injury requirement in Utah

2013Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) ("Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.... [Wlhen a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) ("We believe our doctrine of standing in Towa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury require

2013Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) ("Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.... [Wlhen a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) ("We believe our doctrine of standing in Towa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury require

2013Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) ("Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.... [Wlhen a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) ("We believe our doctrine of standing in Towa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury require

2013Standing in the state courts is a judge-made doctrine and is used to refuse to determine the merits of a legal controversy irrespective of its correctness where the party advancing it is not properly situated to prosecute the action.” (footnotes omitted)). 10 Cite as: 2013 UT 18 Opinion of the Court est in the matter nor be a public official.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) (“We believe our doctrine of standing in Iowa is not so rigid that an excep- tion to the injury requirement could not be recognized for citizens who seek to resolve ce

2019See Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 1167, 1171 (Utah 1913) (“One of the principal objects of the statute is to prevent spurious claims from being paid, and, in order to fully accomplish that purpose, to give the city officials ample opportunity to examine into both the cause and extent of the injury and also to test the good faith of the claimant in presenting the claim.”); Hall v. Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶¶ 14, 23 , 24 P.3d 938 ; Lee v. Arizona, 182 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Ariz. 2008) (“A notice of claim serves to give the government notice of potential liability, an opportunity to investigate c

2001Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 315 , 134 P. 1167, 1171 (1913). where the government grants statutory rights of action against itself, any conditions placed on those rights must be followed precisely.

2024See Jepson v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 846 P.2d 485, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the plaintiff could meet the threshold injury of one resulting in medical expenses in excess of $3,000 “so long as his expenses exceeded the statutory minimum at time of trial” (emphasis added)).

2024Service v. Industrial Comm’n, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997) (“Substantive law is defined as the positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties and which may give rise to a cause of action.” (cleaned up)). ¶15 Rodriguez correctly points out that whether the threshold injury requirement has been met is a determination that is not made until the time of trial.

2019See Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 1167, 1171 (Utah 1913) (“One of the principal objects of the statute is to prevent spurious claims from being paid, and, in order to fully accomplish that purpose, to give the city officials ample opportunity to examine into both the cause and extent of the injury and also to test the good faith of the claimant in presenting the claim.”); Hall v. Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶¶ 14, 23 , 24 P.3d 938 ; Lee v. Arizona, 182 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Ariz. 2008) (“A notice of claim serves to give the government notice of potential liability, an opportunity to investigate c

2019See Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 1167, 1171 (Utah 1913) (“One of the principal objects of the statute is to prevent spurious claims from being paid, and, in order to fully accomplish that purpose, to give the city officials ample opportunity to examine into both the cause and extent of the injury and also to test the good faith of the claimant in presenting the claim.”); Hall v. Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶¶ 14, 23 , 24 P.3d 938 ; Lee v. Arizona, 182 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Ariz. 2008) (“A notice of claim serves to give the government notice of potential liability, an opportunity to investigate c

2018As we have stated many times, "an appellate court is not a depository in which a party may dump the burden of argument and research." See, e.g. , Wachocki v. Luna , 2014 UT App 139 , ¶ 14, 330 P.3d 717 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Davie , 2011 UT App 380 , ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 770 ("An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." (quotation simplified) ).

2018As we have stated many times, "an appellate court is not a depository in which a party may dump the burden of argument and research." See, e.g. , Wachocki v. Luna , 2014 UT App 139 , ¶ 14, 330 P.3d 717 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Davie , 2011 UT App 380 , ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 770 ("An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." (quotation simplified) ).

2013Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) ("Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.... [Wlhen a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) ("We believe our doctrine of standing in Towa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury require

2012See Arndt, 1999 UT 91, 1121-22 , 991 P.2d 584 (distinguishing between injuries that are unique to a shareholder and injuries that affect shareholders uniformly). §16 When a shareholder can "show ... an injury to him- or herself that is distinct from that suffered by the corporation," the shareholder may bring a traditional direct action to recover for that injury.

2012See Arndt, 1999 UT 91, 1121-22 , 991 P.2d 584 (distinguishing between injuries that are unique to a shareholder and injuries that affect shareholders uniformly). §16 When a shareholder can "show ... an injury to him- or herself that is distinct from that suffered by the corporation," the shareholder may bring a traditional direct action to recover for that injury.

2010See id.

2007Compare Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 , 353 n. 15 (Utah 1980) (indicating that an "intervening cause may be used as a defense against the plaintiff's proof of proximate causation"), with State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶22 , 132 P.3d 703 (distinguishing between a defense that contemplates an intervening force as the cause of the injury and a defense that presents an alternative version of events "which does not implicate intervening causes at all”); see also Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) (stating that defendants have the burden of proof with respect to affirmative defens

2007Compare Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 , 353 n. 15 (Utah 1980) (indicating that an "intervening cause may be used as a defense against the plaintiff's proof of proximate causation"), with State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶22 , 132 P.3d 703 (distinguishing between a defense that contemplates an intervening force as the cause of the injury and a defense that presents an alternative version of events "which does not implicate intervening causes at all”); see also Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) (stating that defendants have the burden of proof with respect to affirmative defens

2007Rather, BYU was refuting the Foxes’ preferred theory and reminding the court that "the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the injury was negligently caused by [the] defendant, [and that] it is not enough to show the injury ... might have occurred from negligence and many other causes.” Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217 , 2 P.2d 257, 265 (1931) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2007Rather, BYU was refuting the Foxes’ preferred theory and reminding the court that "the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the injury was negligently caused by [the] defendant, [and that] it is not enough to show the injury ... might have occurred from negligence and many other causes.” Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217 , 2 P.2d 257, 265 (1931) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2007Compare Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 , 353 n. 15 (Utah 1980) (indicating that an "intervening cause may be used as a defense against the plaintiff's proof of proximate causation"), with State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶22 , 132 P.3d 703 (distinguishing between a defense that contemplates an intervening force as the cause of the injury and a defense that presents an alternative version of events "which does not implicate intervening causes at all”); see also Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) (stating that defendants have the burden of proof with respect to affirmative defens

2007Compare Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 , 353 n. 15 (Utah 1980) (indicating that an "intervening cause may be used as a defense against the plaintiff's proof of proximate causation"), with State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶22 , 132 P.3d 703 (distinguishing between a defense that contemplates an intervening force as the cause of the injury and a defense that presents an alternative version of events "which does not implicate intervening causes at all”); see also Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) (stating that defendants have the burden of proof with respect to affirmative defens

1987Finally, in Mannes-Vale, Inc. v. Vale, 717 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that when the applicant gives his employer notice of the injury and a claim for benefits and where the employer paid the applicant’s medical benefits and disability compensation for three years after the accident, the employer and the Commission had notice of the applicant’s claim for purposes of section 35-1-99.