18 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dr. Pepper Co. v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2000See Dr. Pepper Co., 154 Ariz. at 566-67 , 744 P.2d at 478-79 ; O’Donnell v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ariz. 358, 362 , 609 P.2d 1058, 1062 (1980). 2000See Dr. Pepper Co., 154 Ariz. at 566-67 , 744 P.2d at 478-79 ; O’Donnell v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ariz. 358, 362 , 609 P.2d 1058, 1062 (1980). | 4 | 4 |
Pearce Development v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1996In O’Donnell , however, as we have indicated, this court rejected the new injury defense to a petition to reopen and concluded that “the claimant alone has the option of selecting” whether “to petition to reopen or file a new injury claim, or both.” Pearce, 147 Ariz. at 603, 712 P.2d at 450, analysis approved, 147 Ariz. 582 , 712 P.2d 429 . 1996In O’Donnell , however, as we have indicated, this court rejected the new injury defense to a petition to reopen and concluded that “the claimant alone has the option of selecting” whether “to petition to reopen or file a new injury claim, or both.” Pearce, 147 Ariz. at 603, 712 P.2d at 450, analysis approved, 147 Ariz. 582 , 712 P.2d 429 . | 3 | 3 |
Sun Control Tile Co. v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2014Id. ¶12 In Sun Control, the claimant sustained a compensable knee injury. 117 Ariz. at 269 , 571 P.2d at 1075 . 2014Id. ¶12 In Sun Control, the claimant sustained a compensable knee injury. 117 Ariz. at 269 , 571 P.2d at 1075 . | 2 | 3 |
Piner v. Superior Court in and for County of Maricopagreen2 sentences2009Thus, our decision in A Tumbling-T Ranches I constitutes the law of the case, even if now we would not interpret Taft and Markiewicz to allow the single injury rule to substitute for a showing of individual causation.' See generally, Piner v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182, 187, ¶ 20 , 962 P.2d 909, 914 (1998) (discussing the indivisible injury rule in Arizona after the legislature adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act). . 2009Thus, our decision in A Tumbling-T Ranches I constitutes the law of the case, even if now we would not interpret Taft and Markiewicz to allow the single injury rule to substitute for a showing of individual causation.' See generally, Piner v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182, 187, ¶ 20 , 962 P.2d 909, 914 (1998) (discussing the indivisible injury rule in Arizona after the legislature adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act). . | 1 | 2 |
Mercante v. Industrial Com'n of Ariz.green2 sentences1991See Dr. Pepper Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 154 Ariz. 563 , 744 P.2d 475 (App.1987); Mercante v. Industrial Comm’n, 153 Ariz. 261 , 735 P.2d 1384 (App.1987). 1991See Dr. Pepper Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 154 Ariz. 563 , 744 P.2d 475 (App.1987); Mercante v. Industrial Comm’n, 153 Ariz. 261 , 735 P.2d 1384 (App.1987). | 1 | 2 |
Schoenrock v. Cigna Health Plan of Arizona, Inc.green1 sentence2022See A.R.S. § 12-611; see also Schoenrock v. Cigna Health Plan of Ariz., Inc., 148 Ariz. 548, 551 (App. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Tumbling-T Ranches v. Paloma Investment Ltd. Partnershipgreen2 sentences2009We disagree. ¶ 40 This court previously addressed the District’s argument in A Tumbling-T Ranches I, holding that the single injury rule applied to the factual scenario presented here. 197 Ariz. at 551, ¶ 22 , 5 P.3d at 265 (citing Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer Inc., 169 Ariz. 173, 177-78 , 818 P.2d 158, 162-63 (App.1991); Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 118 Ariz. 329, 338-39 , 576 P.2d 517, 526-27 (App.1978)). 2009We disagree. ¶ 40 This court previously addressed the District’s argument in A Tumbling-T Ranches I, holding that the single injury rule applied to the factual scenario presented here. 197 Ariz. at 551, ¶ 22 , 5 P.3d at 265 (citing Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer Inc., 169 Ariz. 173, 177-78 , 818 P.2d 158, 162-63 (App.1991); Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 118 Ariz. 329, 338-39 , 576 P.2d 517, 526-27 (App.1978)). | 1 | 1 |
Markiewicz v. SALT RIVER VALLEY, ETC.green2 sentences2009We disagree. ¶ 40 This court previously addressed the District’s argument in A Tumbling-T Ranches I, holding that the single injury rule applied to the factual scenario presented here. 197 Ariz. at 551, ¶ 22 , 5 P.3d at 265 (citing Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer Inc., 169 Ariz. 173, 177-78 , 818 P.2d 158, 162-63 (App.1991); Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 118 Ariz. 329, 338-39 , 576 P.2d 517, 526-27 (App.1978)). 2009We disagree. ¶ 40 This court previously addressed the District’s argument in A Tumbling-T Ranches I, holding that the single injury rule applied to the factual scenario presented here. 197 Ariz. at 551, ¶ 22 , 5 P.3d at 265 (citing Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer Inc., 169 Ariz. 173, 177-78 , 818 P.2d 158, 162-63 (App.1991); Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 118 Ariz. 329, 338-39 , 576 P.2d 517, 526-27 (App.1978)). | 1 | 1 |
Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc.green2 sentences2009We disagree. ¶ 40 This court previously addressed the District’s argument in A Tumbling-T Ranches I, holding that the single injury rule applied to the factual scenario presented here. 197 Ariz. at 551, ¶ 22 , 5 P.3d at 265 (citing Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer Inc., 169 Ariz. 173, 177-78 , 818 P.2d 158, 162-63 (App.1991); Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 118 Ariz. 329, 338-39 , 576 P.2d 517, 526-27 (App.1978)). 2009We disagree. ¶ 40 This court previously addressed the District’s argument in A Tumbling-T Ranches I, holding that the single injury rule applied to the factual scenario presented here. 197 Ariz. at 551, ¶ 22 , 5 P.3d at 265 (citing Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer Inc., 169 Ariz. 173, 177-78 , 818 P.2d 158, 162-63 (App.1991); Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 118 Ariz. 329, 338-39 , 576 P.2d 517, 526-27 (App.1978)). | 1 | 1 |
Flores v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co.green2 sentences2009Under the law of the case doctrine, “if an appellate court has ruled upon a legal question and remanded for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same ease.” Flores v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., 218 Ariz. 52, 57, ¶ 23 , 178 P.3d 1176, 1181 (App. 2008) (citations omitted). 2009Under the law of the case doctrine, “if an appellate court has ruled upon a legal question and remanded for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same ease.” Flores v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., 218 Ariz. 52, 57, ¶ 23 , 178 P.3d 1176, 1181 (App. 2008) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
O'Donnell v. Industrial Com'n of Arizonagreen2 sentences2000See Dr. Pepper Co., 154 Ariz. at 566-67 , 744 P.2d at 478-79 ; O’Donnell v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ariz. 358, 362 , 609 P.2d 1058, 1062 (1980). 2000See Dr. Pepper Co., 154 Ariz. at 566-67 , 744 P.2d at 478-79 ; O’Donnell v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ariz. 358, 362 , 609 P.2d 1058, 1062 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Vishinskas v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONAgreen2 sentences1999Vishinskas v. Industrial Comm’n, 147 Ariz. 574, 577-78 , 711 P.2d 1247, 1250-51 (App.1985). ¶ 12 CNA has provided no authority in support of its argument that the successive injury doctrine cannot be applied when the original injury claim remains open, rather than requiring reopening, and we believe that the ALJ practically and correctly applied the successive injury doctrine. 1999Vishinskas v. Industrial Comm’n, 147 Ariz. 574, 577-78 , 711 P.2d 1247, 1250-51 (App.1985). ¶ 12 CNA has provided no authority in support of its argument that the successive injury doctrine cannot be applied when the original injury claim remains open, rather than requiring reopening, and we believe that the ALJ practically and correctly applied the successive injury doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuitgreen1 sentence1991Some jurisdictions follow Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir.1976), which held that under New Jersey law the burden was on the plaintiff to establish the nature and extent of enhanced injuries. 3 See, e.g., Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir.1978) (applying South Carolina law). | 1 | 1 |
Cotton v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1987See generally Cotton v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ariz. App. 58 , 546 P.2d 35 (1976) (claimant should file both a petition to reopen and a new injury claim and request consolidation when the appropriate remedy is uncertain). 1987See generally Cotton v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ariz. App. 58 , 546 P.2d 35 (1976) (claimant should file both a petition to reopen and a new injury claim and request consolidation when the appropriate remedy is uncertain). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Holtz v. Holder
green
2 sentences2000There, the court shifted the burden of apportionment to the defendants, noting that “it is more desirable, as a matter of policy, for an injured and innocent plaintiff to recover his entire damages jointly and severally from independent tortfeasors ... than it is to let two or more wrongdoers escape liability altogether, simply because the plaintiff cannot carry the impossible burden of proving the respective shares of causation.” Id. at 251 , 418 P.2d at 588 . ¶ 24 Recently, in Finer v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182 , 962 P.2d 909 (1998), the supreme court considered the status of the single 2000There, the court shifted the burden of apportionment to the defendants, noting that “it is more desirable, as a matter of policy, for an injured and innocent plaintiff to recover his entire damages jointly and severally from independent tortfeasors ... than it is to let two or more wrongdoers escape liability altogether, simply because the plaintiff cannot carry the impossible burden of proving the respective shares of causation.” Id. at 251 , 418 P.2d at 588 . ¶ 24 Recently, in Finer v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182 , 962 P.2d 909 (1998), the supreme court considered the status of the single | 2 | 1978–2000 |
Pearce Development v. INDUS. COM'N OF ARIZONA
green
2 sentences1996In O’Donnell , however, as we have indicated, this court rejected the new injury defense to a petition to reopen and concluded that “the claimant alone has the option of selecting” whether “to petition to reopen or file a new injury claim, or both.” Pearce, 147 Ariz. at 603, 712 P.2d at 450, analysis approved, 147 Ariz. 582 , 712 P.2d 429 . 1996In O’Donnell , however, as we have indicated, this court rejected the new injury defense to a petition to reopen and concluded that “the claimant alone has the option of selecting” whether “to petition to reopen or file a new injury claim, or both.” Pearce, 147 Ariz. at 603, 712 P.2d at 450, analysis approved, 147 Ariz. 582 , 712 P.2d 429 . | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Young v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences2014Id. at 305-06 , 506 P.2d at 1090-91 . 2014Id. at 305-06 , 506 P.2d at 1090-91 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Schlecht v. Schiel
green
2 sentences2000In Schlecht, the plaintiff suffered damage after the defendant constructed a wall in a wash that diverted stream water onto the plaintiffs property during a rainstorm. 76 Ariz. at 217 , 262 P.2d at 254 . 2000In Schlecht, the plaintiff suffered damage after the defendant constructed a wall in a wash that diverted stream water onto the plaintiffs property during a rainstorm. 76 Ariz. at 217 , 262 P.2d at 254 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Terry Lee Stonehocker v. General Motors Corporation
green
1 sentence1991Some jurisdictions follow Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir.1976), which held that under New Jersey law the burden was on the plaintiff to establish the nature and extent of enhanced injuries. 3 See, e.g., Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir.1978) (applying South Carolina law). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Professional Furniture Service v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1987On review, we set aside the reopening, holding that where two industrial claims were involved, the fact that “the first injury had created a condition which was then acted upon by the second injury to result in clamant’s current disability” was not sufficient to impose liability on the first injury carrier. 133 Ariz. at 208-09 , 650 P.2d at 510-11 . 1987On review, we set aside the reopening, holding that where two industrial claims were involved, the fact that “the first injury had created a condition which was then acted upon by the second injury to result in clamant’s current disability” was not sufficient to impose liability on the first injury carrier. 133 Ariz. at 208-09 , 650 P.2d at 510-11 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1985Rather, in such circumstances, our courts have refused to apply the doctrine of consequential damages so as to hold the first carrier liable, and instead have imposed liability on the second carrier____ As stated in Morrison-Knudsen [Company, Inc., v. Industrial Commission, 115 Ariz. 492 , 566 P.2d 293 (1977) ]: “Although the second injury would have been less severe in the absence of the prior injury, the second employer is held to be solely responsible.” This is merely a specialized application of the principle that an employer takes an employee as he finds him, and if an injury operates upo 1985Rather, in such circumstances, our courts have refused to apply the doctrine of consequential damages so as to hold the first carrier liable, and instead have imposed liability on the second carrier____ As stated in Morrison-Knudsen [Company, Inc., v. Industrial Commission, 115 Ariz. 492 , 566 P.2d 293 (1977) ]: “Although the second injury would have been less severe in the absence of the prior injury, the second employer is held to be solely responsible.” This is merely a specialized application of the principle that an employer takes an employee as he finds him, and if an injury operates upo | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Howard P. Foley Co. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1982The only argument made in support of this contention is that this court’s decision in Howard P. Foley Co. v. Industrial Commission, 120 Ariz. 325 , 585 P.2d 1237 (App.1978), does not authorize such a late request for relief under the statute. 1982The only argument made in support of this contention is that this court’s decision in Howard P. Foley Co. v. Industrial Commission, 120 Ariz. 325 , 585 P.2d 1237 (App.1978), does not authorize such a late request for relief under the statute. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Caganich v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1973Unlike the instant case, the issue there was what date should be used upon which to base claimant’s monthly wage, but like the instant case, claimant filed a petition to reopen in the original injury claim and the Commission denied reopening on the basis that the later episode was a new injury. 1 The Supreme Court affirmed the award, stating: “Although the unequivocal testimony of the doctor indicates a mere extension of the old injury, we are of the opinion that *109 the facts indicate that a new injury occurred on July 30, 1968.” (emphasis added) 108 Ariz. at 581 , 503 P.2d at 802 . 1973Unlike the instant case, the issue there was what date should be used upon which to base claimant’s monthly wage, but like the instant case, claimant filed a petition to reopen in the original injury claim and the Commission denied reopening on the basis that the later episode was a new injury. 1 The Supreme Court affirmed the award, stating: “Although the unequivocal testimony of the doctor indicates a mere extension of the old injury, we are of the opinion that *109 the facts indicate that a new injury occurred on July 30, 1968.” (emphasis added) 108 Ariz. at 581 , 503 P.2d at 802 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Degidio v. State Industrial Accident Commission
green
2 sentences1932“In the case of Degidio v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 105 Or. 642 , 207 Pac. 176, 178 , it was held: “ ‘All questions arising out of the facts, circumstances, and conditions surrounding an injury for which claim for compensation is made, existing and known at the time of the decision upon the original application, are concluded by the final decision upon that application, unless an appeal is taken to the circuit court, and a different result obtained upon such appeal.’ “Aggravation of disability gives a right to compensation equal in dignity to the right of compensation which arises 1932“In the case of Degidio v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 105 Or. 642 , 207 Pac. 176, 178 , it was held: “ ‘All questions arising out of the facts, circumstances, and conditions surrounding an injury for which claim for compensation is made, existing and known at the time of the decision upon the original application, are concluded by the final decision upon that application, unless an appeal is taken to the circuit court, and a different result obtained upon such appeal.’ “Aggravation of disability gives a right to compensation equal in dignity to the right of compensation which arises | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.