20 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1916–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Massachusetts v. Mellongreen2 sentences2020In this case, we need only consider whether Appellees meet the first prong, the injury requirement: whether the litigant “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). 2020In this case, we need only consider whether Appellees meet the first prong, the injury requirement: whether the litigant “Tias sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). | 3 | 3 |
O'Shea v. Littletongreen2 sentences2020In this case, we need only consider whether Appellees meet the first prong, the injury requirement: whether the litigant “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). 2020In this case, we need only consider whether Appellees meet the first prong, the injury requirement: whether the litigant “Tias sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). | 3 | 3 |
Whitmore Ex Rel. Simmons v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2020It is well-settled that “[ajllegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of [standing].” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). 2020It is well-settled that “(a]llegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of [standing].” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
Elena David v. J. Alphingreen2 sentences2020Importantly, the requirement of an injury in fact is a hard floor of our courts’ jurisdiction that cannot be set aside by courts or legislatures.46 So in 44 See Lee, 837 F.3d at 546 (rejecting argument that plan beneficiaries’ statutory right to proper plan management sufficed for Article HI standing where participants did not themselves have a concrete stake in the suit and reiterating that the Lujan Court “clarified that a legislative creating of rights does not eliminate the injury requirement for a party seeking review” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578)); see also Alphin, 704 F.3d at 338 (re 2020Importantly, the requirement of an injury in fact is a hard floor of our courts’ jurisdiction that cannot be set aside by courts or legislatures.46 So in 44See Lee, 837 F.3d at 546 (rejecting argument that plan beneficiaries’ statutory right to proper plan management sufficed for Article III standing where participants did not themselves have a concrete stake in the suit and reiterating that the Lujan Court “clarified that a legislative creating of rights does not eliminate the injury requirement for a party seeking review” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578)); see also Alphin, 704 F.3d at 338 (re | 2 | 2 |
William Lee v. Verizon Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2020Importantly, the requirement of an injury in fact is a hard floor of our courts’ jurisdiction that cannot be set aside by courts or legislatures.46 So in 44 See Lee, 837 F.3d at 546 (rejecting argument that plan beneficiaries’ statutory right to proper plan management sufficed for Article HI standing where participants did not themselves have a concrete stake in the suit and reiterating that the Lujan Court “clarified that a legislative creating of rights does not eliminate the injury requirement for a party seeking review” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578)); see also Alphin, 704 F.3d at 338 (re 2020Importantly, the requirement of an injury in fact is a hard floor of our courts’ jurisdiction that cannot be set aside by courts or legislatures.46 So in 44See Lee, 837 F.3d at 546 (rejecting argument that plan beneficiaries’ statutory right to proper plan management sufficed for Article III standing where participants did not themselves have a concrete stake in the suit and reiterating that the Lujan Court “clarified that a legislative creating of rights does not eliminate the injury requirement for a party seeking review” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578)); see also Alphin, 704 F.3d at 338 (re | 2 | 2 |
Summers v. Earth Island Institutegreen1 sentence2020Importantly, the requirement of an injury in fact is a hard floor of our courts’ jurisdiction that cannot be set aside by courts or legislatures.46 So in 44 See Lee, 837 F.3d at 546 (rejecting argument that plan beneficiaries’ statutory right to proper plan management sufficed for Article HI standing where participants did not themselves have a concrete stake in the suit and reiterating that the Lujan Court “clarified that a legislative creating of rights does not eliminate the injury requirement for a party seeking review” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578)); see also Alphin, 704 F.3d at 338 (re | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hugenberg v. West American Insurance Co./Ohio Casualty Group
green
2 sentences2024Id. 2024Id. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Estep Coal Company v. Ward
green
2 sentences1994Estep Coal Co. v. Ward, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 367 (1967); Osborne v. Blackburn, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 144 (1965). 1992Estep Coal Co. v. Ward, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 367 (1967). | 2 | 1992–1994 |
Weaver v. Toney
green
2 sentences1918Weaver v. Toney, Judge, 107 Ky. 419 ; L. & N. R. 1916Weaver v. Toney, Judge, 107 Ky. 419 ; L. & N. R. | 2 | 1916–1918 |
Mamie Baytos Widow of Stephen Baytos v. Family Dollar
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 66-67 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Shields v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co.
green
2 sentences2023Thus, the Board’s previous recommendation that the ALJ “clearly outline his decision as it relates to an occupational disease claim, not as an injury claim” was “unavailing dicta.” -6- explanation clearly informs all parties of the basis for his decision as required by Shields v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 634 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. App. 1982). 2023Thus, the Board’s previous recommendation that the ALJ “clearly outline his decision as it relates to an occupational disease claim, not as an injury claim” was “unavailing dicta.” -6- explanation clearly informs all parties of the basis for his decision as required by Shields v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 634 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. App. 1982). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Lewis v. B & R CORPORATION
green
1 sentence2021Even so, the “violation must be a substantial factor in causing the injury and the violation must be one intended to prevent the specific type of occurrence before liability can attach.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Osborne Mining Corporation v. Blackburn
green
1 sentence1994Estep Coal Co. v. Ward, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 367 (1967); Osborne v. Blackburn, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 144 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Davis
neutral
1 sentence1992Island Creek Coal Co. v. Davis, Ky.App., 761 S.W.2d 179 (1988). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Kentland Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1980Kentland Elkhorn Coal Company v. Johnson, Ky.App., 549 S.W.2d 308 (1977) and Wagoner v. Smith, Ky., 530 S.W.2d 368 (1975). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Wagoner v. Smith
green
1 sentence1980Kentland Elkhorn Coal Company v. Johnson, Ky.App., 549 S.W.2d 308 (1977) and Wagoner v. Smith, Ky., 530 S.W.2d 368 (1975). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Carey Lumber Co. v. Newsome
green
1 sentence1971In Carey Lumber Company v. Newsome, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 691 (decided November 5, 1971) there was positive evidence that the injury on which the claim was based alone and independently caused all of the resulting occupational disability. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Carey v. Sampson
neutral
1 sentence1922(Carey v. Sampson, Judge, 150 Ky. 460 ; Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 170 Ky. 412 .) Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, supra, is a relatively recent case in which there is a reiteration of the established rule, that the granting of a writ of prohibition under section 110 of the Constitution is never warranted save in exceptional or unusual cases, where it is shown that an injury or the violation of one’s rights is threatened, against which there is no other adequate remedy. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon
green
2 sentences1922(Carey v. Sampson, Judge, 150 Ky. 460 ; Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 170 Ky. 412 .) Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, supra, is a relatively recent case in which there is a reiteration of the established rule, that the granting of a writ of prohibition under section 110 of the Constitution is never warranted save in exceptional or unusual cases, where it is shown that an injury or the violation of one’s rights is threatened, against which there is no other adequate remedy. 1922(Carey v. Sampson, Judge, 150 Ky. 460 ; Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 170 Ky. 412 .) Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, supra, is a relatively recent case in which there is a reiteration of the established rule, that the granting of a writ of prohibition under section 110 of the Constitution is never warranted save in exceptional or unusual cases, where it is shown that an injury or the violation of one’s rights is threatened, against which there is no other adequate remedy. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Adams Express Co. v. Young
neutral
1 sentence1920A review of all the cases decided by this court upon applications for writs of prohibition under section 110, supra, sustains the view, that the writ is granted as a matter of sound discretion, determined by the facts of the particular case, which must present an exceptional or unusual state of facts, which make it apparent that an injury or violation of one’s rights is threatened, and against the results of which he has no adequate remedy, other than the writ of prohibition.” Following the rule laid down in this case, which is in harmony with the rule announced in many others, among them Adam | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Hughes v. Atlanta Steel Co.
green
1 sentence1916Hughes v. Atlanta Steel Co., 136 Ga. 511 , 37 L. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.