injury claim in Texas

2019Taylor v. Margo, 508 S.W.3d 12, 24-25 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2015, pet. denied), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 391 (2016), citing Nauslar, 170 S.W.3d at 249 .

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242 (2005) trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong. 1 Cases that cite this headnote 3 Cases that cite this headnote [5] [9] Pleading Action Construction in General Persons entitled to sue The court construes the allegations in the A person has “standing” to sue if: (1) he has pleadings in favor of the pleader. sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains; (2) he has a Cases that cite

2015The Supreme Court held that “[t]he Formosa opinion’s rejection of the independent injury requirement in fraudulent inducement claims does not extend to claims for negligent misrepresentation or negligent inducement.” Id.

2012“The Formosa 15 opinion's rejection of the independent injury requirement in fraudulent inducement claims does not extend to claims for negligent misrepresentation or negligent inducement.” Id.

2008See Marburger, 957 S.W.2d at 89 .

2008See Marburger, 957 S.W.2d at 89 .

2018Id.

2013AVCO Corp. v. Interstate Sw., Ltd., 251 S.W.3d 632, 649 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); El Paso Cmty. Partners v. B & G/Sunrise Joint Venture, 24 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex.App.Austin 2000, no pet.).

2000See Lake Medina , 980 S.W.2d at 515-16 ; Billy B., Inc. v. Board of Trustees , 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Housing Auth. v. State ex rel.

2000See Lake Medina, 980 S.W.2d at 515-16 ; Billy B., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Housing Auth. v. State ex rel.

2008Id. at 874-75 (citing Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex.1998), to support proposition that the property must proximately cause the injury for immunity to be waived).

2008Id. at 874–75 (citing Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998), to support proposition that the property must proximately cause the injury for immunity to be waived).

2003In Federal Land Bank Ass'n v. Sloane , 825 S.W.2d 439, 442-43 (Tex. 1991), the Texas Supreme Court adopted the independent injury requirement of section 552B of the Second Restatement of Torts.

2003In Federal Land Bank Ass’n v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442-43 (Tex.1991), the Texas Supreme Court adopted the independent injury requirement of section 552B of the Second Restatement of Torts.

2019The plurality determined that the appellant did not modify or repair the appellee’s roof and further stated “Chapter 95 does not apply to a contractor’s employee’s claim against a property owner when the improvement the condition or use of which gives rise to the injury claim is not the same improvement the contractor was at the premises to address at the time of injury.” See id. at 157–58.

2015In Hernandez v. Brinker International, Inc., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to the plain language of section 95.002(2), Chapter 95 does not apply to a contractor’s employee's claim against a property owner when the improvement the condition or use of which gives rise to the injury claim is not the same improvement the contractor was at the premise to address at the time of injury. 285 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2012Formosa, 960 S.W.2d at 47 . 191 S.W.3d 805, 815-16 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).

2012Formosa, 960 S.W.2d at 47 . 191 S.W.3d 805 , 815–16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).

2006See Rodgers v. RAB Investments, Ltd., 816 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ); Assoc.

2001Marburger v. Seminole Pipeline Co., 957 S.W.2d 82, 89 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Rodgers v. RAB Investments, Ltd., 816 S.W.2d 543, 546 , (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ).

2025Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555–56 (Tex. 2000) (“Unless standing is conferred by statute, taxpayers must show as a rule that they have suffered a particularized injury distinct from that suffered by the general public in order to have standing to challenge a government action or assert a public right.” (footnote omitted));33 Lara, 52 S.W.3d at 178 (“As a general rule of Texas law, to have standing, unless it is conferred by statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she possesses an interest in a conflict distinct from that of the general public, such that the defendant’s actions have

2003See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (“general test” with injury requirement); Huff, 52 S.W.3d at 178 (“general rule” with injury requirement).

2020See Hall v. Douglas, 380 S.W.3d 860 , 872–73 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).

2018See Hall v. Douglas, 380 S.W.3d 860 , 872–73 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2005, no pet.).

2015Asshauer v. Wells Fargo Foothill, 263 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

2015Asshauer v. Wells Fargo Foothill, 263 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

2015The Court held that the injury requirement was not met because "the petition [did] not allege such facts as would authorize the suit by plaintiff, as an individual stockholder, against the company for damages in the depreciation of the value of his stock, and injury to the corporate property.” Cates, 11 S.W. at 850 (citing Evans v. Brandon, 53 Tex. 56, 60 (1880)).

2015The defendants also rely on this part of Cates—the discussion pertaining to the requirement that a plaintiff plead a breach of duty that would authorize a court to take action—as supportive of their standing argument. 11 The Court held that the injury requirement was not met because “the petition [did] not allege such facts as would authorize the suit by plaintiff, as an individual stockholder, against the company for damages in the depreciation of the value of his stock, and injury to the corporate property.” Cates, 11 S.W . at 850 (citing Evans v. Brandon, 53 Tex. 56, 60 (1880)).

2013Said another way, Elkins has not demonstrated as a matter of law that the Jaegers and Beckmans gave, in the words used in Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975), “knowing and express oral or written consent to the dangerous activity or condition.” Elkins has not shown its entitlement to summary judgment under the contractual doctrine of assumed risk. 3 We note that the record contains evidence that the tour guide requested another employee of Elkins to bring him brake fluid during the tour because the jeep’s brakes were not working.

2013Said another way, El-kins has not demonstrated as a matter of law that the Jaegers and Beckmans gave, in the words used in Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex.1975), “knowing and express oral or written consent to the dangerous activity or condition.” Elkins has not shown its entitlement to summary judgment under the contractual doctrine of assumed risk. 3.

2012See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro ISD , 973 S.W.2d 662 , 663–64 (Tex. 1998); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft Network, L.L.C. , 213 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2006, pets. denied) (op. on reh’g).

2012See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro ISD, 973 S.W.2d 662 , 663–64 (Tex. 1998); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft Network, L.L.C., 213 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2006, pets. denied) (op. on reh’g).

2008See Shah v. Moss , 67 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2001).

2008See Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2001).

2004See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro I.S.D ., 973 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. 1998) (refusing to extend to negligent misrepresentation cases Formosa Plastic’s exception to the independent injury requirement in fraudulent inducement cases). 46: 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). 47: 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ). 48: 808 S.W.2d at 639-40 . 49: Id . at 644. 50: Id . at 644-45 (citing Group Hosp.

2004See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro I.S.D ., 973 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. 1998) (refusing to extend to negligent misrepresentation cases Formosa Plastic’s exception to the independent injury requirement in fraudulent inducement cases). 46. 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). 47. 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ). 48. 808 S.W.2d at 639-40 . 49.

2004See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro I.S.D ., 973 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. 1998) (refusing to extend to negligent misrepresentation cases Formosa Plastic’s exception to the independent injury requirement in fraudulent inducement cases). 46: 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). 47: 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ). 48: 808 S.W.2d at 639-40 . 49: Id . at 644. 50: Id . at 644-45 (citing Group Hosp.

2004See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro I.S.D ., 973 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. 1998) (refusing to extend to negligent misrepresentation cases Formosa Plastic’s exception to the independent injury requirement in fraudulent inducement cases). 46: 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). 47: 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ). 48: 808 S.W.2d at 639-40 . 49: Id . at 644. 50: Id . at 644-45 (citing Group Hosp.

2000See Lake Medina , 980 S.W.2d at 515-16 ; Billy B., Inc. v. Board of Trustees , 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Housing Auth. v. State ex rel.

2000See Lake Medina, 980 S.W.2d at 515-16 ; Billy B., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Housing Auth. v. State ex rel.

2020Formosa Plastics Corp. United States v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998).

2014See Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. 1998) (required inquiry is whether source of the duty arises from the contract or from common law along with analysis of remedy sought by plaintiff).

2023Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Aguilar, 394 S.W.3d 276, 288 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied).

2021Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Aguilar, 394 S.W.3d 276, 288 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied).

2013AVCO Corp. v. Interstate Sw., Ltd., 251 S.W.3d 632, 649 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); El Paso Cmty. Partners v. B & G/Sunrise Joint Venture, 24 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex.App.Austin 2000, no pet.).

2013AVCO Corp. v. Interstate Sw., Ltd., 251 S.W.3d 632, 649 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); El Paso Cmty. Partners v. B & G/Sunrise Joint Venture, 24 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.).

2025To satisfy the injury requirement for standing, the Court has emphasized that “[t]he plaintiff must be personally injured—he must plead facts demonstrating that he, himself (rather than 14 APP034 a third party or the public at large), suffered the injury.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155.

2018The Supreme Court has summarized the injury requirement as follows: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed t

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768 (2009) 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 89 An application of the single injury rule does not arise unless there is more than one recovery for a single injury. 1 Cases that cite this headnote [2] Joint Adventures Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of Parties Secured Transactions Requisites and validity in general Secured Transactions Rights and liabilities of parties Joint venturer's assignment of right, title, and interest in joint venture in consideration of and as security for the payment of all i

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768 (2009) 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 89 An application of the single injury rule does not arise unless there is more than one recovery for a single injury. 1 Cases that cite this headnote [2] Joint Adventures Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of Parties Secured Transactions Requisites and validity in general Secured Transactions Rights and liabilities of parties Joint venturer's assignment of right, title, and interest in joint venture in consideration of and as security for the payment of all i

2010Robinson, 192 S.W.3d at 907 .

2009Robinson v. Neeley, 192 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).