overriding principle in Oregon

2024The Court explained that, if the instruction was understood to create a “conclu- sive presumption” on the intent element—as the petitioner argued—then it violated due process because it “conflict[ed] with the overriding presumption of innocence with which Cite as 336 Or App 684 (2024) 701 the law endows the accused and which extends to every ele- ment of the crime,” as well as “invad[ing] the factfinding function which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury.” Id. at 523 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

2024The Court explained that, if the instruction was understood to create a “conclu- sive presumption” on the intent element—as the petitioner argued—then it violated due process because it “conflict[ed] with the overriding presumption of innocence with which Cite as 336 Or App 684 (2024) 701 the law endows the accused and which extends to every ele- ment of the crime,” as well as “invad[ing] the factfinding function which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury.” Id. at 523 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

2012The state petitions for reconsideration of our decision in State v. Smith, 236 Or App 5 , 237 P3d 853 (2010), arguing that our conclusion that defendant’s consent to a search of his person was invalid is erroneous in light of the Supreme Court’s overriding analysis in State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297 , 244 P3d 360 (2010) (Ashbaugh II).

2012The state petitions for reconsideration of our decision in State v. Smith, 236 Or App 5 , 237 P3d 853 (2010), arguing that our conclusion that defendant’s consent to a search of his person was invalid is erroneous in light of the Supreme Court’s overriding analysis in State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297 , 244 P3d 360 (2010) (Ashbaugh II).

2012The state petitions for reconsideration of our decision in State v. Smith, 236 Or App 5 , 237 P3d 853 (2010), arguing that our conclusion that defendant’s consent to a search of his person was invalid is erroneous in light of the Supreme Court’s overriding analysis in State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297 , 244 P3d 360 (2010) (Ashbaugh II).

2012The state petitions for reconsideration of our decision in State v. Smith, 236 Or App 5 , 237 P3d 853 (2010), arguing that our conclusion that defendant’s consent to a search of his person was invalid is erroneous in light of the Supreme Court’s overriding analysis in State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297 , 244 P3d 360 (2010) (Ashbaugh II).

2012In McKay Creek Valley Association v. Washington County, 122 Or App 59, 64 , 857 P2d 167 (1993), we held that “the overriding principle of Beck is that issues in land use cases must be brought to finality at the earliest possible opportunity.” See also Fisher v. City of Gresham, 69 Or App 411 , 414 n 1, 685 P2d 486 (1984) (“It is clear that the legislative policy in land use cases is that ‘time is of the essence in reaching final decisions in matters involving land use,’ ORS 197.805, and that disputes involving land use decisions ought not be decided piecemeal in unending appeals.”).

2012In McKay Creek Valley Association v. Washington County, 122 Or App 59, 64 , 857 P2d 167 (1993), we held that “the overriding principle of Beck is that issues in land use cases must be brought to finality at the earliest possible opportunity.” See also Fisher v. City of Gresham, 69 Or App 411 , 414 n 1, 685 P2d 486 (1984) (“It is clear that the legislative policy in land use cases is that ‘time is of the essence in reaching final decisions in matters involving land use,’ ORS 197.805, and that disputes involving land use decisions ought not be decided piecemeal in unending appeals.”).

2002Id. at 106 (citing Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp Prob 401, 404 (1958)).

2000That maxim “serves the overriding rule that the role of courts in construing ambiguous contracts is to ascertain the parties’ intent.” Delay v. Patel, 80 Or App 620, 624 , 723 P2d 352 , rev den 302 Or 299 (1986).

2000That maxim “serves the overriding rule that the role of courts in construing ambiguous contracts is to ascertain the parties’ intent.” Delay v. Patel, 80 Or App 620, 624 , 723 P2d 352 , rev den 302 Or 299 (1986).

1993We held that her injuries were compensable under the dual-purpose doctrine, because the business mission was accomplished by the plaintiff arranging for a friend to pick up the treats and because the plaintiffs supervisors regarded the trip to be “school-related.” We emphasized in Marshall that the overriding inquiry in deciding whether the dual-purpose doctrine applies is “whether the business aspect of the trip was significant enough to have necessitated it, independently of the employee’s personal purpose.” 112 Or App at 390 .

1993That is merely a restatement of what we said in Rosencrantz v. Insurance Service, supra. The only additional comment that we made in Marshall was that “the employer’s later directive to another employee to complete the mission is one possible basis, but not the exclusive one, for determining that the injured employee’s journey had a significant business purpose.” 112 Or App at 390 .

1992However, the overriding principle in the construction of wills, reiterated in LaGrand, is that an unambiguous “will speaks for itself and resort to extrinsic evidence may not be had to ascertain a testator’s intent.” 47 Or App at 84 .

1992We explained in Barrett v. Emanuel Hospital, supra: “Under its traditional formulation, res ipsa loquitur permits negligence to be inferred against a defendant if the injury (1) is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) is caused by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (3) is not attributable to voluntary action or contribution by the plaintiff.” 64 Or App at 638-39 . 4 We also noted that, under the second element, the inquiry is more about the defendant’s conduct than about his control of the instrumentality

1992We explained in Barrett v. Emanuel Hospital, supra: “Under its traditional formulation, res ipsa loquitur permits negligence to be inferred against a defendant if the injury (1) is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) is caused by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (3) is not attributable to voluntary action or contribution by the plaintiff.” 64 Or App at 638-39 . 4 We also noted that, under the second element, the inquiry is more about the defendant’s conduct than about his control of the instrumentality

1992We explained in Barrett v. Emanuel Hospital, supra: “Under its traditional formulation, res ipsa loquitur permits negligence to be inferred against a defendant if the injury (1) is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) is caused by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (3) is not attributable to voluntary action or contribution by the plaintiff.” 64 Or App at 638-39 . 4 We also noted that, under the second element, the inquiry is more about the defendant’s conduct than about his control of the instrumentality

1992We explained in Barrett v. Emanuel Hospital, supra: “Under its traditional formulation, res ipsa loquitur permits negligence to be inferred against a defendant if the injury (1) is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) is caused by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (3) is not attributable to voluntary action or contribution by the plaintiff.” 64 Or App at 638-39 . 4 We also noted that, under the second element, the inquiry is more about the defendant’s conduct than about his control of the instrumentality

1992In Hartman v. Pendleton, 96 Or 503 , 186 P 572 , 190 P 339 (1920), the court stated that principle in the context of a dispute over the description of a beneficiary in a will: “Where the language employed in the will is clear, and of well-defined force and meaning, extrinsic evidence of what was intended in fact cannot be adduced to explain, qualify, enlarge or contradict this language, but the will must stand as written.” 96 Or at 507 .

1992In Hartman v. Pendleton, 96 Or 503 , 186 P 572 , 190 P 339 (1920), the court stated that principle in the context of a dispute over the description of a beneficiary in a will: “Where the language employed in the will is clear, and of well-defined force and meaning, extrinsic evidence of what was intended in fact cannot be adduced to explain, qualify, enlarge or contradict this language, but the will must stand as written.” 96 Or at 507 .

1980In State v. Flores, 31 Or App 187 , 570 P2d 94 (1977), we stated: *898 "* * * In approaching a motion for a mistrial the trial court must first determine if the remarks presented to the jury would have a likelihood of prejudicing the rights of the defendant to have a fair and impartial trial. * * * The overriding inquiry is whether the defendant can receive a fair trial if it were to continue.” 31 Or App at 190.

1980In State v. Flores, 31 Or App 187 , 570 P2d 94 (1977), we stated: *898 "* * * In approaching a motion for a mistrial the trial court must first determine if the remarks presented to the jury would have a likelihood of prejudicing the rights of the defendant to have a fair and impartial trial. * * * The overriding inquiry is whether the defendant can receive a fair trial if it were to continue.” 31 Or App at 190.