44 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ronald G. Becker v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2019“Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013). 2019Further, Twitty challenged his consecutive sentences in a motion to correct erroneous sentence. [19] “Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013). | 11 | 11 |
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-436 | November 20, 2025 Page 9 of 11 Sanders v. State, 401 N.E.2d 694, 695 (Ind. 1980). 2016Sanders v. State, 273 Ind. 30, 32 , 401 N.E.2d 694, 695 (1980). [6] Bertram requested representation by the Public Defender’s office and attached an affidavit of indigency. | 5 | 6 |
Litchfield v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). 2006Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind.2005). | 3 | 3 |
Indiana State Ethics Commission, Office of Inspector General, and David Thomas, in his Official Capacity as Inspector General v. Patricia Sanchezgreen2 sentences2017Res judicata “applies where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the same issue between the same parties.” Indiana State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2017Res judicata “applies where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the same issue between the same parties.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A05-1608-PO-1855 | April 27, 2017 Page 8 of 10 Indiana State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [17] At the protective order hearing below, M.G. argued that claim preclusion applied and would bar V.P.’s Third PO Petition because all the allegations in her petition had already been previously “raised, aired, and decided upon at a prior court.” (Tr. 30). | 2 | 2 |
Adrian Durden v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2019In other words, the language we associate today with invited error materialized as a form of waiver, leaving open (rather than foreclosing) the possibility of appellate review if the error affected the appellant's "substantial" rights. 5 Over time, our invited-error doctrine expanded to foreclose even constitutional claims. 6 See, e.g. , Brewington , 7 N.E.3d at 977 (noting that "even constitutional errors may be invited"); Durden , 99 N.E.3d at 655 (finding "no reason to exempt structural errors from the invited-error doctrine" despite prejudicial impact of juror removal) (internal quotation | 1 | 1 |
Freddie L. Webb v. Thomas A. Yeagergreen1 sentence2019“Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.” Webb v. Yeager, 52 N.E.3d 30, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. a. | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Robertson v. State, 871 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ind. 2007). [9] We review questions of law de novo. | 1 | 1 |
Daniel Brewington v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2019See also Brewington , 7 N.E.3d at 975 (virtually the same). 2019In other words, the language we associate today with invited error materialized as a form of waiver, leaving open (rather than foreclosing) the possibility of appellate review if the error affected the appellant's "substantial" rights. 5 Over time, our invited-error doctrine expanded to foreclose even constitutional claims. 6 See, e.g. , Brewington , 7 N.E.3d at 977 (noting that "even constitutional errors may be invited"); Durden , 99 N.E.3d at 655 (finding "no reason to exempt structural errors from the invited-error doctrine" despite prejudicial impact of juror removal) (internal quotation | 1 | 1 |
M.G. v. V.P.green1 sentence2018We agree. “‘Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.’” M.G. v. V.P., 74 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013)). “‘Claim preclusion applies when the following four factors are present: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1707-CR | 1 | 1 |
Dawson v. Estate of Ottgreen1 sentence2018We agree. “‘Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.’” M.G. v. V.P., 74 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013)). “‘Claim preclusion applies when the following four factors are present: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1707-CR | 1 | 1 |
State v. Holmesgreen1 sentence2018Discussion and Decision [13] The doctrine of res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion, “prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute.” State v. Holmes, 728 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ind. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Microvote General Corp. v. Indiana Election Commissiongreen2 sentences2016“Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation' of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind.2013). “ ‘[A] “privy” is one who after rendition of [a] judgment has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment,’ or ‘whose interests are represented by a party to the action.’ ” Id. at 700-701 (quoting Micro-Vote Gen: Corp. v. Ind. Election Co 2016“Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation' of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind.2013). “ ‘[A] “privy” is one who after rendition of [a] judgment has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment,’ or ‘whose interests are represented by a party to the action.’ ” Id. at 700-701 (quoting Micro-Vote Gen: Corp. v. Ind. Election Co | 1 | 1 |
Indianapolis Downs, LLC v. Herrgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Indianapolis Downs, LLC v. Herr, 834 N.E.2d 699, 703-05 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
White v. Crowgreen2 sentences2006White v. Crow, 245 Ind. 276 , 198 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1964). 2006White v. Crow, 245 Ind. 276 , 198 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind.1988); Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind. Ct.App.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1996). 1998See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind.1988); Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893 (Ind.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind.1988); Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind. Ct.App.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1996). 1998See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind.1988); Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893 (Ind.1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Fuentes v. Shevingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bunch v. State
green
2 sentences2005Id. (citations omitted). 2005Id. (citations omitted). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Eastin v. State
green
2 sentences1965We are not unmindful that the court in Eastin v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 101, 105 , 117 N. E. 2d 124, 126 , had before it a similar instruction and stated that while it did not recommend the form of the instruction, concluded it was error to exclude two instructions on intoxication. 1965We are not unmindful that the court in Eastin v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 101, 105 , 117 N. E. 2d 124, 126 , had before it a similar instruction and stated that while it did not recommend the form of the instruction, concluded it was error to exclude two instructions on intoxication. | 2 | 1962–1965 |
Jolly v. MODISETT
green
2 sentences2019We can attribute this apparent inconsistency to a long line of precedent defining invited error in somewhat contradictory terms-as both a form of estoppel and as a form of waiver. 4 As this Court stated in Jolly v. Modisett , a "party will not be permitted to take advantage of errors which he himself committed or invited or induced the trial court to commit, or which were the natural consequences of his own neglect or misconduct." 257 Ind. 426 , 429, 275 N.E.2d 780 , 782 (1971) (emphases added). 2019We can attribute this apparent inconsistency to a long line of precedent defining invited error in somewhat contradictory terms-as both a form of estoppel and as a form of waiver. 4 As this Court stated in Jolly v. Modisett , a "party will not be permitted to take advantage of errors which he himself committed or invited or induced the trial court to commit, or which were the natural consequences of his own neglect or misconduct." 257 Ind. 426 , 429, 275 N.E.2d 780 , 782 (1971) (emphases added). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc.
green
1 sentence2017“To hold otherwise would constitute an unprecedented departure from accepted principles of res judicata.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [16] “Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013) (italicization removed). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Simmons v. State
green
2 sentences2013In other words, the rule about burden of proof requires the prosecution by evidence to convince the jury of the accused’s guilt; while the presumption of innocence, too, requires this, but conveys for the jury a special and additional caution (which is perhaps only an implied corollary to the other) to consider, in the material for their belief, nothing but the evidence, i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused. *1172 This caution is indeed particularly needed in criminal cases.” Id. at 344 , 385 N.E.2d at 226 (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85 , 98 S.Ct. 2013In other words, the rule about burden of proof requires the prosecution by evidence to convince the jury of the accused’s guilt; while the presumption of innocence, too, requires this, but conveys for the jury a special and additional caution (which is perhaps only an implied corollary to the other) to consider, in the material for their belief, nothing but the evidence, i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused. *1172 This caution is indeed particularly needed in criminal cases.” Id. at 344 , 385 N.E.2d at 226 (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85 , 98 S.Ct. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Taylor v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2013In other words, the rule about burden of proof requires the prosecution by evidence to convince the jury of the accused’s guilt; while the presumption of innocence, too, requires this, but conveys for the jury a special and additional caution (which is perhaps only an implied corollary to the other) to consider, in the material for their belief, nothing but the evidence, i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused. *1172 This caution is indeed particularly needed in criminal cases.” Id. at 344 , 385 N.E.2d at 226 (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85 , 98 S.Ct. 2013In other words, the rule about burden of proof requires the prosecution by evidence to convince the jury of the accused’s guilt; while the presumption of innocence, too, requires this, but conveys for the jury a special and additional caution (which is perhaps only an implied corollary to the other) to consider, in the material for their belief, nothing but the evidence, i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused. *1172 This caution is indeed particularly needed in criminal cases.” Id. at 344 , 385 N.E.2d at 226 (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85 , 98 S.Ct. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Winegeart v. State
green
2 sentences1998See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind.1988); Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind. Ct.App.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1996). 1998See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind.1988); Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893 (Ind.1996). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State Ex Rel. Rondon v. Lake Superior Court, Criminal Division Two
green
1 sentence1993Rondon v. Lake Superior Court (1991), Ind., 569 N.E.2d 635 , to contend that once a petitioner has complied with the form required by the rule, the trial judge is obliged to grant the motion for a change of judge. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Lombardo v. State
green
2 sentences1991Lombardo v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1075 . 1991Lombardo v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1075 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Leuck v. Goetz
green
1 sentence1982In this form the requirement of a mutual interest persists as a minimum in all courts, to the exclusion of all cases in which the parties are casually together for pleasure or for independent ends.” Id. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Perry v. Goss
green
2 sentences1980Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603 , 255 N.E.2d 923 ; Galbreath v. Engineering Construction Corp. (1971), 149 Ind.App. 347 , 273 N.E.2d 121, 130 . 1980Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603 , 255 N.E.2d 923 ; Galbreath v. Engineering Construction Corp. (1971), 149 Ind.App. 347 , 273 N.E.2d 121, 130 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Galbreath v. Engineering Construction Corp.
green
2 sentences1980Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603 , 255 N.E.2d 923 ; Galbreath v. Engineering Construction Corp. (1971), 149 Ind.App. 347 , 273 N.E.2d 121, 130 . 1980Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603 , 255 N.E.2d 923 ; Galbreath v. Engineering Construction Corp. (1971), 149 Ind.App. 347 , 273 N.E.2d 121, 130 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Town of Speedway v. Harris
green
1 sentence1979Although the Court has held that due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing ‘appropriate to the nature of the case,’ . . . and ‘depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings [if any], ‘ . . . the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect. . . . ” (Citations omitted) See Town of Speedway v. Harris, (1976) Ind.App., 346 N.E.2d 646 and cases cited therein. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Armstrong v. Manzo
green
1 sentence1978Id. at 81-82 . *258 Podgor’s claim of entitlement arose out of University Rule 8 which provides: A student who is not satisfied by the determination of the Registrar has the right to lodge a written appeal with the Standing Committee on Residence within 30 days of receipt of written notice of the Registrar’s determination, which committee shall review the appeal in a fair manner and shall afford to the student a personal hearing upon written request. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Town of Walkerton v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Foltz, Van Camp Hdw., Etc. v. City of Indpls. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Falender v. Atkins green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Hake v. Moorhead, Admr. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Prophet v. State green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Union Traction Co. v. Haworth neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Sylvester v. State green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Domestic Block Coal Co. v. DeArmey green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.