form hearing in North Dakota

2016Because the hearing’s primary purpose is to assist the court in resolving factual disputes, the' petitioner must generally “prove his petition through testimony, rather than by affidavits alone, with an opportunity for cross-examination.” Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 2005 ND 190, ¶ 23 , 705 N.W.2d 836 ; but see Cusey v. Nagel, 2005 ND 84, ¶ 15 , 695 N.W.2d 697 (observing “[w]e have held that' a trial court conducts a ‘full hearing’ on a disorderly conduct restraining ordér petition by accepting affidavits and allowing cross-examination, at least when the parties raise no objection to the form of the

2016Because the hearing’s primary purpose is to assist the court in resolving factual disputes, the' petitioner must generally “prove his petition through testimony, rather than by affidavits alone, with an opportunity for cross-examination.” Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 2005 ND 190, ¶ 23 , 705 N.W.2d 836 ; but see Cusey v. Nagel, 2005 ND 84, ¶ 15 , 695 N.W.2d 697 (observing “[w]e have held that' a trial court conducts a ‘full hearing’ on a disorderly conduct restraining ordér petition by accepting affidavits and allowing cross-examination, at least when the parties raise no objection to the form of the

1986Although this Court, on occasion and generally before the United States Supreme Court’s decision of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), has used the phrase "probable cause to stop” [e.g., State v. Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115 (N.D.1984)], our discussion below demonstrates that the better form of analysis employs the reasonable suspicion standard in regard to the stopping of a person or vehicle.

1986Although this Court, on occasion and generally before the United States Supreme Court’s decision of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), has used the phrase "probable cause to stop” [e.g., State v. Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115 (N.D.1984)], our discussion below demonstrates that the better form of analysis employs the reasonable suspicion standard in regard to the stopping of a person or vehicle.

1986Although this Court, on occasion and generally before the United States Supreme Court’s decision of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), has used the phrase "probable cause to stop” [e.g., State v. Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115 (N.D.1984)], our discussion below demonstrates that the better form of analysis employs the reasonable suspicion standard in regard to the stopping of a person or vehicle.

1985It is therefore of no import that the State cannot establish the test was performed within two hours of Kimball’s driving. 2 *604 In this case there was sufficient evidence, see State v. Manke, 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D.1982); Engebretson, supra, both in the form of the test results and the law enforcement officer’s testimony, that Kim-ball was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 39-08-01(l)(b). 3 Kimball’s final argument is that the results of his blood test should have been suppressed as a product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and

1985It is therefore of no import that the State cannot establish the test was performed within two hours of Kimball’s driving. 2 *604 In this case there was sufficient evidence, see State v. Manke, 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D.1982); Engebretson, supra, both in the form of the test results and the law enforcement officer’s testimony, that Kim-ball was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 39-08-01(l)(b). 3 Kimball’s final argument is that the results of his blood test should have been suppressed as a product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and

1927York v. General Utility Corp. 44 N. D. 51 , 116 N. W. 352 .

1927York v. General Utility Corp. 44 N. D. 51 , 116 N. W. 352 .