injury claim in Oklahoma

1934Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be forever barred unless within one year after the injury a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the State Industrial Commission, is a limitation on the remedy and not upon the right itself.’ Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 148 Okla. 36 , 296 P. 963 , the writer hereof dissenting.” Therefore, adhering to the rule as announced in the above cases, we are of the opinion that) when the petitioner herein filed with the Commission employer’s first notice of injury and paid wages in lieu of compensation to the respondent' >,o October 22, 1930, the jurisdi

1934Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be forever barred unless within one year after the injury a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the State Industrial Commission, is a limitation on the remedy and not upon the right itself.’ Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 148 Okla. 36 , 296 P. 963 , the writer hereof dissenting.” Therefore, adhering to the rule as announced in the above cases, we are of the opinion that) when the petitioner herein filed with the Commission employer’s first notice of injury and paid wages in lieu of compensation to the respondent' >,o October 22, 1930, the jurisdi

2025See Frye, 566 U.S. at 141-42 (a knowing and voluntary plea does not supersede plea counsel's errors); Lafler , 566 U.S. at 166 (finding that a subsequent fair trial is not a cure for prior insufficient assistance during plea negotiation process, but rather "the trial caused the injury from the error" when the defendant received a more severe sentence at trial); Jimenez , 2006 OK CR 43 ¶9 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant generally must show deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

2020Co. , 1992 OK CIV APP 177 , 852 P.2d 783 (approved for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 135 Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 1994 OK CIV APP 171 , 895 P.2d 731 (approved for publication by Supreme Court) explained in Roth v. Mercy Health Center, Inc. , 2011 OK 2 , ¶¶ 15-20, 246 P.3d 1079 . 136 Abel v. Tisdale , 1980 OK 61 , 619 P.2d 608, 609-610 . 137 Carris v. John R.

2020Co. , 1992 OK CIV APP 177 , 852 P.2d 783 (approved for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 135 Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 1994 OK CIV APP 171 , 895 P.2d 731 (approved for publication by Supreme Court) explained in Roth v. Mercy Health Center, Inc. , 2011 OK 2 , ¶¶ 15-20, 246 P.3d 1079 . 136 Abel v. Tisdale , 1980 OK 61 , 619 P.2d 608, 609-610 . 137 Carris v. John R.

2020Co. , 1992 OK CIV APP 177 , 852 P.2d 783 (approved for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 135 Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 1994 OK CIV APP 171 , 895 P.2d 731 (approved for publication by Supreme Court) explained in Roth v. Mercy Health Center, Inc. , 2011 OK 2 , ¶¶ 15-20, 246 P.3d 1079 . 136 Abel v. Tisdale , 1980 OK 61 , 619 P.2d 608, 609-610 . 137 Carris v. John R.

2020Co. , 1992 OK CIV APP 177 , 852 P.2d 783 (approved for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 135 Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 1994 OK CIV APP 171 , 895 P.2d 731 (approved for publication by Supreme Court) explained in Roth v. Mercy Health Center, Inc. , 2011 OK 2 , ¶¶ 15-20, 246 P.3d 1079 . 136 Abel v. Tisdale , 1980 OK 61 , 619 P.2d 608, 609-610 . 137 Carris v. John R.

2020Co. , 1992 OK CIV APP 177 , 852 P.2d 783 (approved for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 135 Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 1994 OK CIV APP 171 , 895 P.2d 731 (approved for publication by Supreme Court) explained in Roth v. Mercy Health Center, Inc. , 2011 OK 2 , ¶¶ 15-20, 246 P.3d 1079 . 136 Abel v. Tisdale , 1980 OK 61 , 619 P.2d 608, 609-610 . 137 Carris v. John R.

2020Co. , 1992 OK CIV APP 177 , 852 P.2d 783 (approved for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 135 Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 1994 OK CIV APP 171 , 895 P.2d 731 (approved for publication by Supreme Court) explained in Roth v. Mercy Health Center, Inc. , 2011 OK 2 , ¶¶ 15-20, 246 P.3d 1079 . 136 Abel v. Tisdale , 1980 OK 61 , 619 P.2d 608, 609-610 . 137 Carris v. John R.

2020Co. , 1992 OK CIV APP 177 , 852 P.2d 783 (approved for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 135 Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 1994 OK CIV APP 171 , 895 P.2d 731 (approved for publication by Supreme Court) explained in Roth v. Mercy Health Center, Inc. , 2011 OK 2 , ¶¶ 15-20, 246 P.3d 1079 . 136 Abel v. Tisdale , 1980 OK 61 , 619 P.2d 608, 609-610 . 137 Carris v. John R.

2020Co. , 1992 OK CIV APP 177 , 852 P.2d 783 (approved for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 135 Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 1994 OK CIV APP 171 , 895 P.2d 731 (approved for publication by Supreme Court) explained in Roth v. Mercy Health Center, Inc. , 2011 OK 2 , ¶¶ 15-20, 246 P.3d 1079 . 136 Abel v. Tisdale , 1980 OK 61 , 619 P.2d 608, 609-610 . 137 Carris v. John R.

2020Miller, M.D., Inc. , 1996 OK 80 , 921 P.2d 350, 355-356 (discussing the single injury rule for defining a single cause of action and how this common-law definition is applied in the context of a statute controlling contribution among tortfeasors and 12 O.S. § 832). 133 1913 OK 481 , 138 P. 790 . 134 Weavel v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar.

2020Miller, M.D., Inc. , 1996 OK 80 , 921 P.2d 350, 355-356 (discussing the single injury rule for defining a single cause of action and how this common-law definition is applied in the context of a statute controlling contribution among tortfeasors and 12 O.S. § 832). 133 1913 OK 481 , 138 P. 790 . 134 Weavel v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar.

2009R.R., 886 S.W.2d 104 (Mo.Ct.App.1994)(Suspicion of a cause is not enough; a claimant must either know of the problem and the probable connection or ignore a problem that would be apparent to a reasonable person.) While a doctor's diagnosis is not necessary to know of an injury and/or its cause, there is a difference between an injury for which a claim of compensation can be filed and intermittent pain that is presumed to be temporary and is quickly resolved.

2008Special Indemnity Fund v. Archer, 1993 OK 14, ¶ 9 , 847 P.2d 791, 794-795 .

2008Special Indemnity Fund v. Archer, 1993 OK 14, ¶ 9 , 847 P.2d 791, 794-795 .

2007TXO Production Corporation v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 1992 OK 39 , 829 P.2d 964 .

2007Interpreting this same statutory language, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Bowling v. Blackwell Zinc Company, 1959 OK 262, ¶ 0 , 347 P.2d 1022 , that "the furnishing of medical treatment to claimant by employer in connection with the injury for which claim was filed is the equivalent of 'payment of compensation," and is sufficient to toll the statute." T4 Employer's brief does not address Bowling, 2 but it does argue that the Legislature's 1977 amendment of 85 0.98.2001 § 483(A) to expressly include medical treatment furnished by the employer as a starting date of the two-year statute of li

2007Interpreting this same statutory language, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Bowling v. Blackwell Zinc Company, 1959 OK 262, ¶ 0 , 347 P.2d 1022 , that "the furnishing of medical treatment to claimant by employer in connection with the injury for which claim was filed is the equivalent of 'payment of compensation," and is sufficient to toll the statute." T4 Employer's brief does not address Bowling, 2 but it does argue that the Legislature's 1977 amendment of 85 0.98.2001 § 483(A) to expressly include medical treatment furnished by the employer as a starting date of the two-year statute of li

2001Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 11 , 930 P.2d 213, 219 . 2 {12 We therefore hold the three-judge panel committed no pure error of law in directing Fund to commence payment of PTD benefits to Claimant-after expiration of the "statutory calculation of time for [employer's] payment" of PPD benefits-by reference to the date of the last payment of TTD.

2001Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 11 , 930 P.2d 213, 219 . 2 {12 We therefore hold the three-judge panel committed no pure error of law in directing Fund to commence payment of PTD benefits to Claimant-after expiration of the "statutory calculation of time for [employer's] payment" of PPD benefits-by reference to the date of the last payment of TTD.

2001Seq, eg., Industrial Track Const. Co. v. Colthrop, 1933 OK. 67, 162 Okla. 274 , 19 P.2d 1084 (period of compensation for "other cases" PPD begins at the expiration of the TTD period, not from date of the PPD award). 1 Moreover, the plain language of § 172(E), in our view, evinces the Legislature's intent to treat all Fund claimants alike, regardless of the mode of payment of PPD benefits, and we are required, by the rules of statutory construction, to effect that which is so clearly expressed.

2001Seq, eg., Industrial Track Const. Co. v. Colthrop, 1933 OK. 67, 162 Okla. 274 , 19 P.2d 1084 (period of compensation for "other cases" PPD begins at the expiration of the TTD period, not from date of the PPD award). 1 Moreover, the plain language of § 172(E), in our view, evinces the Legislature's intent to treat all Fund claimants alike, regardless of the mode of payment of PPD benefits, and we are required, by the rules of statutory construction, to effect that which is so clearly expressed.

1994In Lang v. Amateur Softball Association of America, 520 P.2d at 661 , the Supreme Court considered a similar injury claim where a pitcher warming up in a “bull pen” area threw a wild pitch over a fence and struck the plaintiff.

1972The case was specifically approved and affirmed by this Court in Orrick Stone Co. v. Jeffries, supra. In Orrick Stone Co. v. Jeffries, supra (p. 1249) we said: “We have observed that in none of the cases we have found or to which our attention has been drawn, was there involved a situation wherein the injured employee, though perhaps having recovered to the maximum extent possible in his case, still was suffering with serious permanent effects of his injury that required that he have constant attendance and nursing care in order to avoid relapses that might involve danger to his health and lif

1972The case was specifically approved and affirmed by this Court in Orrick Stone Co. v. Jeffries, supra. In Orrick Stone Co. v. Jeffries, supra (p. 1249) we said: “We have observed that in none of the cases we have found or to which our attention has been drawn, was there involved a situation wherein the injured employee, though perhaps having recovered to the maximum extent possible in his case, still was suffering with serious permanent effects of his injury that required that he have constant attendance and nursing care in order to avoid relapses that might involve danger to his health and lif

1965Gas Co. v. Courtney, 182 Okl. 582 , 79 P.2d 235 : “2.

1965Gas Co. v. Courtney, 182 Okl. 582 , 79 P.2d 235 : “2.

1964In Shell Pipe Line Co. v. Camper, 143 Okl. 94 , 287 P. 1009 , employer contended it “should not be held liable for the payment of an award for compensation based on an accident occurring May 22, 1928, when the notice of the injury and claim for compensation alleged that the accident occurred ‘about the middle of June, 1928.’ ” In that case claimant testified from memory as to the injury, which happened nearly 12 months prior to the hearing, that the accident complained of happened “in the first part of June,” that he didn’t know the exact date but that it happened on the last day he worked for

1964In Shell Pipe Line Co. v. Camper, 143 Okl. 94 , 287 P. 1009 , employer contended it “should not be held liable for the payment of an award for compensation based on an accident occurring May 22, 1928, when the notice of the injury and claim for compensation alleged that the accident occurred ‘about the middle of June, 1928.’ ” In that case claimant testified from memory as to the injury, which happened nearly 12 months prior to the hearing, that the accident complained of happened “in the first part of June,” that he didn’t know the exact date but that it happened on the last day he worked for

1960In Indian Drilling Mud Company v. McGrew, supra, it is stated: “The requirement of 85 O.S.1951, § 43, that the right to claim compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be forever barred unless within one year after the injury a claim for compensation shall be filed with the State Industrial Commission may be waived by the employer and the insurance carrier .and held under the evidence in this case the statute' was waived,” There was no error in holding the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.

1934Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 148 Okla. 36 , 296 P. 963 ; Pine v. State Ind. Comm. et al., 148 Okla. 200 , 298 P. 276 .

1934Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 148 Okla. 36 , 296 P. 963 ; Pine v. State Ind. Comm. et al., 148 Okla. 200 , 298 P. 276 .

1933In the case of Southwestern Grocery Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 85 Okla. 248 , 205 P. 929 , this court considered this identical question under a set of facts almost identical with the case at bar.

1933In the case of Southwestern Grocery Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 85 Okla. 248 , 205 P. 929 , this court considered this identical question under a set of facts almost identical with the case at bar.

1933Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300 , 270 P. 1103 ; Pickering Lbr.

1933Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300 , 270 P. 1103 ; Pickering Lbr.