injury bar in Pennsylvania

2024Further, the [U.S. Supreme] Court in Lewis reiterated that “Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 . . . .

2004Further, the Court in Lewis reiterated that “Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 , 116 S.Ct. 2174 .

2020Kohler, 615 A.2d at 32 ; Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa, 421 A.2d 251, 256 (Pa. Super. 1980).

2020Kohler, 615 A.2d at 32 ; Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa, 421 A.2d 251, 256 (Pa. Super. 1980).

2025Indeed, an injury for a violation of procedural due process rights “cannot be presumed to occur, and . . . plaintiffs at least should be put to their proof on the issue, as plaintiffs are in most tort actions.” Id. at 13 262.

2012Moreover, in McGee v. Muldowney, 750 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 2000), the Superior Court reviewed whether a plaintiff who suffered from back and neck pain following a motor vehicle accident met the serious injury requirement under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a).

1999NGK Metals Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Bailey), 698 A.2d 1365 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997).

1990Taglianetti v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 503 Pa. 270 , 469 A.2d 548 (1983).

1990Taglianetti v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 503 Pa. 270 , 469 A.2d 548 (1983).

1989(Emphasis added.) Id., 485 Pa. at 539-540 , 403 A.2d at 519-520 . 4 Reference to the present record fails to provide the exact date when the Employer had knowledge of the injury and claim, but it clearly was prior to the March 25, 1983 dated fixed by the Board, since Employer’s official Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial is dated February 24, 1983 and asserts as “Date of Alleged Injury, January 13, 1983.” This form as executed denies liability with no apparent reason therefor, but makes clear that there was knowledge by Employer of the injury and claim prior to the date fixed by the Board,

1989(Emphasis added.) Id., 485 Pa. at 539-540 , 403 A.2d at 519-520 . 4 Reference to the present record fails to provide the exact date when the Employer had knowledge of the injury and claim, but it clearly was prior to the March 25, 1983 dated fixed by the Board, since Employer’s official Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial is dated February 24, 1983 and asserts as “Date of Alleged Injury, January 13, 1983.” This form as executed denies liability with no apparent reason therefor, but makes clear that there was knowledge by Employer of the injury and claim prior to the date fixed by the Board,

1989(Emphasis added.) Id., 485 Pa. at 539-540 , 403 A.2d at 519-520 . 4 Reference to the present record fails to provide the exact date when the Employer had knowledge of the injury and claim, but it clearly was prior to the March 25, 1983 dated fixed by the Board, since Employer’s official Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial is dated February 24, 1983 and asserts as “Date of Alleged Injury, January 13, 1983.” This form as executed denies liability with no apparent reason therefor, but makes clear that there was knowledge by Employer of the injury and claim prior to the date fixed by the Board,

1962Consolidation Coal Co., 385 Pa. 149 , 122 A. 2d 406 (1956), and Union of Russian Societies of St.

1962Consolidation Coal Co., 385 Pa. 149 , 122 A. 2d 406 (1956), and Union of Russian Societies of St.

1957In Connelly et al. v. Kaufmann and Baer Company, 349 Pa. 261 , 37 A. 2d 125 , a suit for injuries suffered by a minor child instituted by the father, on behalf of the child and on his own behalf, we held that negligence on the part of the mother which contributed to the child’s injury would bar a recovery by the father in his own right.

1957In Connelly et al. v. Kaufmann and Baer Company, 349 Pa. 261 , 37 A. 2d 125 , a suit for injuries suffered by a minor child instituted by the father, on behalf of the child and on his own behalf, we held that negligence on the part of the mother which contributed to the child’s injury would bar a recovery by the father in his own right.

1917In view of the undisputed evidence that deceased increased his intoxication by taking at least two drinks of liquor subsequent ,to the time of his removal from the car at a regular station of defendant it cannot be said that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that defendant’s act was the sole and proximate cause of the injury and it was error to give the jury an opportunity to guess which was the correct theory: Glancy v. McKees Rocks Borough, 243 Pa. 216 .

1907The permanence of the injury is the test for the application of the rule: Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474 .

1865In Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts 349 , it was decided by this court that the legislature had not conferred upon Courts of Common Pleas jurisdiction of a cause of divorce alleged to have been committed by the husband whilst his domicil was in another state, and that the law of the actual domicil at the time and place of the injury is the rule in cases of divorce for everything hut the original obligation of marriage.