12 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Livesay v. Keatongreen2 sentences2024However, the overriding principle pertaining to resulting trusts is that “the trust must arise at the time of the purchase, attach to the title at that time and not arise out of any subsequent contract or transaction.” In re Estate of Jones, 183 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Livesay v. Keaton, 611 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)); see also Frazier v. Pomeroy, No. M2005-00911-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3542534 , at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2006); Smalling v. Terrell, 943 S.W.2d [at] 400 []. 2017However, the overriding principle pertaining to resulting trusts is that “the trust must arise at the time of the purchase, attach to the title at that time and not arise out of any subsequent contract or transaction.” In re Estate of Jones, 183 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Livesay v. Keaton, 611 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)); see also Frazier v. Pomeroy, No. M2005- 00911-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3542534 , at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2006); Smalling v. Terrell, 943 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). | 3 | 3 |
In Re Estate of Jonesgreen2 sentences2024However, the overriding principle pertaining to resulting trusts is that “the trust must arise at the time of the purchase, attach to the title at that time and not arise out of any subsequent contract or transaction.” In re Estate of Jones, 183 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Livesay v. Keaton, 611 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)); see also Frazier v. Pomeroy, No. M2005-00911-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3542534 , at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2006); Smalling v. Terrell, 943 S.W.2d [at] 400 []. 2017However, the overriding principle pertaining to resulting trusts is that “the trust must arise at the time of the purchase, attach to the title at that time and not arise out of any subsequent contract or transaction.” In re Estate of Jones, 183 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Livesay v. Keaton, 611 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)); see also Frazier v. Pomeroy, No. M2005- 00911-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3542534 , at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2006); Smalling v. Terrell, 943 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). | 2 | 2 |
Smalling v. Terrellgreen2 sentences2024Resulting trusts can be proven by parol evidence, Smalling, 943 S.W.2d at 400 (citing Estate of Wardell[, ex rel. 2017However, the overriding principle pertaining to resulting trusts is that “the trust must arise at the time of the purchase, attach to the title at that time and not arise out of any subsequent contract or transaction.” In re Estate of Jones, 183 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Livesay v. Keaton, 611 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)); see also Frazier v. Pomeroy, No. M2005- 00911-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3542534 , at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2006); Smalling v. Terrell, 943 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.green2 sentences2020Ed. 2d 218 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court has disapproved the use of mandatory conclusive presumptions not merely because it conflicts with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused, but also because it invades the fact-finding function which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury[.]” (internal citations and alterations omitted)) (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523 ); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 , 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2872 , 57 L. 2020Ed. 2d 218 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court has disapproved the use of mandatory conclusive presumptions not merely because it conflicts with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused, but also because it invades the fact-finding function which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury[.]” (internal citations and alterations omitted)) (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523 ); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 , 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2872 , 57 L. | 1 | 1 |
Marie v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Ed. 2d 854 (1978) (“[A] defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption[.]”); cf. Marie v. State, 204 Tenn. 197, 204 , 319 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tenn. 1958) (quoting Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., § 43, p. 66) (“‘So, though the decisions are not harmonious, the better and more reasonable view is that the law will not countenance any presumption, which by overcoming the presumption of innocence will cast the b 2020Ed. 2d 854 (1978) (“[A] defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption[.]”); cf. Marie v. State, 204 Tenn. 197, 204 , 319 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tenn. 1958) (quoting Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., § 43, p. 66) (“‘So, though the decisions are not harmonious, the better and more reasonable view is that the law will not countenance any presumption, which by overcoming the presumption of innocence will cast the b | 1 | 1 |
California v. Carneygreen1 sentence2017Accordingly, ―the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.‖ State v. Leveye, 796 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tenn. 1990) (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Bright v. Brightgreen1 sentence2017Resulting trusts can be proven by parol evidence, Smalling, 943 S.W.2d at 400 (citing Estate of Wardell, 674 S.W.2d at 295; Bright v. Bright, 729 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)), with the following caveat: A trust may rest upon parol agreement where the declaration of trust is made prior to or contemporaneous with the transfer of the interest in realty. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leveyegreen1 sentence2017Accordingly, ―the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.‖ State v. Leveye, 796 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tenn. 1990) (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Dunn v. Hackettgreen1 sentence2005See Dunn v. Hackett, 833 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Johnson v. State, 531 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn.1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1998Id. at 242-44 . 1998Id. at 242-44 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
1 sentence2020Ed. 2d 218 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court has disapproved the use of mandatory conclusive presumptions not merely because it conflicts with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused, but also because it invades the fact-finding function which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury[.]” (internal citations and alterations omitted)) (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523 ); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 , 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2872 , 57 L. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Francisco Toscanino
green
1 sentence1993The court recognized the Ker-Frisbie doctrine as the general rule but found it “subject to the overriding principle that where the Government itself secures the defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction through use of cruel and inhuman conduct amounting to a patent violation of due process principles, it may not take advantage of its own denial of the defendant’s constitutional rights.... [A] court must ‘divest itself of jurisdiction_’” United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d at 70 (citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275 ). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Rafael Lira
green
2 sentences1993The court recognized the Ker-Frisbie doctrine as the general rule but found it “subject to the overriding principle that where the Government itself secures the defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction through use of cruel and inhuman conduct amounting to a patent violation of due process principles, it may not take advantage of its own denial of the defendant’s constitutional rights.... [A] court must ‘divest itself of jurisdiction_’” United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d at 70 (citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275 ). 1993Essential is the finding that “the gross mistreatment leading to the forcible abduction of the defendant was perpetrated by representatives of the United States Government.” Lira, 515 F.2d at 70 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.
green
2 sentences1984Certainly it cannot be argued that the absence of any language from the Act prohibiting devices whereby employers may circumvent their duties under the Act can be interpreted to mean that retaliatory discharge is less repugnant to the public policy of this State than it is to that of Indiana.” Id. 23 Ill.Dec. at 564 , 384 N.E.2d at 358 . 1984Certainly it cannot be argued that the absence of any language from the Act prohibiting devices whereby employers may circumvent their duties under the Act can be interpreted to mean that retaliatory discharge is less repugnant to the public policy of this State than it is to that of Indiana.” Id. 23 Ill.Dec. at 564 , 384 N.E.2d at 358 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Morissette v. United States
green
2 sentences1980In either case, ‘ this presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.’ 342 U.S. at 274-275 , 72 S.Ct. at 255-256 . 1980In either case, ‘ this presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.’ 342 U.S. at 274-275 , 72 S.Ct. at 255-256 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.