injury claim in Illinois

2016Martis, 388 Ill.

2016Martis, 388 Ill.

2016Copes, 2015 IL App (1st) 150432, ¶ 38 , 45 N.E.3d 1123 (discussing the legislature’s motivation for limiting the time in which to bring an injury claim against Pace, Metra, and the CTA); 70 ILCS 3615/5.03 (West 2008) (one-year statute of limitations for actions against the Regional Transit Authority and its divisions including Pace); 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 2008) (one-year statute of limitations for actions against the CTA). ¶ 29 Furthermore, the fact that SCR and Pace may have known that others, such as van drivers and passengers, would indirectly benefit from the minimum insurance clause in th

2016Copes, 2015 IL App (1st) 150432, ¶ 38 , 45 N.E.3d 1123 (discussing the legislature’s motivation for limiting the time in which to bring an injury claim against Pace, Metra, and the CTA); 70 ILCS 3615/5.03 (West 2008) (one-year statute of limitations for actions against the Regional Transit Authority and its divisions including Pace); 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 2008) (one-year statute of limitations for actions against the CTA). ¶ 29 Furthermore, the fact that SCR and Pace may have known that others, such as van drivers and passengers, would indirectly benefit from the minimum insurance clause in th

2014Fink, 174 Ill.2d at 311 , 673 N.E.2d at 286 . ¶ 38 In this case, defendant does not dispute Piat was injured to such an extent as to satisfy the section 11-501.6(g) type-A injury requirement.

2014Fink, 174 Ill.2d at 311 , 673 N.E.2d at 286 . ¶ 38 In this case, defendant does not dispute Piat was injured to such an extent as to satisfy the section 11-501.6(g) type-A injury requirement.

2008Majumdar, 274 Ill.

2008Majumdar, 274 Ill.

1998Antol , 284 Ill.

1998Antol, 284 Ill.

1997It may very well be that there is some period of time after receiving a puncture wound from medical waste during which any person would experience a range of mental reactions, from mere anxiety to actionable emotional distress, and ought to be eligible for compensation therefor if she meets the required tests, including the serious injury standard applying to all claims based upon infliction of emotional distress.” Williamson, 291 N.J.

1997It may very well be that there is some period of time after receiving a puncture wound from medical waste during which any person would experience a range of mental reactions, from mere anxiety to actionable emotional distress, and ought to be eligible for compensation therefor if she meets the required tests, including the serious injury standard applying to all claims based upon infliction of emotional distress." Williamson, 291 N.J.Super. at 605-06 , 677 A.2d at 1181 .

1992(Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 278 , 319 N.E.2d 25 ; McFadyen v. North River Insurance Co. (1965), 62 Ill.

1992(Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 278 , 319 N.E.2d 25 ; McFadyen v. North River Insurance Co. (1965), 62 Ill.

1992(Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 278 , 319 N.E.2d 25 ; McFadyen v. North River Insurance Co. (1965), 62 Ill.

1978(Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 278 , 319 N.E.2d 25 ; McFadyen v. North River Insurance Co. (1965), 62 Ill.

2025The injury requirement “derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 . ¶ 22 C.

2018Our review of the case law interpreting these sections supports this finding. ¶ 49 In Hurlbert, an insurance company that would be the sole source of satisfaction of the judgment was found to have standing because, at the time of the judgment, the parties sought to hold the insurance company liable for the judgment, meeting the injury exception. 386 Ill.

2018Sign, Inc. v. Schane, 2013 IL App (2d) 120434, ¶ 35 , an insurance company was found to meet the injury exception to the general rule because it was the only entity from which the judgment could be satisfied.

1999The court said: “The time within which notice is required is determined by a standard of reasonableness, based upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. [Citations.] Actual prejudice to the insurer and due diligence of the insured are but factors to be considered in the propriety of the notice and do not conclusively establish the timeliness of the notice. [Citation.] The purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the insurer to make a timely and thorough investigation of the injury claim. [Citations.] The test is whether any reasonably prudent person could foresee a lawsuit u

1996Drawing an analogy to our decision in Walker v. American River Transportation, 277 Ill.

1995(District 141 v. Industrial Comm’n (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 544, 558 ; see Riley v. Industrial Comm’n (1991), 212 Ill.

1993App. 3d 158, 162 , 453 N.E.2d 36, 39 .) The purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the insurer to make a timely and thorough investigation of the injury claim.

1993(INA Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago (1978), 62 Ill.

1983(See, e.g., Jones v. Industrial Com. (1983), 93 Ill. 2d 524, 526 ; Rogers v. Industrial Com. (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 221, 223 ; Eagle Discount Supermarket v. Industrial Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 331, 337 .) An employer takes his employees as he finds them (Doyle v. Industrial Com. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 544, 549 ), and the fact that a preexisting condition contributed to the injury does not bar compensation if the employment was also a. causative factor.

1983(Williams v. Industrial Com. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 117, 122 ; County of Cook v. Industrial Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 10, 18 ; Cossident v. Industrial Com. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 33, 37 ; Okaw Homes, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 81, 84 .) “The sole limitation to the above general rule is that where it is shown that the employee’s health has so deteriorated that any normal daily activity is overexertion, or where it is shown that the activity engaged in presented risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed, compensation will be denied.” County of Cook v. Industrial Co

1983(Williams v. Industrial Com. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 117, 122 ; County of Cook v. Industrial Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 10, 18 ; Cossident v. Industrial Com. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 33, 37 ; Okaw Homes, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 81, 84 .) “The sole limitation to the above general rule is that where it is shown that the employee’s health has so deteriorated that any normal daily activity is overexertion, or where it is shown that the activity engaged in presented risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed, compensation will be denied.” County of Cook v. Industrial Co

1983(Williams v. Industrial Com. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 117, 122 ; County of Cook v. Industrial Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 10, 18 ; Cossident v. Industrial Com. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 33, 37 ; Okaw Homes, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 81, 84 .) “The sole limitation to the above general rule is that where it is shown that the employee’s health has so deteriorated that any normal daily activity is overexertion, or where it is shown that the activity engaged in presented risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed, compensation will be denied.” County of Cook v. Industrial Co

1983Whether an injury was “foreseeable” is the test used by a jury to determine whether a defendant was guilty of a breach of duty (see Mieher v. Brown (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 539 , 301 N.E.2d 307 ); whether a defendant’s conduct was the “proximate cause” of a plaintiff’s injury is the test used by a jury to determine whether there was a causal connection between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s injury.

1983Whether an injury was “foreseeable” is the test used by a jury to determine whether a defendant was guilty of a breach of duty (see Mieher v. Brown (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 539 , 301 N.E.2d 307 ); whether a defendant’s conduct was the “proximate cause” of a plaintiff’s injury is the test used by a jury to determine whether there was a causal connection between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s injury.

1983(Williams v. Industrial Com. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 117, 122 ; County of Cook v. Industrial Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 10, 18 ; Cossident v. Industrial Com. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 33, 37 ; Okaw Homes, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 81, 84 .) “The sole limitation to the above general rule is that where it is shown that the employee’s health has so deteriorated that any normal daily activity is overexertion, or where it is shown that the activity engaged in presented risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed, compensation will be denied.” County of Cook v. Industrial Co

1983(Williams v. Industrial Com. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 117, 122 ; County of Cook v. Industrial Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 10, 18 ; Cossident v. Industrial Com. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 33, 37 ; Okaw Homes, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 81, 84 .) “The sole limitation to the above general rule is that where it is shown that the employee’s health has so deteriorated that any normal daily activity is overexertion, or where it is shown that the activity engaged in presented risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed, compensation will be denied.” County of Cook v. Industrial Co

1983(See, e.g., Jones v. Industrial Com. (1983), 93 Ill. 2d 524, 526 ; Rogers v. Industrial Com. (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 221, 223 ; Eagle Discount Supermarket v. Industrial Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 331, 337 .) An employer takes his employees as he finds them (Doyle v. Industrial Com. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 544, 549 ), and the fact that a preexisting condition contributed to the injury does not bar compensation if the employment was also a. causative factor.

1983(See, e.g., Jones v. Industrial Com. (1983), 93 Ill. 2d 524, 526 ; Rogers v. Industrial Com. (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 221, 223 ; Eagle Discount Supermarket v. Industrial Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 331, 337 .) An employer takes his employees as he finds them (Doyle v. Industrial Com. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 544, 549 ), and the fact that a preexisting condition contributed to the injury does not bar compensation if the employment was also a. causative factor.

1983(See, e.g., Jones v. Industrial Com. (1983), 93 Ill. 2d 524, 526 ; Rogers v. Industrial Com. (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 221, 223 ; Eagle Discount Supermarket v. Industrial Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 331, 337 .) An employer takes his employees as he finds them (Doyle v. Industrial Com. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 544, 549 ), and the fact that a preexisting condition contributed to the injury does not bar compensation if the employment was also a. causative factor.

1981II Plaintiff’s reliance upon Sobczak v. Whitten (1979), 75 Ill.