overriding principle in Pennsylvania

2019See Miller, 440 U.S. at 137 - 38; In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 755 (Pa. 1990) (holding, “CYS has the duty to give financial support to dependent children”); In re Lowry, 484 A.2d at 388 (holding, “the court is guided by the overriding principle of acting ‘to - 15 - J-S23030-19 provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children’” under the Juvenile Act (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301)).

2019See Miller, 440 U.S. at 137 - 38; In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 755 (Pa. 1990) (holding, “CYS has the duty to give financial support to dependent children”); In re Lowry, 484 A.2d at 388 (holding, “the court is guided by the overriding principle of acting ‘to - 15 - J-S23030-19 provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children’” under the Juvenile Act (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301)).

2026“The overriding principle in determining if any evidence, including demonstrative, should be admitted involves a weighing of the probative value versus prejudicial effect.” Serge, 896 A.2d at 1177 ; see also Pa.R.E. 403, supra. Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows: (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. (1) Prohibited Uses.

2023We have held that the trial court must decide first if the evidence is relevant and, if so, whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2006).

2019See Miller, 440 U.S. at 137 - 38; In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 755 (Pa. 1990) (holding, “CYS has the duty to give financial support to dependent children”); In re Lowry, 484 A.2d at 388 (holding, “the court is guided by the overriding principle of acting ‘to - 15 - J-S23030-19 provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children’” under the Juvenile Act (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301)).

2019See Miller, 440 U.S. at 137 - 38; In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 755 (Pa. 1990) (holding, “CYS has the duty to give financial support to dependent children”); In re Lowry, 484 A.2d at 388 (holding, “the court is guided by the overriding principle of acting ‘to - 15 - J-S23030-19 provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children’” under the Juvenile Act (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301)).

2019See Miller, 440 U.S. at 137 - 38; In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 755 (Pa. 1990) (holding, “CYS has the duty to give financial support to dependent children”); In re Lowry, 484 A.2d at 388 (holding, “the court is guided by the overriding principle of acting ‘to - 15 - J-S23030-19 provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children’” under the Juvenile Act (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301)).

2019See Miller, 440 U.S. at 137 - 38; In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 755 (Pa. 1990) (holding, “CYS has the duty to give financial support to dependent children”); In re Lowry, 484 A.2d at 388 (holding, “the court is guided by the overriding principle of acting ‘to - 15 - J-S23030-19 provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children’” under the Juvenile Act (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301)).

2017“The overriding standard for a variance is unnecessary hardship.” Doris Terry Revocable Living Trust v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 873 A.2d 57, 63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

2017“The overriding standard for a variance is unnecessary hardship.” Doris Terry Revocable Living Trust v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 873 A.2d 57, 63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

2013Appellee maintains that “the courts of this Commonwealth have consistently found that a court acting pursuant to the Juvenile Act has broad discretionary powers guided by the overriding principle of acting to provide care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming with the provisions of the Juvenile Act.” Brief for Appellee at 8 (quoting In re Frederick F., 400 Pa.Super. 542 , 583 A.2d 1248, 1253 (1990)).

2013Appellee maintains that “the courts of this Commonwealth have consistently found that a court acting pursuant to the Juvenile Act has broad discretionary powers guided by the overriding principle of acting to provide care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming with the provisions of the Juvenile Act.” Brief for Appellee at 8 (quoting In re Frederick F., 400 Pa.Super. 542 , 583 A.2d 1248, 1253 (1990)).

2004Such a proposition loses sight of "the basic overriding principle of *202 American government — that all power is in the people." Id. at 466-67, 554 A.2d at 903-04 (citations omitted).

2004Such a proposition loses sight of “the basic overriding principle of American government — that all power is in the people.” Id. at 466-67, 554 A.2d at 903-04 (citations omitted).

2005When the goals given in support of contract clauses like this are used as a sword to strike down access to justice instead of as a shield against prohibitive costs, we must defer to the overriding principle of access to justice.” Lytle, 810 A.2d at 667 -68 (quoting Mendez, 111 Wash App. at 462-65, 45 P.3d at 603-605).

2004Lytle, 810 A.2d at 667 -68 (quoting Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 111 Wash.App. 446 , 45 P.3d 594 (2002)). ¶ 30 As applied to facts of this case, the enforcement of the arbitration provision would work to deny the allegedly injured parties access to justice and is therefore unconscionable. 9 We believe that this determination of unconscionability satisfies the FAA in that it represents grounds in both law and equity for the defeat of the arbitration provision. ¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, order affirmed. 1 .

2003Accord Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596, 602 (1998). [7] "To allow otherwise would abrogate the overriding rule, when the inference is statutory, that a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on him and may not argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied hypothetically to third parties." MacPherson, 752 A.2d at 390 . [8] This analysis stands in contrast to the analysis which obtains where the constitutionality of a mandatory presumption is at issue; there, "the courts examine the presumption on its face to determi

2003Accord Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596, 602 (1998). [7] "To allow otherwise would abrogate the overriding rule, when the inference is statutory, that a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on him and may not argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied hypothetically to third parties." MacPherson, 752 A.2d at 390 . [8] This analysis stands in contrast to the analysis which obtains where the constitutionality of a mandatory presumption is at issue; there, "the courts examine the presumption on its face to determi

2004In re T.R., J.M., C.R., & C.R., 445 Pa.Super. 553 , 665 A.2d 1260, 1265 (1995) (alteration in original) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 557 Pa. 99 , 108, 731 A.2d 1276 , 1281 (1999); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b). ¶25 In light of the purpose and mandates of the Juvenile Act, we fail to see how C.M.T.’s “treatment, reformation and rehabilitation” can proceed without a full and thorough inquiry into the circumstances of her disabilities and her very specific needs.

2004In re T.R., J.M., C.R., & C.R., 445 Pa.Super. 553 , 665 A.2d 1260, 1265 (1995) (alteration in original) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 557 Pa. 99 , 108, 731 A.2d 1276 , 1281 (1999); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b). ¶25 In light of the purpose and mandates of the Juvenile Act, we fail to see how C.M.T.’s “treatment, reformation and rehabilitation” can proceed without a full and thorough inquiry into the circumstances of her disabilities and her very specific needs.

2003Accord Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596, 602 (1998). [7] "To allow otherwise would abrogate the overriding rule, when the inference is statutory, that a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on him and may not argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied hypothetically to third parties." MacPherson, 752 A.2d at 390 . [8] This analysis stands in contrast to the analysis which obtains where the constitutionality of a mandatory presumption is at issue; there, "the courts examine the presumption on its face to determi

2003Accord Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596, 602 (1998). [7] "To allow otherwise would abrogate the overriding rule, when the inference is statutory, that a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on him and may not argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied hypothetically to third parties." MacPherson, 752 A.2d at 390 . [8] This analysis stands in contrast to the analysis which obtains where the constitutionality of a mandatory presumption is at issue; there, "the courts examine the presumption on its face to determi

2003"To allow otherwise would abrogate the overriding rule, when the inference is statutory, that a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on him and may not argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied hypothetically to third parties.” MacPherson, 752 A.2d at 390 . .

2003Accord Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596, 602 (1998). [7] "To allow otherwise would abrogate the overriding rule, when the inference is statutory, that a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on him and may not argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied hypothetically to third parties." MacPherson, 752 A.2d at 390 . [8] This analysis stands in contrast to the analysis which obtains where the constitutionality of a mandatory presumption is at issue; there, "the courts examine the presumption on its face to determi

2000Id. at 154-55 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 ; Knup v. City of Philadelphia, 386 Pa. 350 , 126 A.2d 399, 400 (1956).

2000Id. at 154-55 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 ; Knup v. City of Philadelphia, 386 Pa. 350 , 126 A.2d 399, 400 (1956).

1991See Keefe v. Spangenberg, 533 F.Supp. 49 (D.Okla.1981).

1990See also Janet D. v. Carros, 240 Pa.Super. 291 , 362 A.2d 1060 (1976) (the juvenile court and the child’s custodian share the responsibility of developing and carrying out a plan of treatment which is appropriate to the individualized needs of each child).

1990See also Janet D. v. Carros, 240 Pa.Super. 291 , 362 A.2d 1060 (1976) (the juvenile court and the child’s custodian share the responsibility of developing and carrying out a plan of treatment which is appropriate to the individualized needs of each child).

1988See Pachesky v. Getz, *145 353 Pa.Super. 505 , 510 A.2d 776 (1986); Whitner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448 , 263 A.2d 889 (1970) (plurality). 3.

1988See Pachesky v. Getz, *145 353 Pa.Super. 505 , 510 A.2d 776 (1986); Whitner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448 , 263 A.2d 889 (1970) (plurality). 3.

1980New York Telephone and Telegraph v. PSC, 309 N.Y. 569, 579-580 , 132 N.E.2d 847, 850-51 (1956).

1980New York Telephone and Telegraph v. PSC, 309 N.Y. 569, 579-580 , 132 N.E.2d 847, 850-51 (1956).

1977As Justice (then *373 Judge) Manderino stated in Akron v. Pa. Public Utility Comm., 2 Pa.Cmwlth. at 641 (1971), "[t]he P.U.C. issues `certificates of public convenience;' not `certificates for the convenience of public utilities.'" (emphasis in original) The judgment of the Commonwealth Court should be reversed and the Commission order sustained.