injury claim in Oregon

1934By force of the statute, the jurisdiction thus acquired continues as long as that workman suffers disability, the proximate cause of which reasonably may be traced to the injury for which claim for compensation was originally made and compensation awarded thereon: Bethlehem Ship Building Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 181 Cal. 500 ( 185 P. 179 , 7 A. L.

1934By force of the statute, the jurisdiction thus acquired continues as long as that workman suffers disability, the proximate cause of which reasonably may be traced to the injury for which claim for compensation was originally made and compensation awarded thereon: Bethlehem Ship Building Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 181 Cal. 500 ( 185 P. 179 , 7 A. L.

2004Id. at 638 .

1993Id. at 638 .

2023Id. at 129 .

2023Id. at 542-43 (citing statute); see also id. at 552-53 (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (describing statutory exceptions and not- ing that former ORS 121.010 (1963) operated “to preclude any representative from continuing or bringing a personal injury cause of action on behalf of a deceased person”).

2023Id.

2022Workers’ Compensation Board 1901029; A174837 509 P3d 763 Employer TriMet filed a petition for reconsideration, contending that the Court of Appeals made a misstatement of fact and erred in its analysis con- cerning the standard of proof of medical causation on an initial injury claim.

2022Cite as 323 Or App 11 (2022) 13 In his order rejecting claimant’s new/omitted med- ical condition claim and upholding employer’s denial, the ALJ found that the evidence did not support claimant’s contention that her thumb condition was related to the accepted injury.

2013Plaintiff’s claim for benefits was denied because of what Defendant proved in the hearing before the ALJ and not because of what Plaintiff failed to prove at that hearing.” (Emphases in original.) Defendant also addressed Article I, section 10, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Smothers, 332 Or 83 , arguing that the court’s holding in that case was not applicable because Smothers addressed an occupational disease claim, whereas plaintiff had filed an injury claim governed by “a different standard of proof’ than that applicable to occupational disease claims.

2010The standards for determining the compensability of a combined condition under ORS 656.005(7) shall also be used to determine the occurrence of a new compensable injury or disease under this section.” The board explained that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Multifoods Specialty Distribution v. McAtee, 333 Or 629, 635 , 43 P3d 1101 (2002), if the claimant’s condition “combined” with a preexisting condition, then the standard set forth in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) applies to the determination whether the claimant is to be compensated for the combined condition.

2010The standards for determining the compensability of a combined condition under ORS 656.005(7) shall also be used to determine the occurrence of a new compensable injury or disease under this section.” The board explained that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Multifoods Specialty Distribution v. McAtee, 333 Or 629, 635 , 43 P3d 1101 (2002), if the claimant’s condition “combined” with a preexisting condition, then the standard set forth in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) applies to the determination whether the claimant is to be compensated for the combined condition.

2007However, as the Court in Lewis also made clear, the injury requirement is not satisfied by “just any type of frustrated legal claim.” 518 US at 354 .

2007Rather, the tools that the state is required to provide are those that are necessary for inmates to “attack their sentences, directly or collaterally,” and “to challenge the conditions of their confinement.” Id. at 355 .

2001If a new compensable injury occurs, all further compensable medical services and disability involving the same condition shall be processed as a new injury claim by the subsequent employer.” 2 We asked the parties for additional briefing to address the application of Croman Corp. v. Serrano, 163 Or App 136 , 986 P2d 1253 (1999).

2001If a new compensable injury occurs, all further compensable medical services and disability involving the same condition shall be processed as a new injury claim by the subsequent employer.” 2 We asked the parties for additional briefing to address the application of Croman Corp. v. Serrano, 163 Or App 136 , 986 P2d 1253 (1999).

2000SAIF relies on Greenwade v. SAIF, 41 Or App 697 , 598 P2d 1265 , rev den 288 Or 173 (1979), to support its argument that a stipulation is authorized when a claim remains denied.

2000SAIF relies on Greenwade v. SAIF, 41 Or App 697 , 598 P2d 1265 , rev den 288 Or 173 (1979), to support its argument that a stipulation is authorized when a claim remains denied.

1999The standards for determining the compensability of a combined condition under ORS 656.005(7) shall also be used to determine the occurrence of a new compensable injury or disease under this section.” (Emphasis added.) At the outset, we note that in Multifoods Specialty Distribution v. McAtee, 164 Or App 654 , 993 P2d 174 (1999), we held that, for the purpose of ORS 656.308(1), a new compensable injury “involves the same condition” when the new compensable injury encompasses, or has as part of itself, the prior compensable injury.

1999The standards for determining the compensability of a combined condition under ORS 656.005(7) shall also be used to determine the occurrence of a new compensable injury or disease under this section.” (Emphasis added.) At the outset, we note that in Multifoods Specialty Distribution v. McAtee, 164 Or App 654 , 993 P2d 174 (1999), we held that, for the purpose of ORS 656.308(1), a new compensable injury “involves the same condition” when the new compensable injury encompasses, or has as part of itself, the prior compensable injury.

1998It states that, because knowledge of a compensable injury is sufficient to support penalties, see Tri-Met, Inc. v. Odighizuwa, 112 Or App 159, 164 , 828 P2d 468 (1992), the ALJ would certainly have awarded penalties if she had believed that defendant knew of the claim at the time of the termination. “[H]ad she determined that the termination was motivated by retaliation for an injury or claim * * * the conclusion of unreasonable denial would be inescapable * * (Emphasis in original.) The difficulty with defendant’s argument is that there is nothing inconsistent in an employer reasonably believ

1998It states that, because knowledge of a compensable injury is sufficient to support penalties, see Tri-Met, Inc. v. Odighizuwa, 112 Or App 159, 164 , 828 P2d 468 (1992), the ALJ would certainly have awarded penalties if she had believed that defendant knew of the claim at the time of the termination. “[H]ad she determined that the termination was motivated by retaliation for an injury or claim * * * the conclusion of unreasonable denial would be inescapable * * (Emphasis in original.) The difficulty with defendant’s argument is that there is nothing inconsistent in an employer reasonably believ

1996The standards for determining the compensability of a combined condition under ORS 656.005(7) shall also be used to determine the occurrence of a new compensable injury or disease under this section.” 2 Our decision in Smurfit Newsprint v. DeRosset, 118 Or App 368 , 848 P2d 116 (1993), involved the application of ORS 656.308(1) 3 in circumstances similar to these.

1996The standards for determining the compensability of a combined condition under ORS 656.005(7) shall also be used to determine the occurrence of a new compensable injury or disease under this section.” 2 Our decision in Smurfit Newsprint v. DeRosset, 118 Or App 368 , 848 P2d 116 (1993), involved the application of ORS 656.308(1) 3 in circumstances similar to these.

1995In Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 223 , 621 P2d 547 (1980), the Supreme Court said that the analysis of the validity of an agency rule that construes a statute depends on which of three categories of statutory terms is involved: “1.) Terms of precise meaning, whether of common or technical'parlance, requiring only factfinding by the agency and judicial review for substantial evidence; “2.) Inexact terms which require agency interpretation and judicial review for consistency with legislative policy; and “3.) Terms of delegation which require legislative policy determin

1995In Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 223 , 621 P2d 547 (1980), the Supreme Court said that the analysis of the validity of an agency rule that construes a statute depends on which of three categories of statutory terms is involved: “1.) Terms of precise meaning, whether of common or technical'parlance, requiring only factfinding by the agency and judicial review for substantial evidence; “2.) Inexact terms which require agency interpretation and judicial review for consistency with legislative policy; and “3.) Terms of delegation which require legislative policy determin

1994However, a claim under ORS 656.273(1) for the worsening of an accepted compensable condition is not a claim for a new injury. [1] "When the claimant has an injury that has been determined to be compensable under [the material contributing cause] standard of medical causation, the words of subparagraph (B) are easily understood: A condition resulting from a combination of the injury and a preexisting condition is compensable only if the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment of the `resultant condition.'" 120 Or.App. at 592 , 853 P.2d 315 . [2

1994However, a claim under ORS 656.273(1) for the worsening of an accepted compensable condition is not a claim for a new injury. [1] "When the claimant has an injury that has been determined to be compensable under [the material contributing cause] standard of medical causation, the words of subparagraph (B) are easily understood: A condition resulting from a combination of the injury and a preexisting condition is compensable only if the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment of the `resultant condition.'" 120 Or.App. at 592 , 853 P.2d 315 . [2

1993Before it was amended, ORS 656.273(6) required an employer to begin payment of compensation on an aggravation claim “no later than the 14th day after the subject employer has notice or knowledge of medically verified inability to work resulting from the worsened, condition.” (Emphasis supplied.) Relying on that language and the statute’s reference to ORS 656.262(4), which, in 1979, required payment of benefits no later than the 14th day after the employer had notice or knowledge of an injury claim, we held in Silsby v. SAIF, 39 Or App 555 , 592 P2d 1074 (1979), that a worker making an aggravat

1993Before it was amended, ORS 656.273(6) required an employer to begin payment of compensation on an aggravation claim “no later than the 14th day after the subject employer has notice or knowledge of medically verified inability to work resulting from the worsened, condition.” (Emphasis supplied.) Relying on that language and the statute’s reference to ORS 656.262(4), which, in 1979, required payment of benefits no later than the 14th day after the employer had notice or knowledge of an injury claim, we held in Silsby v. SAIF, 39 Or App 555 , 592 P2d 1074 (1979), that a worker making an aggravat

1993If a new compensable injury occurs, all further compensable medical services and disability involving the same condition shall be processed as a new injury claim by the subsequent employer.” In SAIF v. Drews, 117 Or App 596 , 845 P2d 217 (1993), we held that, in order to shift responsibility to a subsequent employer under ORS 656.308(1), the first employer has the burden to establish that the claimant experienced a new injury at the subsequent employment.

1993If a new compensable injury occurs, all further compensable medical services and disability involving the same condition shall be processed as a new injury claim by the subsequent employer.” In SAIF v. Drews, 117 Or App 596 , 845 P2d 217 (1993), we held that, in order to shift responsibility to a subsequent employer under ORS 656.308(1), the first employer has the burden to establish that the claimant experienced a new injury at the subsequent employment.

1993See, e.g., Harris v. Kissling, 80 Or App 5, 8 , 721 P2d 828 (1986); Saechao v. Matsakoun, 78 Or App 340, 348 , 717 P2d 165 , rev dismissed 302 Or 155 (1986).

1993See, e.g., Harris v. Kissling, 80 Or App 5, 8 , 721 P2d 828 (1986); Saechao v. Matsakoun, 78 Or App 340, 348 , 717 P2d 165 , rev dismissed 302 Or 155 (1986).

1993See, e.g., Harris v. Kissling, 80 Or App 5, 8 , 721 P2d 828 (1986); Saechao v. Matsakoun, 78 Or App 340, 348 , 717 P2d 165 , rev dismissed 302 Or 155 (1986).

1992If plaintiff misrepresented her condition, defendant would be subjected to the risk that the misrepresentátion might go undetected and claims relating to plaintiffs digestive tract might be paid.” 259 Or at 50 .

1991Relying on Spurlock v. International Paper Co., 89 Or App 461 , 749 P2d 611 (1988), it argues that American, as the employer that had last accepted an injury claim, must prove that the employment at Stevens caused a worsening of the underlying condition in order to shift responsibility under the last injurious exposure rule.

1991Relying on Spurlock v. International Paper Co., 89 Or App 461 , 749 P2d 611 (1988), it argues that American, as the employer that had last accepted an injury claim, must prove that the employment at Stevens caused a worsening of the underlying condition in order to shift responsibility under the last injurious exposure rule.

1990Oregon has adopted the distinction between an “injury” and a “disease” explained in IB Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law § 41:31: “ ‘* * * What set[s] occupational diseases apart from accidental injuries [is] both the fact that they can[not] honestly be *202 said to be unexpected, since they [are] recognized as an inherent hazard of continued exposure to conditions of the. particular employment, and the fact that they [are] gradual rather than sudden in onset.* * *’” James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343, 348 , 624 P2d 565 (1980); Donald Drake Co. v. Lundmark, 63 Or App 261, 266 , 663 P2d 1303 (1983), rev

1990Oregon has adopted the distinction between an “injury” and a “disease” explained in IB Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law § 41:31: “ ‘* * * What set[s] occupational diseases apart from accidental injuries [is] both the fact that they can[not] honestly be *202 said to be unexpected, since they [are] recognized as an inherent hazard of continued exposure to conditions of the. particular employment, and the fact that they [are] gradual rather than sudden in onset.* * *’” James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343, 348 , 624 P2d 565 (1980); Donald Drake Co. v. Lundmark, 63 Or App 261, 266 , 663 P2d 1303 (1983), rev

1990Oregon has adopted the distinction between an “injury” and a “disease” explained in IB Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law § 41:31: “ ‘* * * What set[s] occupational diseases apart from accidental injuries [is] both the fact that they can[not] honestly be *202 said to be unexpected, since they [are] recognized as an inherent hazard of continued exposure to conditions of the. particular employment, and the fact that they [are] gradual rather than sudden in onset.* * *’” James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343, 348 , 624 P2d 565 (1980); Donald Drake Co. v. Lundmark, 63 Or App 261, 266 , 663 P2d 1303 (1983), rev

1990Oregon has adopted the distinction between an “injury” and a “disease” explained in IB Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law § 41:31: “ ‘* * * What set[s] occupational diseases apart from accidental injuries [is] both the fact that they can[not] honestly be *202 said to be unexpected, since they [are] recognized as an inherent hazard of continued exposure to conditions of the. particular employment, and the fact that they [are] gradual rather than sudden in onset.* * *’” James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343, 348 , 624 P2d 565 (1980); Donald Drake Co. v. Lundmark, 63 Or App 261, 266 , 663 P2d 1303 (1983), rev