form warning in Nevada

2022Ca., 127 Nev. 156 , 161 1.3, 252 Pi3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (Tssues not raised in an appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived.) Bougeom vo Sullivan, 122 New. 656, 570n.5, 138 Pood 459, 444 1.4 (2006) (declining to consider an argument that the appellant lirst raised in his reply brief. explaining that “reply briefs are limited to answering any matter set forth in the opposing brief’), 3For example, the district court’s application of the doctrine of form Aon conventens—which appellants did net properly challenge and which we therefore assume to be correct—is legally sufficient to sustain the

1983See McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72 , 657 P.2d 1157 (1983); Dias v. State, 95 Nev. 710 , 601 P.2d 706 (1979). 6 The record in Pacheco’s case indicates that in two separate prior misdemeanor prosecutions in the Sparks Municipal Court, Pacheco signed a form waiver which stated: I, Chester Pacheco, being first sworn, deposes and says: 1.

1983See McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72 , 657 P.2d 1157 (1983); Dias v. State, 95 Nev. 710 , 601 P.2d 706 (1979). 6 The record in Pacheco’s case indicates that in two separate prior misdemeanor prosecutions in the Sparks Municipal Court, Pacheco signed a form waiver which stated: I, Chester Pacheco, being first sworn, deposes and says: 1.

1979The Supreme Court of Montana, In re Russell’s Estate, 59 P.2d 777 (Mont. 1936), considered a similar situation, where an executrix had paid sums to satisfy certain debts and obligations of an oil company owned almost entirely by the decedent through a holding company, although no statutory creditor’s claim against the estate had been filed.

1977See Hudson v. State, 92 Nev. 84 , 545 P.2d 1163 (1976); Azbill v. State, 88 Nev. 240 , 495 P.2d 1064 (1972); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev. 567 , 472 P.2d 339 (1970). 2 NRS 175.161(1) provides in relevant part: “. . . in no case shall any charge or instructions be given to the jury otherwise than in writing, unless by mutual consent of the parties.” We need not decide whether the trial court’s actions violated this rule, since we conclude the form of the instruction itself was erroneous.

1977See Hudson v. State, 92 Nev. 84 , 545 P.2d 1163 (1976); Azbill v. State, 88 Nev. 240 , 495 P.2d 1064 (1972); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev. 567 , 472 P.2d 339 (1970). 2 NRS 175.161(1) provides in relevant part: “. . . in no case shall any charge or instructions be given to the jury otherwise than in writing, unless by mutual consent of the parties.” We need not decide whether the trial court’s actions violated this rule, since we conclude the form of the instruction itself was erroneous.

1977See Hudson v. State, 92 Nev. 84 , 545 P.2d 1163 (1976); Azbill v. State, 88 Nev. 240 , 495 P.2d 1064 (1972); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev. 567 , 472 P.2d 339 (1970). 2 NRS 175.161(1) provides in relevant part: “. . . in no case shall any charge or instructions be given to the jury otherwise than in writing, unless by mutual consent of the parties.” We need not decide whether the trial court’s actions violated this rule, since we conclude the form of the instruction itself was erroneous.

1977See Hudson v. State, 92 Nev. 84 , 545 P.2d 1163 (1976); Azbill v. State, 88 Nev. 240 , 495 P.2d 1064 (1972); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev. 567 , 472 P.2d 339 (1970). 2 NRS 175.161(1) provides in relevant part: “. . . in no case shall any charge or instructions be given to the jury otherwise than in writing, unless by mutual consent of the parties.” We need not decide whether the trial court’s actions violated this rule, since we conclude the form of the instruction itself was erroneous.

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1968In resolving the question in light of the Miranda standards, the substance and not the form of the warnings should be of primary importance.” This court on many occasions in the past has applied the McNaghten test of insanity and we again subscribe to the doctrine originally announced in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333 , 22 P. 241 (1889), when the court said: (1) “The accused is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown.” (2) “Insanity is an affirmative proposition, and the burden of proving it is upon the defense.” (3) “Insanity, as a defense to crime, must be *463 established by a preponde

1956In both cases concurring opinions criticise the majority opinion in this respect and in State v. Salgado, Norcross, J. dissented from that portion of the opinion stating ( 38 Nev. 64, 77 , 145 P. 919, 924 ) “The right of the defendant to be tried by a fair and impartial jury ought not to turn on the mere technical form of the objection where the form of the challenge was not questioned by the court or opposing counsel and where the course of the examination of the juror indicated that a proper challenge was assumed to have been made.” In State v. Raymond, supra, where objection was made under

1956In both cases concurring opinions criticise the majority opinion in this respect and in State v. Salgado, Norcross, J. dissented from that portion of the opinion stating ( 38 Nev. 64, 77 , 145 P. 919, 924 ) “The right of the defendant to be tried by a fair and impartial jury ought not to turn on the mere technical form of the objection where the form of the challenge was not questioned by the court or opposing counsel and where the course of the examination of the juror indicated that a proper challenge was assumed to have been made.” In State v. Raymond, supra, where objection was made under

1956In both cases concurring opinions criticise the majority opinion in this respect and in State v. Salgado, Norcross, J. dissented from that portion of the opinion stating ( 38 Nev. 64, 77 , 145 P. 919, 924 ) “The right of the defendant to be tried by a fair and impartial jury ought not to turn on the mere technical form of the objection where the form of the challenge was not questioned by the court or opposing counsel and where the course of the examination of the juror indicated that a proper challenge was assumed to have been made.” In State v. Raymond, supra, where objection was made under

1914(People v. Hopt, 3 Utah, 398 , 4 Pac. 250 ; Robinson v. Territory, 16 Okl. 241 , 85 Pac. 451 .) In the case of People v. Hopt, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah passed upon the question here under consideration, and in the light of a statute identical to ours, and under almost identical conditions.

1914(People v. Hopt, 3 Utah, 398 , 4 Pac. 250 ; Robinson v. Territory, 16 Okl. 241 , 85 Pac. 451 .) In the case of People v. Hopt, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah passed upon the question here under consideration, and in the light of a statute identical to ours, and under almost identical conditions.