injury requirement in Massachusetts

2025Light Co., 475 Mass. 67, 73 (2016) (“Bellermann II”); Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 464 Mass. 492 , 501–503 (2013); Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, Inc., 445 Mass. 790 , 800–802 (2006). “[T]o meet the injury requirement under G.L. c. 93A, § 9(1) or 11, a plaintiff must have suffered a ‘separate, identifiable harm arising from the [regulatory] violation’ that is distinct ‘from the claimed unfair or deceptive conduct itself.’ ” Bellermann II, supra, quoting Tyler, supra. A consumer is not entitled to collect even nominal, statutory damages under c. 93A without proving that th

2025Light Co., 475 Mass. 67, 73 (2016) (“Bellermann II”); Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 464 Mass. 492 , 501–503 (2013); Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, Inc., 445 Mass. 790 , 800–802 (2006). “[T]o meet the injury requirement under G.L. c. 93A, § 9(1) or 11, a plaintiff must have suffered a ‘separate, identifiable harm arising from the [regulatory] violation’ that is distinct ‘from the claimed unfair or deceptive conduct itself.’ ” Bellermann II, supra, quoting Tyler, supra. A consumer is not entitled to collect even nominal, statutory damages under c. 93A without proving that th

2025This is because "[f]ar from curing the error, the trial cause[s] the injury from the error." Lafler, 566 U.S. at 166 .

2016“The injury requirement has been interpreted as requiring (1) a justi-ciable injury, (2) that is particular to the plaintiff[ ] rather than common to the public or a segment thereof, and (3) that is more than ‘hypothetical.’ ” Hoffer, 461 Mass. at 457 n.8, quoting Fiske v. Selectmen of Hopkinton, 354 Mass. 269, 271 (1968).

2003Co., 370 Mass. 674 (1976), would bar employees from recovering for one injury when they have settled a separate injury claim by entering into a lump-sum agreement.

1954In Milliman v. Coulter, 301 Mass. 320 , a pedestrian standing in a private driveway a few feet in from the public way was struck by the side of an automobile travelling upon the public way. *202 Where negligence of the operator is proved and a judgment obtained against him, we see nothing in the insurance statute that should prevent the injured person from having recourse to the policy in satisfaction of the judgment merely because when injured he was upon private property provided the cause of the injury was the operation of a motor vehicle partially at least upon a public way.

1954The fact that the detached part was projected onto private property and brought about the injury there did not bar recovery in Facteau v. Gould, 310 Mass. 105 .

1951De Filippo’s Case, 284 Mass. 531, 534 .

1945The fact that the condition of the employee’s heart was the same as it would have been if he had not incurred the injury would not bar an award of further compensation if the employee proved that the present condition was due to the aggravation caused by' the injury, Duprey’s Case, 219 Mass. 189, 193 , but the fact that the present heart condition might have developed to its present extent through natural causes alone called for careful consideration of the evidence, which in this aspect consisted chiefly of medical testimony.

1941In McKenna v. Andreassi, 292 Mass. 213 , the plaintiff was a boy about six years old.

1940And it was held in the case of Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 , which was an action to recover for injuries caused by a vicious animal kept by the defendant in his pasture, that the mere fact that the plaintiff was a trespasser at the time, if his own negligence did not contribute to the injury, would not bar plaintiff’s recovery; and, in this case, the defendant requested the court to rule that if the plaintiff’s intestate was a trespasser in the pasture plaintiff could not recover, which rule was refused and sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court.

1940Wall v. Massachusetts Northeastern Street Railway, 229 Mass. 506 .

1935In Dalton v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 241 Mass. 400, 404 , where the defendant maintained an awning over a sidewalk without a license to do so, as required by a city ordinance, the court said: “The defendant, when it wrongfully maintained an obstruction in the street, was forewarned that it might turn out to be an object of peril to travellers.” Though the accident would not have occurred if the defendant had not dug the trench, and though the trench was dug by the defendant in violation of the ordinance, the judge could have found that the accident to the plaintiff while playing in th

1935In Dalton v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 241 Mass. 400, 404 , where the defendant maintained an awning over a sidewalk without a license to do so, as required by a city ordinance, the court said: “The defendant, when it wrongfully maintained an obstruction in the street, was forewarned that it might turn out to be an object of peril to travellers.” Though the accident would not have occurred if the defendant had not dug the trench, and though the trench was dug by the defendant in violation of the ordinance, the judge could have found that the accident to the plaintiff while playing in th

1935In Dalton v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 241 Mass. 400, 404 , where the defendant maintained an awning over a sidewalk without a license to do so, as required by a city ordinance, the court said: “The defendant, when it wrongfully maintained an obstruction in the street, was forewarned that it might turn out to be an object of peril to travellers.” Though the accident would not have occurred if the defendant had not dug the trench, and though the trench was dug by the defendant in violation of the ordinance, the judge could have found that the accident to the plaintiff while playing in th

1919In Sweet v. Pecker, 223 Mass. 286 , the notice was served upon the owners; action was brought against them and the tenants of the building.

1876Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176 .