28 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1904–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Duncan v. USAA Ins. Co.green2 sentences2017Importantly, “[t]he insurer cannot rely on the insured’s intent to waive UM coverage to cure a defect in the form of the waiver.” Id. at 553 . 2015Plaintiffs cite Duncan, 950 So.2d at 553 , as authority wherein the court held that “[t]he insurer cannot rely on the insured’s intent to waive UM coverage to cure a defect in the form of the waiver.” In their brief, Plaintiffs cite approximately one page of the colloquy between the trial court and Plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Roy S. Halcomb, Jr., contained in the trial court transcript. | 1 | 8 |
Bloxom v. Bloxomgreen2 sentences2003Bloxom, supra . 1995Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 839, 844 (La. 1987) (emphasis added, citations deleted). | 1 | 4 |
First Federal Sav. & Loan v. Stanleygreen2 sentences1999First Federal Savings & Loan v. Stanley, 578 So.2d 220 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991). 1994See First Federal Savings & Loan Association of New Iberia v. Stanley, 578 So.2d 220, 223 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1991). | 1 | 2 |
Gray v. American Nat. Property & Cas. Co.green2 sentences2008The supreme court quoting Duncan , noted: “ ‘[Compliance with the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance is necessary for the UM waiver to be valid.’ The insurer cannot rely on the insured’s intent to waive UM coverage to cure a defect in the form of the waiver.” Gray at p. 14, 977 So.2d at 849 , quoting Duncan, 950 So.2d at 553 . (emphasis in original). 2008The supreme court quoting Duncan , noted: “ ‘[Compliance with the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance is necessary for the UM waiver to be valid.’ The insurer cannot rely on the insured’s intent to waive UM coverage to cure a defect in the form of the waiver.” Gray at p. 14, 977 So.2d at 849 , quoting Duncan, 950 So.2d at 553 . (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Normand Company v. Abrahamgreen1 sentence1991Our conclusion in this regard coincides with that of our brethren of the Fourth Circuit who, in Normand Company v. Abraham, 176 So.2d 178, 181 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965), stated: "A motion for summary judgment is intended to be a contradictory proceeding with hearing on the day fixed by the court. | 1 | 1 |
Dewey v. Lutcher-Moore Lumber Co.green2 sentences1955See also Dewey v. Lutcher-Moore Lumber Co., 151 La. 672 , 92 So. 273, 274 , wherein it was stated: "The defense, in this instance, is presented in the form of an exception of no cause of action. 1955See also Dewey v. Lutcher-Moore Lumber Co., 151 La. 672 , 92 So. 273, 274 , wherein it was stated: "The defense, in this instance, is presented in the form of an exception of no cause of action. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2004Johnson v. Johnson, 94-0018, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/10/94), 645 So.2d 1260, 1262 . 1996Johnson v. Johnson, 94-0018, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/10/94), 645 So.2d 1260, 1262 . | 2 | 1996–2004 |
Walker v. Maybelline Co.
green
2 sentences1991Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 839 (La.1987); also, Walker v. Maybelline, 477 So.2d 1136 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1333 (La. 1986)." No evidence was introduced to show the foreseeability of use by illiterates. 1990Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 839 (La.1987); also, Walker v. Maybelline, 477 So.2d 1136 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1333 (La.1986). | 2 | 1990–1991 |
Walker v. Maybelline Co.
green
2 sentences1991Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 839 (La.1987); also, Walker v. Maybelline, 477 So.2d 1136 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1333 (La. 1986)." No evidence was introduced to show the foreseeability of use by illiterates. 1990Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 839 (La.1987); also, Walker v. Maybelline, 477 So.2d 1136 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1333 (La.1986). | 2 | 1990–1991 |
Crowe v. Homesplus Manufactured Housing, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024App. 2 Cir. 6/21/04), 877 So. 2d 156 , 161–62. of performance is conditional on completion or tender of the requested performance. 11 “An obligation may be valid even though its cause is not expressed.” La. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bergeron v. Hymel
neutral
1 sentence2003Bergeron v. Hymel, 98-737 (La.App. 5 Cir.1/26/99), 726 So.2d 482 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Lemaire v. CIBA-GEIGY CORP.
neutral
1 sentence2002As I pointed out in my dissent to Lemaire v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 1999-1809 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/22/01) , 793 So.2d 336, 354 , writ denied, 2001-2153 (La.11/16/01), 802 So.2d 608 , the test of “more probable than not” is the burden of proof test for a jury to accept a fact. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Lemaire v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.
green
1 sentence2002As I pointed out in my dissent to Lemaire v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 1999-1809 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/22/01) , 793 So.2d 336, 354 , writ denied, 2001-2153 (La.11/16/01), 802 So.2d 608 , the test of “more probable than not” is the burden of proof test for a jury to accept a fact. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Leday v. Clairol, Inc.
green
1 sentence1991In Leday v. Clairol, Inc., supra, at page 869, this court stated: "The determination of whether a warning is adequate depends upon a balancing of considerations including, among other factors, the severity of the danger, the likelihood that the warning will catch the *111 attention of those who will foreseeably use the product and convey the nature of the danger to them, the intensity and the form of the warning, and the cost of improving the strength or the mode of the warning. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.
green
2 sentences1961If one or the other factor in any calculation is unreal, it distorts the liability of the particular taxpayer to the detriment or advantage of the entire taxpaying group.” The United States Supreme Court applying the substance vs. form rule in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 1945, 324 U.S. 331 , 65 S.Ct. 707, 708 , 89 L.Ed. 981 said: “ * * * The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction. 1961If one or the other factor in any calculation is unreal, it distorts the liability of the particular taxpayer to the detriment or advantage of the entire taxpaying group.” The United States Supreme Court applying the substance vs. form rule in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 1945, 324 U.S. 331 , 65 S.Ct. 707, 708 , 89 L.Ed. 981 said: “ * * * The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Long v. Louisiana Highway Commission
neutral
1 sentence1958If the fee of this expert can be justified, the matter can be taken care of in a proper proceeding in the form of a rule to tax costs in the court a qua.” See, also, Long v. Louisiana Highway Commission, La.App., 2 So.2d 683 . | 1 | 1958–1958 |
State Ex Rel. Brenner v. Noe
green
2 sentences1943Brenner v. Noe, Governor, 186 La. 102 , 171 So. 708 , 712, the question which we are now considering came before the court in the form of an exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione materiae. 1943Brenner v. Noe, Governor, 186 La. 102 , 171 So. 708 , 712, the question which we are now considering came before the court in the form of an exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione materiae. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Gould v. Gardner
neutral
1 sentence1942It may be that the record as made up contains all that is necessary for the Court to pass on and decide the issue that is involved in the present controversy but we infer from a statement of the Court in the last cited case of Succession of Mielke, supra, that a similar situation might there have existed and that the parties even had consented to a final decision as though the question had been presented in the proper form of proceeding, and still the Court refused to render such a decision stating: "We have, on some occasions, adjudicated upon matters in litigation in the form of a rule and a | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Younger Bros. v. Spell
neutral
2 sentences1941Younger Bros., Inc. v. Spell, 194 La. 16 , 193 So. 354 . 1941Younger Bros., Inc. v. Spell, 194 La. 16 , 193 So. 354 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Merrill v. Insurance Co. of North America
neutral
1 sentence1931C.] 23 F. 245 , that, to defeat a recovery upon a policy providing that any change increasing the hazard, within the control of, or known to, the assured, and not reported to the company and agreed to by it, will render the policy null and void, the insurer must affirmatively prove that changes made by a tenant, which increased the hazard, were made by the consent of the owner or his agent. [Authorities.]” On the question of law involved in the second point, we conclude that to avoid a policy upon the ground that the hazard has been increased, the increased hazard must be shown to have taken p | 1 | 1931–1931 |
State ex rel. Anglade v. Judge of the Second City Court
neutral
1 sentence1904Ann. 1415 , 20 South. 912 , the court'saying: “It was suggested in argument at the bar on behalf of the respondent that there are two modes of executing a fi. fa.— one by causing the sheriff or constable to break open the doors of the safe, hs authorized by article 762, Code Rrac.; and the other by the form of a rule for contempt. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.