overriding principle in California

2020(Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San Buenaventura (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1184 (Channelkeeper).) The rule of reasonableness, codified in the California Constitution since 1928, is “the overriding principle governing the use of water in California.” (Forni, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 750 .) This rule limits “[t]he right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State” to “such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or un

2020Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water of the stream to which the owner’s land is riparian under reasonable methods of diversion and use, or as depriving any appropriator of water to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled.”

2020(Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San Buenaventura (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1184 (Channelkeeper).) The rule of reasonableness, codified in the California Constitution since 1928, is “the overriding principle governing the use of water in California.” (Forni, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 750 .) This rule limits “[t]he right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State” to “such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or un

2020(Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San Buenaventura (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1184 (Channelkeeper).) The rule of reasonableness, codified in the California Constitution since 1928, is “the overriding principle governing the use of water in California.” (Forni, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 750 .) This rule limits “[t]he right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State” to “such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or un

1984If the jury were instructed that the law conclusively presumes the intention of the accused solely from his or her voluntary acts, it would "`effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense'" and would "`conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.'" ( Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510, 522 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 49-50 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 ], quoting from Morissette v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246, 274-275 [ 96 L.Ed. 288, 306-307 , 72 S.Ct. 240 ]; original italics omitted.) Where an ap

1984If the jury were instructed that the law conclusively presumes the intention of the accused solely from his or her voluntary acts, it would "`effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense'" and would "`conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.'" ( Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510, 522 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 49-50 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 ], quoting from Morissette v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246, 274-275 [ 96 L.Ed. 288, 306-307 , 72 S.Ct. 240 ]; original italics omitted.) Where an ap

1989Prejudice The analysis for prejudice from an erroneous instruction regarding the burden of proof is particularly delicate because such an instruction may “conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.” (Morissette v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246, 275 [ 96 L.Ed. 288, 307 , 72 S.Ct. 240 ].) It may also invade the fact-finding function of the jury.

1989Prejudice The analysis for prejudice from an erroneous instruction regarding the burden of proof is particularly delicate because such an instruction may “conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.” (Morissette v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246, 275 [ 96 L.Ed. 288, 307 , 72 S.Ct. 240 ].) It may also invade the fact-finding function of the jury.

1987As the Supreme Court has explained, "reasonableness' is the overriding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment...." ( Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 559 [ 56 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Even searches "supported by a warrant issued on probable cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to be seized" are unlawful if executed in an unreasonable manner. ( Id., at p. 560 [ 56 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ]; accord Dalia v. United States (1979) 441 U.S. 238, 258 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 177, 193 , 99 S.Ct. 1682 ]; United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285 U.S. 452, 464-465 [ 76 L

1987As the Supreme Court has explained, "reasonableness' is the overriding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment...." ( Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 559 [ 56 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Even searches "supported by a warrant issued on probable cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to be seized" are unlawful if executed in an unreasonable manner. ( Id., at p. 560 [ 56 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ]; accord Dalia v. United States (1979) 441 U.S. 238, 258 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 177, 193 , 99 S.Ct. 1682 ]; United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285 U.S. 452, 464-465 [ 76 L

1979Preemption Certain fundamental principles expressed by the United States Supreme Court guide our analysis of the preemption issue. (1) When respective federal and state sovereignties are juxtaposed, "the proper approach is to reconcile `the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'" ( Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts thereby attempt "the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce....

1979Preemption Certain fundamental principles expressed by the United States Supreme Court guide our analysis of the preemption issue. (1) When respective federal and state sovereignties are juxtaposed, "the proper approach is to reconcile `the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'" ( Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts thereby attempt "the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce....

1983(Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts should attempt “the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce . . . .” (Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 253 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 272 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ]; See also Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 93 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 733 , 603 P.2d 1329 ].) 2. “[F]ederal regulation of an area of commerce may preempt state actions upon the same subject matter if (1) there is a

1983(Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts should attempt “the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce . . . .” (Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 253 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 272 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ]; See also Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 93 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 733 , 603 P.2d 1329 ].) 2. “[F]ederal regulation of an area of commerce may preempt state actions upon the same subject matter if (1) there is a

1979Preemption Certain fundamental principles expressed by the United States Supreme Court guide our analysis of the preemption issue. (1) When respective federal and state sovereignties are juxtaposed, "the proper approach is to reconcile `the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'" ( Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts thereby attempt "the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce....

1979Preemption Certain fundamental principles expressed by the United States Supreme Court guide our analysis of the preemption issue. (1) When respective federal and state sovereignties are juxtaposed, "the proper approach is to reconcile `the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'" ( Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts thereby attempt "the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce....

1979Preemption Certain fundamental principles expressed by the United States Supreme Court guide our analysis of the preemption issue. (1) When respective federal and state sovereignties are juxtaposed, "the proper approach is to reconcile `the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'" ( Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts thereby attempt "the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce....

1979Preemption Certain fundamental principles expressed by the United States Supreme Court guide our analysis of the preemption issue. (1) When respective federal and state sovereignties are juxtaposed, "the proper approach is to reconcile `the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'" ( Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts thereby attempt "the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce....

1983(Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts should attempt “the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce . . . .” (Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 253 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 272 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ]; See also Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 93 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 733 , 603 P.2d 1329 ].) 2. “[F]ederal regulation of an area of commerce may preempt state actions upon the same subject matter if (1) there is a

1983(Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 127 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 359 , 94 S.Ct. 383 ].) The courts should attempt “the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce . . . .” (Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 253 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 272 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ]; See also Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 93 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 733 , 603 P.2d 1329 ].) 2. “[F]ederal regulation of an area of commerce may preempt state actions upon the same subject matter if (1) there is a

1972While these appellate principles are well established, they are subject to the overriding exception in a criminal case, impelled by the Constitution, that a waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel will not be implied from a silent record, that appellant’s right to counsel does not depend upon a request for an attorney and that it can be foregone only by an express, knowing and intelligent waiver appearing in the record (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146-147 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 465 P.2d 257 ]; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 620-621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 ,

1972While these appellate principles are well established, they are subject to the overriding exception in a criminal case, impelled by the Constitution, that a waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel will not be implied from a silent record, that appellant’s right to counsel does not depend upon a request for an attorney and that it can be foregone only by an express, knowing and intelligent waiver appearing in the record (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146-147 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 465 P.2d 257 ]; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 620-621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 ,

1972While these appellate principles are well established, they are subject to the overriding exception in a criminal case, impelled by the Constitution, that a waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel will not be implied from a silent record, that appellant’s right to counsel does not depend upon a request for an attorney and that it can be foregone only by an express, knowing and intelligent waiver appearing in the record (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146-147 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 465 P.2d 257 ]; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 620-621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 ,

1972While these appellate principles are well established, they are subject to the overriding exception in a criminal case, impelled by the Constitution, that a waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel will not be implied from a silent record, that appellant’s right to counsel does not depend upon a request for an attorney and that it can be foregone only by an express, knowing and intelligent waiver appearing in the record (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146-147 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 465 P.2d 257 ]; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 620-621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 ,

1972While these appellate principles are well established, they are subject to the overriding exception in a criminal case, impelled by the Constitution, that a waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel will not be implied from a silent record, that appellant’s right to counsel does not depend upon a request for an attorney and that it can be foregone only by an express, knowing and intelligent waiver appearing in the record (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146-147 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 465 P.2d 257 ]; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 620-621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 ,

1972While these appellate principles are well established, they are subject to the overriding exception in a criminal case, impelled by the Constitution, that a waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel will not be implied from a silent record, that appellant’s right to counsel does not depend upon a request for an attorney and that it can be foregone only by an express, knowing and intelligent waiver appearing in the record (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146-147 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 465 P.2d 257 ]; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 620-621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 ,

2025X, § 2.) Scope and Effect Section 2 declares that the right to use water “does not extend to unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or … diversion of water.” (Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 351, 367 .) The mandates of section 2 “are plain, they are positive, and admit of no exception.” (Ibid.) They “apply to the use of all water, under whatever right the use may be enjoyed” and to “every method of diversion.” (Ibid.) Indeed, section 2’s reasonable use requirement “is now ‘the overriding principle governing the use of water in California.’ ” (Light v. State Water Resources C

2014X, § 2.) As the Supreme Court recognized soon after Article X, Section 2 was added, the rule limiting water use to that reasonably necessary “applies] to the use of all water, under whatever right the use may be enjoyed.” (Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 351, 367-368 [ 40 P.2d 486 ] (Peabody).) The rule of reasonableness is now “the overriding principle governing the use of water in California.” (People ex rel.

2025X, § 2.) Scope and Effect Section 2 declares that the right to use water “does not extend to unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or … diversion of water.” (Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 351, 367 .) The mandates of section 2 “are plain, they are positive, and admit of no exception.” (Ibid.) They “apply to the use of all water, under whatever right the use may be enjoyed” and to “every method of diversion.” (Ibid.) Indeed, section 2’s reasonable use requirement “is now ‘the overriding principle governing the use of water in California.’ ” (Light v. State Water Resources C

2020Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water of the stream to which the owner’s land is riparian under reasonable methods of diversion and use, or as depriving any appropriator of water to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled.”

2012(Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 148 [“[In Signal Oil] we concluded that the order suffered from no jurisdictional defect because the invalidity of the agreement did not appear upon the face of the order.”].) Indeed, by repeatedly arguing that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding that the customer list attached to the Stipulated Injunction is not a trade secret, Keck and WP Solutions implicitly concede that the Stipulated Injunction is facially valid.

1996We acknowledged in Berry that Signal Oil held that an injunctive order enforcing an invalid contract, the invalidity of which is not apparent on its face, is not an injunction issued “in excess of jurisdiction.” (Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 148 .) But we also explained in Berry the overriding principle that an order unconstitutional on its face is in excess of jurisdiction and cannot sustain a contempt judgment.

2011Appeals Bd (2005) 35 Cal.4th 24, 34 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 179 , 105 P.3d 544 ].) Lastly, we adhere to the overriding principle that “all workers’ compensation statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the injured worker.” (Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal.4th 367, 373 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 246 , 96 P.3d 496 ], citing § 3202.) B.

2011Appeals Bd (2005) 35 Cal.4th 24, 34 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 179 , 105 P.3d 544 ].) Lastly, we adhere to the overriding principle that “all workers’ compensation statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the injured worker.” (Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal.4th 367, 373 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 246 , 96 P.3d 496 ], citing § 3202.) B.

1980The overriding principle here applicable is that when a statute omits a specific matter from its coverage, the inclusion of such matter in another statute on a related subject demonstrates an intent to omit the matter from the coverage of the statute in which it is not mentioned. ( Marsh v. Edwards Theatres Circuit, Inc. (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d 881, 891 [ 134 Cal. Rptr. 844 ].) The Commission argues that because the shareholder owner of a stock cooperative has an accretion of homeowner-type benefits which have accrued in recent years, a cooperative conversion is essentially indistinguishable fro

1980The overriding principle here applicable is that when a statute omits a specific matter from its coverage, the inclusion of such matter in another statute on a related subject demonstrates an intent to omit the matter from the coverage of the statute in which it is not mentioned. ( Marsh v. Edwards Theatres Circuit, Inc. (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d 881, 891 [ 134 Cal. Rptr. 844 ].) The Commission argues that because the shareholder owner of a stock cooperative has an accretion of homeowner-type benefits which have accrued in recent years, a cooperative conversion is essentially indistinguishable fro

1972While these appellate principles are well established, they are subject to the overriding exception in a criminal case, impelled by the Constitution, that a waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel will not be implied from a silent record, that appellant’s right to counsel does not depend upon a request for an attorney and that it can be foregone only by an express, knowing and intelligent waiver appearing in the record (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146-147 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 465 P.2d 257 ]; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 620-621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 ,

1972While these appellate principles are well established, they are subject to the overriding exception in a criminal case, impelled by the Constitution, that a waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel will not be implied from a silent record, that appellant’s right to counsel does not depend upon a request for an attorney and that it can be foregone only by an express, knowing and intelligent waiver appearing in the record (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146-147 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 465 P.2d 257 ]; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 620-621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 ,

2025(Id. at pp. 503-504; see also Beltran, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 .) As Roder explained, “[u]nder Evidence Code section 501, any statute which assigns the burden of proof in a criminal case is made subject to the overriding rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Roder, 6 supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 506 .) In light of Evidence Code section 501 and the constitutional limits on the use of rebuttable presumptions in a criminal case, it is “in keeping with the overall legislative intent [of such statutes] for courts to pare down existing statutory

2025(See People v. Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 505 ; see also People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1199 (McNeal); Judicial Council of Cal., Crim.