evidential, must be causally related to the happening of the accident, since a permissible inference of causality is indispensable to its relevancy." Ibid. 7 The Third Restatement suggests "the doctrine of negligence per se is largely superfluous in ascertaining the actor's liability" in statutes "that duplicate the common law," leading some courts to allow parties to argue negligence per se; but others to more frequently reject the doctrine, "recognizing its redu 2022In the usual case, violation of a statute is only evidence of negligence, and only if the statutory violation was "causally 8 In finding plaintiff had sufficiently pled a cognizable claim for negligence per se, the judge wrote: The violation of a statute or regulation 'may be considered by a jury together with all of the evidence in determining issues of negligence[,]' and this proposition is 'subsumed by the overriding principle that the . . . statutory violation, to be evidential, must be causally related to the happening of the accident[.]' Mattero v. Silverman, 71 N.J.	1	3
State v. Browngreen nj · 1994 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2005–2020 2 sentences 2020The overriding principle of our merger analysis "is that a defendant who has committed one offense 'cannot be punished as if for two.'" Ibid. (quoting Brown, 138 N.J. at 561 (citations omitted)). 2020The overriding principle of our merger analysis "is that a defendant who has committed one offense 'cannot be punished as if for two.'" Ibid. (quoting Brown, 138 N.J. at 561 (citations omitted)).	1	2
Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtorsgreen nj · 1993 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1997–1998 2 sentences 1998The owner owes a minimal degree of care to a trespasser, who has no privilege to be on the land. [Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 433 , 625 A.2d 1110 (1993) (citations omitted).] Although the injured party’s status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser defines the extent of a landowner’s tort liability, foreseeability is one constant that plays a significant role in fixing a landowner’s duty: As in other tort contexts, ... the overriding principle governing the determination of a duty is the general tort obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others. 1998The owner owes a minimal degree of care to a trespasser, who has no privilege to be on the land. [Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 433 , 625 A.2d 1110 (1993) (citations omitted).] Although the injured party’s status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser defines the extent of a landowner’s tort liability, foreseeability is one constant that plays a significant role in fixing a landowner’s duty: As in other tort contexts, ... the overriding principle governing the determination of a duty is the general tort obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others.	1	2
State v. Troy N. Tate (069314)green nj · 2013 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 1 sentence 2014The overriding principle of merger analysis is that "an accused [who] committed only one offense . . . cannot be punished as if for two." State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (citing State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)).	1	1
State v. Pillotgreen nj · 1989 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 2 sentences 1992E.g., State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621 , 575 A. 2d 855 (1990) (stating that the polestar of the Code is uniformity in sentencing); see State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 577 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989); State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 79 , 552 A. 2d 994 (1989); State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 405-06 , 522 A. 2d 423 (1987); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 , 498 A. 2d 1239 (1985). 1992E.g., State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621 , 575 A. 2d 855 (1990) (stating that the polestar of the Code is uniformity in sentencing); see State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 577 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989); State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 79 , 552 A. 2d 994 (1989); State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 405-06 , 522 A. 2d 423 (1987); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 , 498 A. 2d 1239 (1985).	1	1
State v. Alstongreen nj · 1981 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989	1	1
Brotman v. Brotmangreen nj · 1946 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984	1	1
Hankin v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Educationgreen njsuperctappdiv · 1957 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968	1	1
Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.green scotus · 1947 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1953–1953	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (34)

Case	Cited	Years
Mattero v. Silverman neutral nj · 1962 2 sentences 2011However, “this rule is subsumed by the overriding principle that the statutory violation, to be evidential, must be causally related to the happening of the accident, since a permissible inference of causality is indispensable to its relevancy.” Mattero v. Silverman, 71 N.J.Super. 1, 9 , 176 A.2d 270 (App.Div.1961), certif. denied, 36 N.J. 305 , 177 A.2d 490 (1962). 2011However, “this rule is subsumed by the overriding principle that the statutory violation, to be evidential, must be causally related to the happening of the accident, since a permissible inference of causality is indispensable to its relevancy.” Mattero v. Silverman, 71 N.J.Super. 1, 9 , 176 A.2d 270 (App.Div.1961), certif. denied, 36 N.J. 305 , 177 A.2d 490 (1962).	2	2011–2022
Service Armament Co. v. Hyland green nj · 1976 2 sentences 1991Noting that there is no statutory definition of the exception, the court followed "the overriding principle of statutory construction ... that in the absence of an explicit indication of special meaning, words will be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning." Id. at 463 , 423 A. 2d 695 (citing Service Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 556 , 362 A. 2d 13 (1976)). 1991Noting that there is no statutory definition of the exception, the court followed "the overriding principle of statutory construction ... that in the absence of an explicit indication of special meaning, words will be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning." Id. at 463 , 423 A. 2d 695 (citing Service Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 556 , 362 A. 2d 13 (1976)).	2	1991–1991
In Re Vrazo Subpoena green njsuperctappdiv · 1980 2 sentences 1991Noting that there is no statutory definition of the exception, the court followed "the overriding principle of statutory construction ... that in the absence of an explicit indication of special meaning, words will be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning." Id. at 463 , 423 A. 2d 695 (citing Service Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 556 , 362 A. 2d 13 (1976)). 1991Noting that there is no statutory definition of the exception, the court followed "the overriding principle of statutory construction ... that in the absence of an explicit indication of special meaning, words will be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning." Id. at 463 , 423 A. 2d 695 (citing Service Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 556 , 362 A. 2d 13 (1976)).	2	1991–1991
New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Serv. v. Jy green njsuperctappdiv · 2002 1 sentence 2025N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29(a) permits emergency removal of a child if "the child's continuance in the place or residence or in the care and custody of the parent or guardian presents an imminent danger to the child's life, safety, or health, and there is insufficient time to apply for a court order pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 9:6 - 8.28]." In reviewing emergent removal under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.28, a court must be "guided by the overriding principle that 'the safety of the child shall be of paramount concern,'" J.Y., 352 N.J.	1	2025–2025
State v. WA green nj · 2005 2 sentences 2007Therefore, when addressing a defendant's exclusion from the individual voir dire of a potential juror who is seated and deliberates, the overriding rule remains that "reversal will not be automatic but will depend on the facts." Id. at 65, 875 A. 2d 882 . 2007Therefore, when addressing a defendant’s exclusion from the individual voir dire of a potential juror who is seated and deliberates, the overriding rule remains that “reversal will not be automatic but will depend on the facts.” Id. at 65, 875 A.2d 882 .	1	2007–2007
Kinsella v. Kinsella green nj · 1997 2 sentences 2005First, Kinsella itself introduces its discussion on alimony with the overriding principle that, “[ajccording to the statute, except where the judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation, proofs made in establishing the grounds for divorce may be considered ‘in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just.’ ” Id. at 314 , 696 A2d 556 . 2005First, Kinsella itself introduces its discussion on alimony with the overriding principle that, “[ajccording to the statute, except where the judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation, proofs made in establishing the grounds for divorce may be considered ‘in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just.’ ” Id. at 314 , 696 A2d 556 .	1	2005–2005
State v. Cooper green nj · 1997 2 sentences 2005State v. Hill, 182 N.J. 532, 542 , 868 A. 2d 290 (2005) (citing State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 561 , 651 A. 2d 19 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 , 700 A. 2d 306 (1997)). 2005State v. Hill, 182 N.J. 532, 542 , 868 A. 2d 290 (2005) (citing State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 561 , 651 A. 2d 19 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 , 700 A. 2d 306 (1997)).	1	2005–2005
State v. Hill green nj · 2005 2 sentences 2005State v. Hill, 182 N.J. 532, 542 , 868 A. 2d 290 (2005) (citing State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 561 , 651 A. 2d 19 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 , 700 A. 2d 306 (1997)). 2005State v. Hill, 182 N.J. 532, 542 , 868 A. 2d 290 (2005) (citing State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 561 , 651 A. 2d 19 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 , 700 A. 2d 306 (1997)).	1	2005–2005
Fablok Mills v. Cocker MacH. Co. green njsuperctappdiv · 1973 2 sentences 2003We conceive that in certain situations continued use of goods by the buyer may be the most appropriate means of achieving mitigation, i.e. where the buyer is unable to purchase a suitable substitute for the goods. [ Id. at 257 , 310 A. 2d 491 . 2003We conceive that in certain situations continued use of goods by the buyer may be the most appropriate means of achieving mitigation, i.e. where the buyer is unable to purchase a suitable substitute for the goods. [ Id. at 257 , 310 A. 2d 491 .	1	2003–2003
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. green scotus · 1992 2 sentences 1999Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ; Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 539 , 683 A. 2d 818 (1996). 1999Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ; Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 539 , 683 A. 2d 818 (1996).	1	1999–1999
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr green scotus · 1996 2 sentences 1999Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ; Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 539 , 683 A. 2d 818 (1996). 1999Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ; Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 539 , 683 A. 2d 818 (1996).	1	1999–1999
Kramer v. BD. OF ADJUST., SEA GIRT. green nj · 1965 2 sentences 1999That principle was explained by this Court in Kramer v. Board of Adjustment of Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296-97 , 212 A.2d 153 (1965): In these highly controversial and oftentimes debatable zoning cases the courts must recognize that local officials ‘who are thoroughly familiar with then- community’s characteristics and interests and are the proper representatives of its people are undoubtedly the best equipped to pass initially on such applications for variance.’ Therefore, the law presumes that boards of adjustment and municipal governing bodies will act fairly and with proper motives and for v 1999That principle was explained by this Court in Kramer v. Board of Adjustment of Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296-97 , 212 A.2d 153 (1965): In these highly controversial and oftentimes debatable zoning cases the courts must recognize that local officials ‘who are thoroughly familiar with then- community’s characteristics and interests and are the proper representatives of its people are undoubtedly the best equipped to pass initially on such applications for variance.’ Therefore, the law presumes that boards of adjustment and municipal governing bodies will act fairly and with proper motives and for v	1	1999–1999
Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller green nj · 1996 2 sentences 1999Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ; Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 539 , 683 A. 2d 818 (1996). 1999Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ; Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 539 , 683 A. 2d 818 (1996).	1	1999–1999
Brett v. Great American Recreation, Inc. green nj · 1996 2 sentences 1998Thus, in a landowner-liability ease decided nearly a half-century ago, we said that “[t]he basis of liability is the foreseeability of harm, and the measure of duty is care in proportion to the foreseeable risk.” Just last term we noted the settled principle that “the common-law classifications of persons on land should be applied flexibly in assessing the landowner’s general tort obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others.” [Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, Inc., 147 N.J. 510, 534 , 688 A.2d 1018 (1997) (quoting Brett, supra, 144 N.J. at 508 , 677 A.2d 705 ) (Stein, J., dissenting) (c 1998Thus, in a landowner-liability ease decided nearly a half-century ago, we said that “[t]he basis of liability is the foreseeability of harm, and the measure of duty is care in proportion to the foreseeable risk.” Just last term we noted the settled principle that “the common-law classifications of persons on land should be applied flexibly in assessing the landowner’s general tort obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others.” [Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, Inc., 147 N.J. 510, 534 , 688 A.2d 1018 (1997) (quoting Brett, supra, 144 N.J. at 508 , 677 A.2d 705 ) (Stein, J., dissenting) (c	1	1998–1998
Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, Inc. green nj · 1997 2 sentences 1998Thus, in a landowner-liability ease decided nearly a half-century ago, we said that “[t]he basis of liability is the foreseeability of harm, and the measure of duty is care in proportion to the foreseeable risk.” Just last term we noted the settled principle that “the common-law classifications of persons on land should be applied flexibly in assessing the landowner’s general tort obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others.” [Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, Inc., 147 N.J. 510, 534 , 688 A.2d 1018 (1997) (quoting Brett, supra, 144 N.J. at 508 , 677 A.2d 705 ) (Stein, J., dissenting) (c 1998Thus, in a landowner-liability ease decided nearly a half-century ago, we said that “[t]he basis of liability is the foreseeability of harm, and the measure of duty is care in proportion to the foreseeable risk.” Just last term we noted the settled principle that “the common-law classifications of persons on land should be applied flexibly in assessing the landowner’s general tort obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others.” [Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, Inc., 147 N.J. 510, 534 , 688 A.2d 1018 (1997) (quoting Brett, supra, 144 N.J. at 508 , 677 A.2d 705 ) (Stein, J., dissenting) (c	1	1998–1998
Carvalho v. Toll Bros. and Developers green nj · 1996 2 sentences 1997Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565, 572 , 675 A.2d 209 (1996). 1997Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565, 572 , 675 A.2d 209 (1996).	1	1997–1997
Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co. green nj · 1952 2 sentences 1997See, e.g., id. at 438, 625 A. 2d 1110 ; Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 277 , 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982); Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 460-64 , 136 A. 2d 887 (1957); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45 , 86 A. 2d 777 (1952). 1997See, e.g., id. at 438, 625 A. 2d 1110 ; Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 277 , 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982); Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 460-64 , 136 A. 2d 887 (1957); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45 , 86 A. 2d 777 (1952).	1	1997–1997
Wytupeck v. City of Camden green nj · 1957 2 sentences 1997See, e.g., id. at 438, 625 A. 2d 1110 ; Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 277 , 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982); Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 460-64 , 136 A. 2d 887 (1957); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45 , 86 A. 2d 777 (1952). 1997See, e.g., id. at 438, 625 A. 2d 1110 ; Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 277 , 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982); Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 460-64 , 136 A. 2d 887 (1957); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45 , 86 A. 2d 777 (1952).	1	1997–1997
Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc. green nj · 1982 2 sentences 1997See, e.g., id. at 438, 625 A. 2d 1110 ; Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 277 , 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982); Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 460-64 , 136 A. 2d 887 (1957); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45 , 86 A. 2d 777 (1952). 1997See, e.g., id. at 438, 625 A. 2d 1110 ; Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 277 , 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982); Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 460-64 , 136 A. 2d 887 (1957); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45 , 86 A. 2d 777 (1952).	1	1997–1997
State v. State Supervisory Employees Association green nj · 1978 2 sentences 1996Moreover, in public-sector arbitration agreements, the validity of an arbitrator’s award necessarily must be measured against the overriding principle that “negotiated agreement with respect to matters beyond the lawful authority of the public employer is impermissible.” State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass’n, 78 N.J. 54, 79 , 393 A.2d 233 (1978). 1996Moreover, in public-sector arbitration agreements, the validity of an arbitrator’s award necessarily must be measured against the overriding principle that “negotiated agreement with respect to matters beyond the lawful authority of the public employer is impermissible.” State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass’n, 78 N.J. 54, 79 , 393 A.2d 233 (1978).	1	1996–1996
Walsh v. State green njtaxct · 1989 1 sentence 1995The overriding principle in each of these cases is that, except where, as in Walsh, supra, the New Jersey statute clearly indicates that New Jersey basis and federal basis are governed by different considerations, federal tax principles are to be applied for purposes of determining gain and loss under the Gross Income Tax Act.	1	1995–1995
State v. O'CONNOR green nj · 1987 2 sentences 1992E.g., State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621 , 575 A. 2d 855 (1990) (stating that the polestar of the Code is uniformity in sentencing); see State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 577 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989); State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 79 , 552 A. 2d 994 (1989); State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 405-06 , 522 A. 2d 423 (1987); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 , 498 A. 2d 1239 (1985). 1992E.g., State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621 , 575 A. 2d 855 (1990) (stating that the polestar of the Code is uniformity in sentencing); see State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 577 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989); State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 79 , 552 A. 2d 994 (1989); State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 405-06 , 522 A. 2d 423 (1987); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 , 498 A. 2d 1239 (1985).	1	1992–1992
State v. Towey green nj · 1989 2 sentences 1992E.g., State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621 , 575 A. 2d 855 (1990) (stating that the polestar of the Code is uniformity in sentencing); see State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 577 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989); State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 79 , 552 A. 2d 994 (1989); State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 405-06 , 522 A. 2d 423 (1987); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 , 498 A. 2d 1239 (1985). 1992E.g., State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621 , 575 A. 2d 855 (1990) (stating that the polestar of the Code is uniformity in sentencing); see State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 577 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989); State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 79 , 552 A. 2d 994 (1989); State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 405-06 , 522 A. 2d 423 (1987); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 , 498 A. 2d 1239 (1985).	1	1992–1992
State v. Pineda green nj · 1990 2 sentences 1992E.g., State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621 , 575 A. 2d 855 (1990) (stating that the polestar of the Code is uniformity in sentencing); see State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 577 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989); State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 79 , 552 A. 2d 994 (1989); State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 405-06 , 522 A. 2d 423 (1987); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 , 498 A. 2d 1239 (1985). 1992E.g., State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621 , 575 A. 2d 855 (1990) (stating that the polestar of the Code is uniformity in sentencing); see State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 577 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989); State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 79 , 552 A. 2d 994 (1989); State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 405-06 , 522 A. 2d 423 (1987); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 , 498 A. 2d 1239 (1985).	1	1992–1992
State v. Yarbough red nj · 1985	1	1992–1992
D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp. green njsuperctappdiv · 1985	1	1991–1991
Fantony v. Fantony green nj · 1956	1	1991–1991
Matter of Baby M. red nj · 1988	1	1991–1991
Penry v. Lynaugh red scotus · 1989	1	1990–1990
State v. Zola green nj · 1988	1	1990–1990
United States v. Ross green scotus · 1982	1	1989–1989
California v. Carney green scotus · 1985	1	1989–1989
Foldi v. Jeffries green nj · 1983	1	1984–1984
Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti green nj · 1965	1	1968–1968

Where else courts name it

LA 70 (1974–2024) CA 61 (1972–2026) OH 45 (1983–2026) FL 43 (1961–2025) TX 42 (1982–2023) MI 37 (1966–2026) NY 36 (1956–2024) SC 32 (1986–2023) PA 30 (1966–2026) IL 29 (1964–2020) NJ 28 (1953–2025) MT 23 (1959–2020) VA 23 (1985–2026) WA 22 (1977–2025) MO 16 (1959–2024) IA 14 (1982–2023) WI 13 (1955–2025) TN 12 (1980–2024) MN 11 (1984–2005) OR 10 (1980–2024) CO 9 (1974–2005) CT 9 (1980–2015) MD 9 (1984–2011) NC 8 (1980–2026) AR 7 (1992–2016) MA 7 (1980–2025) KS 7 (1969–2020) UT 7 (1987–2022) KY 6 (1961–2023) RI 6 (2004–2017) NM 5 (1991–2020) ND 4 (1998–2013) GA 4 (1983–2025) ME 4 (1975–2018) AZ 4 (1977–2015) ID 4 (1980–2025) NH 4 (1993–2018) OK 4 (1983–2018) WV 4 (1975–2019) IN 4 (1976–2014) HI 4 (2005–2014) SD 3 (1984–1992) AK 3 (1979–2018) AL 3 (1984–2015) MS 3 (2001–2024) DC 3 (1987–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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