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21 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1891–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Duncangreen2 sentences2019The language of subsection (B)(1), particularly the absence of an injury requirement and the authorization of a less severe punishment, “demonstrates a legislative intent to prohibit conduct that also has the potential of endangering a child’s life.” Id. 2018“The absence of an injury requirement in subsection (B)(1) reflects the lesser nature of the offense, a Class 6 felony, and demonstrates a legislative intent to prohibit conduct that also has the potential of endangering a child’s life.” Id. (emphasis added). | 3 | 7 |
Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024“Instead,” the Court noted, “as ‘a preliminary jurisdictional issue,’ the standing doctrine asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’” Id. at ___ (quoting McClary, 299 Va. at 221-22); see also McClary, 299 Va. at 222 (noting the “personal stake” requirement and that “[t]ypically, to establish standing a plaintiff must allege a particularized injury that is separate from the public at large”).21 Considering the “personal-stake factors” germane to the specific context before it, the Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he homeowners’ factual al 2024“Instead,” the Court noted, “as ‘a preliminary jurisdictional issue,’ the standing doctrine asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’” Id. at ___ (quoting McClary, 299 Va. at 221-22); see also McClary, 299 Va. at 222 (noting the “personal stake” requirement and that “[t]ypically, to establish standing a plaintiff must allege a particularized injury that is separate from the public at large”).21 Considering the “personal-stake factors” germane to the specific context before it, the Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he homeowners’ factual al | 3 | 3 |
Ashley Jennifer White v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen2 sentences2018See also White v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 111 , 115 n.2, 804 S.E.2d 317 , 319 n.2 (2017) (noting that White’s decision to leave “her young children alone at home while she took her husband to work was a significant fact in her convictions under Code § 18.2-371.1(B)” – which she did not appeal – but would not have established criminal liability under Code § 18.2-371.1(A) because no injury occurred to either of the children at that time). 4 Although Barnes’s conviction fell under Code § 40.1-103(A), our decision in that case is also persuasive for our determination of the type of behavior that 2018See also White v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 111 , 115 n.2, 804 S.E.2d 317 , 319 n.2 (2017) (noting that White’s decision to leave “her young children alone at home while she took her husband to work was a significant fact in her convictions under Code § 18.2-371.1(B)” – which she did not appeal – but would not have established criminal liability under Code § 18.2-371.1(A) because no injury occurred to either of the children at that time). 4 Although Barnes’s conviction fell under Code § 40.1-103(A), our decision in that case is also persuasive for our determination of the type of behavior that | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Debra Levy v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 582 . 2022Id. at 582 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1969On appeal we affirmed that award and held that under the circumstances the Commission “was well justified” in holding that the claimant was, under the statute, excused from giving notice at an earlier date and that it had been given “as soon as practicable.” We there said ( 149 Va. at 311 , 141 S.E. at 226 ): “* * * The requirement of notice necessarily implies knowledge of the injury for which claim is made. 1969On appeal we affirmed that award and held that under the circumstances the Commission “was well justified” in holding that the claimant was, under the statute, excused from giving notice at an earlier date and that it had been given “as soon as practicable.” We there said ( 149 Va. at 311 , 141 S.E. at 226 ): “* * * The requirement of notice necessarily implies knowledge of the injury for which claim is made. | 2 | 1969–1991 |
Jaqua v. Canadian National Railroad
green
1 sentence2017Jaqua , 734 N.W.2d at 234 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sergio's Pizza v. Soncini
green
2 sentences2009The commission also had the discretion to join the “compensable consequence” neck issue for resolution with the existing claim that the neck injury occurred at the same time as the shoulder injury, see id. at 376-77 , 339 S.E.2d at 208 , again so long as employer received adequate notice of the commission’s intent to do so. -8- We agree with employer’s contention that, on the facts of this case, employer did not receive sufficient notice of the new injury claim and the commission’s intent to entertain it at a time when employer had an opportunity to develop and present evidence on the issue—pr 2009The commission also had the discretion to join the “compensable consequence” neck issue for resolution with the existing claim that the neck injury occurred at the same time as the shoulder injury, see id. at 376-77 , 339 S.E.2d at 208 , again so long as employer received adequate notice of the commission’s intent to do so. -8- We agree with employer’s contention that, on the facts of this case, employer did not receive sufficient notice of the new injury claim and the commission’s intent to entertain it at a time when employer had an opportunity to develop and present evidence on the issue—pr | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Myseros v. Sissler
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lucas v. Research Analysis Corp.
green
2 sentences1991Lucas, 209 Va. at 585 , 166 S.E.2d at 296 ; Maryland Casualty Co., 149 Va. at 311 , 141 S.E.2d at 226. 1991Lucas, 209 Va. at 585 , 166 S.E.2d at 296 ; Maryland Casualty Co., 149 Va. at 311 , 141 S.E.2d at 226. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. White
green
2 sentences1934Co. v. White, 158 Va. 243 , 163 S. E. 530 , it was held that the contributory negligence of a plaintiff in going upon a railroad crossing and sustaining an injury would not bar his recovery, hut would operate only to mitigate his damages, where the operators of the train failed to give the signals required by statute or by a city ordinance. 1934Co. v. White, 158 Va. 243 , 163 S. E. 530 , it was held that the contributory negligence of a plaintiff in going upon a railroad crossing and sustaining an injury would not bar his recovery, hut would operate only to mitigate his damages, where the operators of the train failed to give the signals required by statute or by a city ordinance. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Rooney v. Levinson
neutral
2 sentences1930In Rooney v. Levinson, 95 Conn. 466 , 111 Atl. 794, 795 , the court, following the well considered opinion of Prentice, C. 1930In Rooney v. Levinson, 95 Conn. 466 , 111 Atl. 794, 795 , the court, following the well considered opinion of Prentice, C. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Donaghe v. Roudeboush
green
1 sentence1907The reason for requiring a description of the goods is that otherwise the defendant might not be able to avail himself of a justification which he wonld otherwise have, and also because withoiit such description the record would not afford conclusive evidence of satisfaction already received for the injury as a bar to another suit for the same injury.” See Donaghe v. Roudeboush, 4 Munf. 251 ; 21 Enc. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Boyles' Adm'r v. Overby
green
1 sentence1891In determining whether a cause of action survives to the personal representative, the real nature of the injury or claim ought to be regarded, and not the form of the remedy by which it is sought to be redressed or enforced.” It is true this court in the earlier case of Boyles’ Adm’r v. Overby, 11 Gratt., 202 , decided differently. | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.