injury standard in New Jersey

2009Indeed, in DiProspero, supra, the Court admonished the trial court and this court for engrafting a substantial injury requirement in verbal threshold cases contrary to the plain language of the recent amendment to the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (“No Fault Act”), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35. 183 N.J. at 481-82 , 874 A.2d 1039 .

2009Indeed, in DiProspero, supra, the Court admonished the trial court and this court for engrafting a substantial injury requirement in verbal threshold cases contrary to the plain language of the recent amendment to the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (“No Fault Act”), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35. 183 N.J. at 481-82 , 874 A.2d 1039 .

2005In affirming a grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs personal injury lawsuit, the appellate panel has superimposed, perhaps inadvertently, the same serious injury standard that we disapproved of in Serrano, supra. The following excerpt makes clear that the appellate panel apparently misread our recent decisions in interpreting AICRA: We discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A.2d 1058 (2005), that modifies plaintiffs obligation under Oswin[v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609

2005In affirming a grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs personal injury lawsuit, the appellate panel has superimposed, perhaps inadvertently, the same serious injury standard that we disapproved of in Serrano, supra. The following excerpt makes clear that the appellate panel apparently misread our recent decisions in interpreting AICRA: We discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A.2d 1058 (2005), that modifies plaintiffs obligation under Oswin[v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609

2021In Tully, the plaintiff attempted to recover funds from the defendant directly, as an individual, "despite the fact that the injury he claim[ed] appear[ed] to be suffered by [the corporation]." 457 N.J.

2005In affirming a grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs personal injury lawsuit, the appellate panel has superimposed, perhaps inadvertently, the same serious injury standard that we disapproved of in Serrano, supra. The following excerpt makes clear that the appellate panel apparently misread our recent decisions in interpreting AICRA: We discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A.2d 1058 (2005), that modifies plaintiffs obligation under Oswin[v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609

2005In affirming a grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs personal injury lawsuit, the appellate panel has superimposed, perhaps inadvertently, the same serious injury standard that we disapproved of in Serrano, supra. The following excerpt makes clear that the appellate panel apparently misread our recent decisions in interpreting AICRA: We discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A.2d 1058 (2005), that modifies plaintiffs obligation under Oswin[v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609

2005In affirming a grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs personal injury lawsuit, the appellate panel has superimposed, perhaps inadvertently, the same serious injury standard that we disapproved of in Serrano, supra. The following excerpt makes clear that the appellate panel apparently misread our recent decisions in interpreting AICRA: We discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A.2d 1058 (2005), that modifies plaintiffs obligation under Oswin[v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609

2005In affirming a grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs personal injury lawsuit, the appellate panel has superimposed, perhaps inadvertently, the same serious injury standard that we disapproved of in Serrano, supra. The following excerpt makes clear that the appellate panel apparently misread our recent decisions in interpreting AICRA: We discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A.2d 1058 (2005), that modifies plaintiffs obligation under Oswin[v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609

2003Id. at 500, 347 A. 2d 5 .

2001In Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Beeby, 327 N.J.Super. 394 , 743 A.2d 853 (App.Div.2000), we considered the applicability of insurance coverage where plaintiff brought an injury claim in a civil action against her long-term paramour on alternative theories of negligent and intentional conduct.

2001In Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Beeby, 327 N.J.Super. 394 , 743 A.2d 853 (App.Div.2000), we considered the applicability of insurance coverage where plaintiff brought an injury claim in a civil action against her long-term paramour on alternative theories of negligent and intentional conduct.

1991The court held that the law firm was liable to the creditor because: (1) the debtor's interest in a settlement was assignable and (2) the debtor's request of the law firm to endorse the settlement draft did not relieve the law firm of its duty under the assignment and (3) attorney disciplinary rules which require an attorney to promptly pay money in the possession to a client did not shield the law firm from responsibility for failing to pay on the assignment. [ Ibid. ] In Brinkman v. Moskowitz, 38 Misc. 2d 950 , 238 N.Y.S. 2d 876 (App.Div. 1962), the court held that an attorney who had notice

1991The court held that the law firm was liable to the creditor because: (1) the debtor's interest in a settlement was assignable and (2) the debtor's request of the law firm to endorse the settlement draft did not relieve the law firm of its duty under the assignment and (3) attorney disciplinary rules which require an attorney to promptly pay money in the possession to a client did not shield the law firm from responsibility for failing to pay on the assignment. [ Ibid. ] In Brinkman v. Moskowitz, 38 Misc. 2d 950 , 238 N.Y.S. 2d 876 (App.Div. 1962), the court held that an attorney who had notice

1991The court held that the law firm was liable to the creditor because: (1) the debtor's interest in a settlement was assignable and (2) the debtor's request of the law firm to endorse the settlement draft did not relieve the law firm of its duty under the assignment and (3) attorney disciplinary rules which require an attorney to promptly pay money in the possession to a client did not shield the law firm from responsibility for failing to pay on the assignment. [ Ibid. ] In Brinkman v. Moskowitz, 38 Misc. 2d 950 , 238 N.Y.S. 2d 876 (App.Div. 1962), the court held that an attorney who had notice

1971Under the so-called "discovery rule" of Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434 (1961), for defendant to prevail on a statute of limitations defense it is not enough that a plaintiff knows of the injury for which claim is made as a residual of the purported offensive treatment, but he must know or have reason to know that such treatment was negligently administered.