21 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. Colorado State Lottery Divisiongreen2 sentences2016See Robinson, 179 P.3d at 1005 . 2016See Robinson, 179 P.3d at 1005. | 2 | 2 |
Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2025If the water court determines that the proposed augmentation plan will not result in injury, it "shall" approve the plan. § 37-92-305 (3) (a) ; see also Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Simpson , 167 P.3d 729, 735 ( Colo. 2007 ) ( " [O] nly if operation of the [augmentation] plan would cause injury . . . does the statute require the water judge to deny the plan." ) , as modified on denial of reh'g ( Oct. 1, 2007 ) . ¶54 The same statutory requirements that govern applications for new augmentation plans also govern an application that, like Independence's, seeks to amend an existing augmentatio 2025If the water court determines that the proposed augmentation plan will not result in injury, it "shall" approve the plan. § 37-92-305 (3) (a) ; see also Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Simpson , 167 P.3d 729, 735 ( Colo. 2007 ) ( " [O] nly if operation of the [augmentation] plan would cause injury . . . does the statute require the water judge to deny the plan." ) , as modified on denial of reh'g ( Oct. 1, 2007 ) . ¶54 The same statutory requirements that govern applications for new augmentation plans also govern an application that, like Independence's, seeks to amend an existing augmentatio | 1 | 1 |
Abrahamson v. City of Montrosegreen1 sentence2024Ct., 842 P.2d 233, 233-36 (Colo. 1992); Abrahamson v. City of Montrose, 77 P.3d 819, 821 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 12 Citing East Lakewood, 842 P.2d at 235-36 , the district court acknowledged in its order that “[a] claimant’s ignorance as to what parties may bear responsibility for the injury is not a defense to the notice deadline.” But the court nonetheless denied the motion to dismiss, distinguishing East Lakewood on the basis that “Mostellar could [not] reasonably have been expected to know that [Colorado Springs] had any potential liability or to find out about the intergovernmental agreement | 1 | 1 |
East Lakewood Sanitation District v. District Court in & for the County of Jeffersongreen2 sentences2024Ct., 842 P.2d 233, 233-36 (Colo. 1992); Abrahamson v. City of Montrose, 77 P.3d 819, 821 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 12 Citing East Lakewood, 842 P.2d at 235-36 , the district court acknowledged in its order that “[a] claimant’s ignorance as to what parties may bear responsibility for the injury is not a defense to the notice deadline.” But the court nonetheless denied the motion to dismiss, distinguishing East Lakewood on the basis that “Mostellar could [not] reasonably have been expected to know that [Colorado Springs] had any potential liability or to find out about the intergovernmental agreement 2024Ct., 842 P.2d 233, 233-36 (Colo. 1992); Abrahamson v. City of Montrose, 77 P.3d 819, 821 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 12 Citing East Lakewood, 842 P.2d at 235-36 , the district court acknowledged in its order that “[a] claimant’s ignorance as to what parties may bear responsibility for the injury is not a defense to the notice deadline.” But the court nonetheless denied the motion to dismiss, distinguishing East Lakewood on the basis that “Mostellar could [not] reasonably have been expected to know that [Colorado Springs] had any potential liability or to find out about the intergovernmental agreement | 1 | 1 |
Guerrero v. Baileygreen1 sentence2018Goodridge v. Dahl, 107 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Colo. App. 2005) (“Because the evidence was sufficient to support the subsequent injury instruction and adequately formed a question of fact for the jury to decide, we perceive no error by the court in instructing the jury on subsequent injury.”); Guerreo v. Bailey, 658 P.2d 278, 279-80 (Colo. App. 1982) (“Since the defendant introduced evidence that [plaintiff’s layoff] aggravated the emotional injuries caused by the collision . . . the instruction was 4 warranted.”). | 1 | 1 |
Francis Ex Rel. Goodridge v. Dahlgreen1 sentence2018Goodridge v. Dahl, 107 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Colo. App. 2005) (“Because the evidence was sufficient to support the subsequent injury instruction and adequately formed a question of fact for the jury to decide, we perceive no error by the court in instructing the jury on subsequent injury.”); Guerreo v. Bailey, 658 P.2d 278, 279-80 (Colo. App. 1982) (“Since the defendant introduced evidence that [plaintiff’s layoff] aggravated the emotional injuries caused by the collision . . . the instruction was 4 warranted.”). | 1 | 1 |
Keefe v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.green1 sentence2003Keefe v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 868 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo.App.1998), aff'd, 900 P.2d 97 (Colo.1995); see also Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 166 Colo. 118 , 444 P.2d 397 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Companygreen2 sentences2003Keefe v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 868 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo.App.1998), aff'd, 900 P.2d 97 (Colo.1995); see also Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 166 Colo. 118 , 444 P.2d 397 (1968). 2003Keefe v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 868 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo.App.1998), aff'd, 900 P.2d 97 (Colo.1995); see also Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 166 Colo. 118 , 444 P.2d 397 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co.green1 sentence1999See City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 89 (Colo.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Peterson v. Ground Water Commissiongreen2 sentences1996Given the factual nature of the injury inquiry, the water court’s “factual determinations and conclusions based thereon cannot be disturbed on appeal if they are based on the record.” Simpson, 886 P.2d at 698 ; accord Peterson v. Ground Water Comm’n, 195 Colo. 508, 516 , 579 P.2d 629, 634 (1978). 1996Given the factual nature of the injury inquiry, the water court’s “factual determinations and conclusions based thereon cannot be disturbed on appeal if they are based on the record.” Simpson, 886 P.2d at 698 ; accord Peterson v. Ground Water Comm’n, 195 Colo. 508, 516 , 579 P.2d 629, 634 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Knox College v. Celotex Corp.green2 sentences1986Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill.2d 407 , 58 Ill.Dec. 725 , 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (1981). 1986Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill.2d 407 , 58 Ill.Dec. 725 , 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Buffalo Park Development Co. v. Mountain Mutual Reservoir Co.
green
1 sentence2025Buffalo Park , 195 P.3d at 690 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz
neutral
1 sentence2025Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz, 2016 CO 37M , ¶ 16. ¶ 78 “Whether a particular claim lies in tort or could lie in tort within the meaning of the [Act] depends on the factual basis underlying the claim.” City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Young
green
1 sentence2024Ct., 842 P.2d 233, 233-36 (Colo. 1992); Abrahamson v. City of Montrose, 77 P.3d 819, 821 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 12 Citing East Lakewood, 842 P.2d at 235-36 , the district court acknowledged in its order that “[a] claimant’s ignorance as to what parties may bear responsibility for the injury is not a defense to the notice deadline.” But the court nonetheless denied the motion to dismiss, distinguishing East Lakewood on the basis that “Mostellar could [not] reasonably have been expected to know that [Colorado Springs] had any potential liability or to find out about the intergovernmental agreement | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kreft v. Adolph Coors Co.
green
1 sentence2021Kreft, 170 P.3d at 858 . ¶ 33 In its complaint, CO2 alleged that Montezuma County violated its members’ due process rights, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, by retroactively increasing the assessed value of their property without providing the members notice and an opportunity to challenge the assessment. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Meese v. Keene
green
2 sentences2015Seq, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 478 , 107 S.Ct. 1862 , 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (concluding that plaintiff had Article III standing where government action was alleged to have threatened his professional reputation); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 2015Seq, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 478 , 107 S.Ct. 1862 , 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (concluding that plaintiff had Article III standing where government action was alleged to have threatened his professional reputation); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Trail's End Ranch, L.L.C. v. Colorado Division of Water Resources
green
1 sentence2011The water court's decree now recognizes the Clobeville structure as a point of diversion and has placed conditions in the decree to protect against injury to other water rights in operating this diversion. 18 The no injury standard applies to protect other appropriators on the stream. § 37-92-805(8)(a); Trail's End Ranch, LLC., 91 P.3d at 1062 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc.
green
1 sentence2005Specifically, we have previously held that a plan for augmentation is to be approved by the water judge based on the same criterion involved in evaluating an application for change of water right, i.e., approval is required “if such change or plan will not injuriously affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or a decreed conditional water right.” Weibert , 200 Colo, at 318-19, 618 P.2d at 1373 (quoting § 37-92-305(3)); see also Simpson v. Yale Inv. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lascano v. Vowell
green
1 sentence2005Contrary to plaintiffs argument, Lascano v. Vowell, 940 P.2d 977 (Colo.App.1996), does not require evidence of permanency. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Vetten v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
green
2 sentences2005The panelists relied on Vetten v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 986 P.2d 983 (Colo.App.1999), which held that a petition to reopen an injury claim was governed by a statute of limitations enacted after the petition was filed because the time limitation was procedural or remedial in nature. 2005The panelists relied on Vetten v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 986 P.2d 983 (Colo.App.1999), which held that a petition to reopen an injury claim was governed by a statute of limitations enacted after the petition was filed because the time limitation was procedural or remedial in nature. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Terry v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence2003Lee v. Colo. Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo.1986); Terry v. Sullivan, 58 P.3d 1098 (Colo.App.2002). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pizza Hut of America, Inc. v. Keefe
green
1 sentence2003Keefe v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 868 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo.App.1998), aff'd, 900 P.2d 97 (Colo.1995); see also Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 166 Colo. 118 , 444 P.2d 397 (1968). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Lee v. Colorado Department of Health
green
1 sentence2003Lee v. Colo. Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo.1986); Terry v. Sullivan, 58 P.3d 1098 (Colo.App.2002). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Sabalka v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
green
1 sentence2002Sabalka v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 54 S.W.3d 605 (Mo.Ct.App.2001); see also Schaefer v. Union Pac. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re the Water Rights of Steffens
green
1 sentence1997However, when historical usage has been quantified for the ditch system by previous court determination, the yield per share which can be removed for use in an augmentation plan is not expected to differ from augmentation case to augmentation case, absent a showing of subsequent events which were not previously addressed by the water court but are germane to the injury inquiry in the present case. 8 Greenview Trust also seeks to invoke In re Steffens, 756 P.2d 1002 (Colo.1988), as controlling the case before us. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Simpson v. Yale Investments, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996Given the factual nature of the injury inquiry, the water court’s “factual determinations and conclusions based thereon cannot be disturbed on appeal if they are based on the record.” Simpson, 886 P.2d at 698 ; accord Peterson v. Ground Water Comm’n, 195 Colo. 508, 516 , 579 P.2d 629, 634 (1978). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Curry v. Industrial Commission
neutral
1 sentence1994The pre-1991 version of the statute, adopted in 1983, created an exemption from statutory employer liability for the “owner of a private home.” See Curry v. Industrial Commission, 672 P.2d 513 (Colo.1983). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Troelstrup
green
1 sentence1992Id. at 417 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.