injury claim in Florida

2019The supreme court stated that a jury may only reject expert testimony if it has a reasonable basis to do so, such as “evidence that disputes the injury claim.” Id. at 1205- 06.

2014Id. at 1206 ; see also Easkold v. Rhodes, 614 So. 2d 495, 497-98 (Fla. 1993) (concluding that jury could reject expert medical testimony that the plaintiff had sustained permanent injuries from an automobile accident where the experts’ medical opinions were premised on the plaintiff’s self-reported false medical history). -12- In Fell v. Carlin, 6 So. 3d 119, 120 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the issue of whether he sustained an injury in an accident.

2016The court reasoned "that the focus of our inquiry should be whether the injury for which a claim is 11 Interestingly, the Harrington, Warren, and Olah decisions failed to mention Workman. - 33 - made is covered by liability insurance, rather than a general inquiry into whether some kind of insurance covered, for some purposes, the automobile involved in the accident." Id. at 660 .

2016The court reasoned “that the focus'of our inquiry should be whether the injury for which a claim is made is covered by liability insurance, rather than a general inquiry into whether some kind of insurance covered, for some purposes, the automobile involved, in the accident.” Id. at 660 .

1982However, we agree with the rationale of Bowsher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 244 Or. 549 , 419 P.2d 606 (1966), that the focus of our inquiry should be whether the injury for which a claim is made is covered by liability insurance, rather than a general inquiry into whether some kind of insurance covered, for some purposes, the automobile involved in the accident.

1982However, we agree with the rationale of Bowsher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 244 Or. 549 , 419 P.2d 606 (1966), that the focus of our inquiry should be whether the injury for which a claim is made is covered by liability insurance, rather than a general inquiry into whether some kind of insurance covered, for some purposes, the automobile involved in the accident.

2025Mizell In Mizell, the First District denied the State’s petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a pretrial order allowing Mizell, a Vietnam veteran, to present evidence of PTSD “under certain limited conditions” in his trial for attempted second-degree murder, in which he was claiming self-defense. 773 So. 2d at 619 .6 Mizell quarreled with the victim, Benny Hayes, at the nearby home of a mutual friend, and Hayes made threats and derogatory comments to Mizell.

2006The court in All Children's Hospital recognized the decision of the Third District in University of Miami v. M.A., 793 So.2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that the issue of whether a health care provider gave proper notice is to be decided by the ALJ because it relates to the issue of whether a claim is compensable under the Act); the decision of the Fifth District in O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n, 757 So.2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that a notice issue is part of a compensability determination and, thus, an issue over which the ALJ has exclus

2006The court in All Children's Hospital recognized the decision of the Third District in University of Miami v. M.A., 793 So.2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that the issue of whether a health care provider gave proper notice is to be decided by the ALJ because it relates to the issue of whether a claim is compensable under the Act); the decision of the Fifth District in O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n, 757 So.2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that a notice issue is part of a compensability determination and, thus, an issue over which the ALJ has exclus

2006Id. at 476-77 .

2006The court in All Children's Hospital recognized the decision of the Third District in University of Miami v. M.A., 793 So.2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that the issue of whether a health care provider gave proper notice is to be decided by the ALJ because it relates to the issue of whether a claim is compensable under the Act); the decision of the Fifth District in O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n, 757 So.2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that a notice issue is part of a compensability determination and, thus, an issue over which the ALJ has exclus

2000In Miller v. Sinclair Refining Co., 268 F.2d 114 (5th Cir.1959), the federal appellate court stated: In such a case, Florida law says that the lessor is not liable for injuries to the lessee or those upon the premises in the lessee's right unless the negligent condition which causes the injury is a violation of law, is a pre-existing defect in construction or is inherently dangerous, or unless the lessor undertakes to keep the premises in repair.

2000Id. at 117 .

1995Section 316.614(10) does not undertake to change that existing law, but instead codifies the accepted legal doctrine, as stated in Parker v. Montgomery, 529 So.2d 1145 (Fla. [App.] 1st DCA1988), that the concept of mitigation of damages has been subsumed within the doctrine of comparative negligence.

1961This court has frequently approved the rule laid down in Crawford v. Benrus Market, supra. In Sanford v. A.P.

1958"The law in my judgment is, and should be, that except in rare cases of absolute nuisance of extreme danger, the negligence of the plaintiff contributing to the injury may be a bar to recovery. * * * To try to distinguish between the different kinds of nuisance or the degree of nuisance, and the cases where the negligence of the plaintiff would or would not bar recovery, has led the courts into a maze." 21 N.E.2d 507, 510 .

1937Although the defendant referred to the additional special pleas as affirmative pleas and offered to prove the defense set up in such special pleas, viz.: that the alleged messenger boy was not in the employ of the defendant, and that such boy was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the injury; yet it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the defendant was liable for the injury under the doctrine of respondeat superior. *164 In Dowling v. Nicholson, 101 Fla. 672 , t. 278, 683, 135 So. 288 , this Court said: “While the plea of not guilty operates as a denial only of

1937Although the defendant referred to the additional special pleas as affirmative pleas and offered to prove the defense set up in such special pleas, viz.: that the alleged messenger boy was not in the employ of the defendant, and that such boy was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the injury; yet it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the defendant was liable for the injury under the doctrine of respondeat superior. *164 In Dowling v. Nicholson, 101 Fla. 672 , t. 278, 683, 135 So. 288 , this Court said: “While the plea of not guilty operates as a denial only of

1937Although the defendant referred to the additional special pleas as affirmative pleas and offered to prove the defense set up in such special pleas, viz.: that the alleged messenger boy was not in the employ of the defendant, and that such boy was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the injury; yet it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the defendant was liable for the injury under the doctrine of respondeat superior. *164 In Dowling v. Nicholson, 101 Fla. 672 , t. 278, 683, 135 So. 288 , this Court said: “While the plea of not guilty operates as a denial only of

1937Although the defendant referred to the additional special pleas as affirmative pleas and offered to prove the defense set up in such special pleas, viz.: that the alleged messenger boy was not in the employ of the defendant, and that such boy was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the injury; yet it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the defendant was liable for the injury under the doctrine of respondeat superior. *164 In Dowling v. Nicholson, 101 Fla. 672 , t. 278, 683, 135 So. 288 , this Court said: “While the plea of not guilty operates as a denial only of

1937Co., 86 So. 433 , 80 Fla. 624 , has been expressly superseded in this class of cases by the Statute of 1921 (Senate Bill No. 131, 1921 Session, Par. 5, Pleas in Actions for Wrongs Independent of Contracts, Sections 4332, 4333, C.

1937Co., 86 So. 433 , 80 Fla. 624 , has been expressly superseded in this class of cases by the Statute of 1921 (Senate Bill No. 131, 1921 Session, Par. 5, Pleas in Actions for Wrongs Independent of Contracts, Sections 4332, 4333, C.

1930Express Co. v. Weatherford, 86 Fla. 626 , the bill of exceptions was examined to determine if the evidence of plaintiff’s negligence contributing to the injury which would bar his recovery was met by any evidence upon which the jury might find that such contributory negligence did not exist.

1894Co., 53 Iowa, 341 , holds to the same view, and further decides that a judgment in an action for such an injury would be a bar to a future action to recover for the construction of an embankment which closed the natural channel of a stream and diverted water from a tract of land, or for the abatement of such embankment; and the fact that in such action the jury were erroneously instructed not to take into account any future injury by reason of the maintenance of the embankment would not alter the effect of the judgment as an adjudication of all questions which were or ought to have been tried