form immunity in New Jersey

2018The judge followed the Court's decision in Nelson Cooney & Son, Inc. v. South Harrison , 57 N.J. 384 , 273 A.2d 33 (1971) and found persuasive the Law Division's decision in Devine v. Mantua Township , 28 N.J.

2018The judge followed the Court's decision in Nelson Cooney & Son, Inc. v. South Harrison , 57 N.J. 384 , 273 A.2d 33 (1971) and found persuasive the Law Division's decision in Devine v. Mantua Township , 28 N.J.

2018The judge followed the Court's decision in Nelson Cooney & Son, Inc. v. South Harrison, 57 N.J. 384 (1971) and found persuasive the Law Division's decision in Devine v. Mantua Township, 28 N.J.

2018The judge followed the Court's decision in Nelson Cooney & Son, Inc. v. South Harrison , 57 N.J. 384 , 273 A.2d 33 (1971) and found persuasive the Law Division's decision in Devine v. Mantua Township , 28 N.J.

2017Super. 51, 63 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting United States v. Filiberto, 712 F. Supp. 482, 487 (E.D.Pa. 1989)), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277 (1995).

2015Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277 (1995).

1990The Court described use and fruits immunity as follows: Under this form of immunity the State is barred from using compelled testimony or any evidence that was developed as a result of such testimony to prosecute a defendant who had given the compelled testimony, but it can use any evidence that is found or derived through means totally independent of the compelled testimony; and it may use such independently obtained evidence to prosecute a defendant even if the prosecution is for the same crime or criminal events that were the subject of the compelled testimony. [ 110 N.J. at 589 , 542 A. 2d

1990The Court described use and fruits immunity as follows: Under this form of immunity the State is barred from using compelled testimony or any evidence that was developed as a result of such testimony to prosecute a defendant who had given the compelled testimony, but it can use any evidence that is found or derived through means totally independent of the compelled testimony; and it may use such independently obtained evidence to prosecute a defendant even if the prosecution is for the same crime or criminal events that were the subject of the compelled testimony. [ 110 N.J. at 589 , 542 A. 2d

1977The chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. 339 U.S. at 315 , 70 S.Ct. at 652 . [ 371 U.S. at 212 , 83 S.Ct. at 282 , 9 L.Ed. 2d at 259 ] The same theme is also repeated elsewhere in the opinion in the form of a rule: The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known.... [ Id. at 212-213 , 83 S.Ct. at 282 , 9 L.Ed. at 259]

1977The chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. 339 U.S. at 315 , 70 S.Ct. at 652 . [ 371 U.S. at 212 , 83 S.Ct. at 282 , 9 L.Ed. 2d at 259 ] The same theme is also repeated elsewhere in the opinion in the form of a rule: The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known.... [ Id. at 212-213 , 83 S.Ct. at 282 , 9 L.Ed. at 259]

1977Ed. 2d at 259 ] The same theme is also repeated elsewhere in the opinion in the form of a rule: The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known. . . . [Id. at 212-213, 83 S. Ct. at 282 , 9 L.

1977The chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. 339 U.S. at 315 , 70 S.Ct. at 652 . [ 371 U.S. at 212 , 83 S.Ct. at 282 , 9 L.Ed. 2d at 259 ] The same theme is also repeated elsewhere in the opinion in the form of a rule: The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known.... [ Id. at 212-213 , 83 S.Ct. at 282 , 9 L.Ed. at 259]

2018JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. **437 This appeal raises substantive and procedural issues about the immunity from local zoning laws and regulation that Rutgers v. Piluso , 60 N.J. 142 , 286 A.2d 697 (1972), recognized for a state university with respect to improvements on state-owned land. **438 Case law recognizes that a state higher educational institution like Montclair State University (MSU), statutorily vested with control over its property, see N.J.S.A. 18A:64-7, has a form of immunity, or exemption, from local land use controls when it comes to the use and develop

2018JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. **437 This appeal raises substantive and procedural issues about the immunity from local zoning laws and regulation that Rutgers v. Piluso , 60 N.J. 142 , 286 A.2d 697 (1972), recognized for a state university with respect to improvements on state-owned land. **438 Case law recognizes that a state higher educational institution like Montclair State University (MSU), statutorily vested with control over its property, see N.J.S.A. 18A:64-7, has a form of immunity, or exemption, from local land use controls when it comes to the use and develop

2014N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.10 extends a similar form of immunity protection for hospitals, peer reviewers, and decision-makers. (continued) will be judged by applying the objective standard regarding whether the Hospital based its actions upon the reasonable belief that they are in furtherance of quality healthcare."); Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[The HCQIA] is an objective standard, rather than a subjective good faith requirement."); Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, 313 F.3d 202, 212 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he HCQIA's objective reasonableness standard

2014N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.10 extends a similar form of immunity protection for hospitals, peer reviewers, and decision-makers. (continued) will be judged by applying the objective standard regarding whether the Hospital based its actions upon the reasonable belief that they are in furtherance of quality healthcare."); Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[The HCQIA] is an objective standard, rather than a subjective good faith requirement."); Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, 313 F.3d 202, 212 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he HCQIA's objective reasonableness standard

2014N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.10 extends a similar form of immunity protection for hospitals, peer reviewers, and decision-makers. (continued) will be judged by applying the objective standard regarding whether the Hospital based its actions upon the reasonable belief that they are in furtherance of quality healthcare."); Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[The HCQIA] is an objective standard, rather than a subjective good faith requirement."); Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, 313 F.3d 202, 212 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he HCQIA's objective reasonableness standard

2010Because a procedural rule "is in general to be deemed applicable to actions pending on its effective date," Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 120 , 299 A. 2d 394 (1973) (citations omitted), see also Romagnola v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596, 603 , 947 A. 2d 646 (2008), we have quoted the version now in effect. [3] The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel drops out of the equation because counsel could only be ineffective if defendant had a constitutional right to be present.

2010Because a procedural rule "is in general to be deemed applicable to actions pending on its effective date," Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 120 , 299 A. 2d 394 (1973) (citations omitted), see also Romagnola v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596, 603 , 947 A. 2d 646 (2008), we have quoted the version now in effect. [3] The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel drops out of the equation because counsel could only be ineffective if defendant had a constitutional right to be present.

2010Because a procedural rule "is in general to be deemed applicable to actions pending on its effective date," Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 120 , 299 A. 2d 394 (1973) (citations omitted), see also Romagnola v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596, 603 , 947 A. 2d 646 (2008), we have quoted the version now in effect. [3] The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel drops out of the equation because counsel could only be ineffective if defendant had a constitutional right to be present.

2010Because a procedural rule "is in general to be deemed applicable to actions pending on its effective date," Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 120 , 299 A. 2d 394 (1973) (citations omitted), see also Romagnola v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596, 603 , 947 A. 2d 646 (2008), we have quoted the version now in effect. [3] The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel drops out of the equation because counsel could only be ineffective if defendant had a constitutional right to be present.

2010NOTES [1] State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 , 577 A. 2d 806 (1990). [2] The rule as quoted above varies from the form of the rule considered by the PCR judge because the rule was amended effective February 1, 2010, to define the requirements for establishing that a ground for relief could not reasonably have been raised in a prior proceeding and to add a new subsection (b) applicable to second and subsequent PCR petitions.

2010NOTES [1] State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 , 577 A. 2d 806 (1990). [2] The rule as quoted above varies from the form of the rule considered by the PCR judge because the rule was amended effective February 1, 2010, to define the requirements for establishing that a ground for relief could not reasonably have been raised in a prior proceeding and to add a new subsection (b) applicable to second and subsequent PCR petitions.

2008The enhanced protections accorded to property owners, in the form of the requirement that the amendment pass by a supermajority, would have been diluted if, as the township urged, the denominator did not include "deaths, absences or recusals." Id. at 66, 178 A. 771 .

2002We also read Bastien as standing for the proposition that it is the substance, not merely the form of the state claim or remedy, that determines whether it is preempted under Section 332. [Ibid. (footnote omitted).] After the FCC issued its opinion, the California Court of Appeal in Spielholz rejected AT&T's argument that awarding damages for falsely advertising the quality of services constitutes rate regulation because a jury would necessarily evaluate the value of the services provided by the carrier. 104 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 200 .

1994Although the question of whether a refusal to sign a written acknowledgement that Miranda warnings have been given is apparently a matter of initial impression in New Jersey, the federal courts have consistently *63 held that such a refusal does not preclude a finding of waiver. "[F]ailure to sign a form of waiver does not preclude a finding of waiver, nor does it make further questioning a violation of defendant's constitutional rights." United States v. Filiberto, 712 F. Supp. 482, 487 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (finding statements voluntary despite refusal to sign waiver card because defendant responde

1994Although the question of whether a refusal to sign a written acknowledgement that Miranda warnings have been given is apparently a matter of initial impression in New Jersey, the federal courts have consistently *63 held that such a refusal does not preclude a finding of waiver. "[F]ailure to sign a form of waiver does not preclude a finding of waiver, nor does it make further questioning a violation of defendant's constitutional rights." United States v. Filiberto, 712 F. Supp. 482, 487 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (finding statements voluntary despite refusal to sign waiver card because defendant responde