form challenge in Massachusetts

2025See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 652 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) ("A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is the weakest form of challenge, and the one that is the least likely to succeed").

2024"A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is the weakest form of challenge, and the one that is the least likely to succeed," because statutes are "presumed constitutional." Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 652 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003).

2024Cf. jury in the form of an instruction," and territorial jurisdiction is treated "as if it is an element of the offense." Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 Mass. 55, 61 (2018).

2024Indeed, the judge instructed the jury on both theories of liability,5 see Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 Mass. 55, 61 (2018) ("where there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether a crime was committed within Massachusetts, as here, that issue is to be submitted to the jury in the form of an instruction"), and the burden was not on the defendant to request a special verdict, cf. Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 691 , 695 n.8 (2007) ("Where, as here, multiple theories of criminal liability are presented to a jury, the Commonwealth would be well advised to request a special verdict indi

2023Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491 , 498 (2020); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 710 (2005).

2023Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491 , 498 (2020); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 710 (2005).

2011We note at the outset that “[a] facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is the weakest form of challenge, and the one that is the least likely to succeed.” Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 652 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003), citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,745 (1987).

2002See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

2025See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 652 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) ("A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is the weakest form of challenge, and the one that is the least likely to succeed").

2024"A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is the weakest form of challenge, and the one that is the least likely to succeed," because statutes are "presumed constitutional." Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 652 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003).

2024Here, the juvenile's age at the time of the offense was properly identified as "a question of fact to be settled by proof" and "entrusted to the deliberative process of the jury." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Travis, 408 Mass. 1, 8 (1990).

2018As such, it is an issue entrusted to the deliberative process of the jury." Commonwealth v. Travis , 408 Mass. 1 , 8, 556 N.E.2d 378 , quoting Gilbert , 366 Mass. at 28 , 314 N.E.2d 111 .

2021But, regardless of the form of inquiry, it must be on the record, Means, 454 Mass. at 96 , and written findings must be made, S.J.C.

2010See id. at 90-91 .

2024Indeed, the judge instructed the jury on both theories of liability,5 see Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 Mass. 55, 61 (2018) ("where there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether a crime was committed within Massachusetts, as here, that issue is to be submitted to the jury in the form of an instruction"), and the burden was not on the defendant to request a special verdict, cf. Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 691 , 695 n.8 (2007) ("Where, as here, multiple theories of criminal liability are presented to a jury, the Commonwealth would be well advised to request a special verdict indi

2020See Smith, 462 Mass. at 373 ; St. 2009, c. 25, § 123.

2012See also Stigum v. Skloff, 433 Mass. 1011 (2001) (failure to use the form required by rule 64[b][2] was fatal to the plaintiff’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury-waived trial in the Boston Municipal Court).

2011Commonwealth v. Tobin, 125 Mass. 203, 206 (1878).

2011“A statute so questioned is presumed constitutional.” Blixt v. Blixt, supra, citing Landry v. Attorney Gen., 429 Mass. 336, 343 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000).

2005Waiver of the right to be present by a defendant’s voluntary absence from a suppression hearing is somewhat analogous to a form of waiver long recognized in the Commonwealth: a defendant’s waiver of the right to be present at trial by voluntary absence after the trial has begun. 4 See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912); Commonwealth v. Flemmi, supra at 694 ; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 163 Mass. 458, 459 (1895).

2005See Glendale Coal Co. v. Nesson, 312 Mass. 293 (1942).

2005See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 664-665 (twenty-five days “is not so short that it even arguably justifies a presumption that no lawyer could provide the respondent with the effective assistance of counsel required by the Constitution”); Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251, 1254 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (“concern over short preparation time does not need to be institutionalized in the form of a presumption”); United States ex rel.

2005Waiver of the right to be present by a defendant’s voluntary absence from a suppression hearing is somewhat analogous to a form of waiver long recognized in the Commonwealth: a defendant’s waiver of the right to be present at trial by voluntary absence after the trial has begun. 4 See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912); Commonwealth v. Flemmi, supra at 694 ; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 163 Mass. 458, 459 (1895).

2005See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 664-665 (twenty-five days “is not so short that it even arguably justifies a presumption that no lawyer could provide the respondent with the effective assistance of counsel required by the Constitution”); Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251, 1254 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (“concern over short preparation time does not need to be institutionalized in the form of a presumption”); United States ex rel.

2005Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 639 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.

2005See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 664-665 (twenty-five days “is not so short that it even arguably justifies a presumption that no lawyer could provide the respondent with the effective assistance of counsel required by the Constitution”); Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251, 1254 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (“concern over short preparation time does not need to be institutionalized in the form of a presumption”); United States ex rel.