13 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Andrew Tsanasgreen2 sentences1999In State v. Powell, 158 Vt. 280 , 608 A.2d 45 (1992), we overruled Duff and held that if a defendant requests a more or a less “rigorous” charge, that ‘“the court should give the form of instruction which the defendant seasonably elects.’” Id. at 284 , 608 A.2d at 47 (quoting United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1978)). 1992If he does, the court should give the form of instruction which the defendant seasonably elects.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences2020Ct. App. 2018) (considering “both the form of the instruction and the factual context to determine whether the instruction was coercive”); see also ABA Standard 15-5.4 cmt. (discussing circumstances under which charge to continue deliberations could be coercive); cf. Perry, 131 Vt. at 340 , 306 A.2d at 112 (holding that “[w]hether, in a given case, reversible error can be predicated on the use of [an Allen charge] must be tested by the circumstances”). 2020Ct. App. 2018) (considering “both the form of the instruction and the factual context to determine whether the instruction was coercive”); see also ABA Standard 15-5.4 cmt. (discussing circumstances under which charge to continue deliberations could be coercive); cf. Perry, 131 Vt. at 340 , 306 A.2d at 112 (holding that “[w]hether, in a given case, reversible error can be predicated on the use of [an Allen charge] must be tested by the circumstances”). | 1 | 1 |
Owen v. City of Independencegreen2 sentences2018See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895C cmt. g (1979); see also Owen v. City of Independence , 445 U.S. 622 , 644-50, 100 S.Ct. 1398 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (discussing these two distinct common law doctrines that afford municipal corporations some measure of protection from tort liability, and explaining that governmental/proprietary distinction is grounded on principle of sovereign immunity while discretionary-decision immunity is based on concern for separation of powers); 18 E. 2018See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895C cmt. g (1979); see also Owen v. City of Independence , 445 U.S. 622 , 644-50, 100 S.Ct. 1398 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (discussing these two distinct common law doctrines that afford municipal corporations some measure of protection from tort liability, and explaining that governmental/proprietary distinction is grounded on principle of sovereign immunity while discretionary-decision immunity is based on concern for separation of powers); 18 E. | 1 | 1 |
Sunday v. Stratton Corp.green1 sentence2010The claim of secondary assumption of the risk in this case—that the plaintiff’s awareness of the risk of injury in playing football completely bars recovery in spite of any negligence of defendant’s employees—is no different in effect from the old rule that contributory negligence created an absolute bar to recovery, a concept essentially made irrelevant by principles of comparative fault.2 See id. at 300 (discussing the similarity of this form of the doctrine with contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery); D. | 1 | 1 |
Lucas v. Hahngreen2 sentences2009Due process “tolerates variances in the form of a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,” Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82 (quotation omitted), so that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); see also Lucas v. Hahn, 162 Vt. 456, 459 , 648 A.2d 839, 842 (1994) (recognizing that “[b]y its nature, due process comprehends a wide range of procedural protections tailored to myriad situations of state action affecting prote 2009Due process “tolerates variances in the form of a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,” Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82 (quotation omitted), so that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); see also Lucas v. Hahn, 162 Vt. 456, 459 , 648 A.2d 839, 842 (1994) (recognizing that “[b]y its nature, due process comprehends a wide range of procedural protections tailored to myriad situations of state action affecting prote | 1 | 1 |
Boddie v. Connecticutgreen1 sentence2009Due process “tolerates variances in the form of a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,” Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82 (quotation omitted), so that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); see also Lucas v. Hahn, 162 Vt. 456, 459 , 648 A.2d 839, 842 (1994) (recognizing that “[b]y its nature, due process comprehends a wide range of procedural protections tailored to myriad situations of state action affecting prote | 1 | 1 |
Fuentes v. Shevingreen1 sentence2009Due process “tolerates variances in the form of a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,” Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82 (quotation omitted), so that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); see also Lucas v. Hahn, 162 Vt. 456, 459 , 648 A.2d 839, 842 (1994) (recognizing that “[b]y its nature, due process comprehends a wide range of procedural protections tailored to myriad situations of state action affecting prote | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Killington, Ltd. v. State
green
2 sentences2026“A facial challenge is ripe for judicial review upon the adoption of the regulation.” Id. at 261 , 668 A.2d at 1283 . 2026“A facial challenge is ripe for judicial review upon the adoption of the regulation.” Id. at 261 , 668 A.2d at 1283 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Ellie May Morse
green
1 sentence2020Recently, in State v. Morse, we discussed the application of the invited-error doctrine, a form of waiver for which there is no standard of review. 2019 VT 58, ¶ 7 , __ Vt. __, 219 A.3d 1309 (holding that where invited-error doctrine applies, there is no review because “the party who invites the error waives or intentionally relinquishes their right to challenge it on appeal” (quotation and alterations omitted)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Libercent v. Aldrich
green
1 sentence2012The latter form of immunity is qualified in the sense that it requires several elements, including a showing that the government officials were “1) acting during the course of their employment and . . . within the scope of their authority; 2) acting in good faith; and 3) *417 performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial acts.” Id. (quotation omitted). 2 ¶ 7. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Powell
green
2 sentences1999In State v. Powell, 158 Vt. 280 , 608 A.2d 45 (1992), we overruled Duff and held that if a defendant requests a more or a less “rigorous” charge, that ‘“the court should give the form of instruction which the defendant seasonably elects.’” Id. at 284 , 608 A.2d at 47 (quoting United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1978)). 1999In State v. Powell, 158 Vt. 280 , 608 A.2d 45 (1992), we overruled Duff and held that if a defendant requests a more or a less “rigorous” charge, that ‘“the court should give the form of instruction which the defendant seasonably elects.’” Id. at 284 , 608 A.2d at 47 (quoting United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1978)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Garrity v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence1996This is the narrow holding of Garrity. 385 U.S. at 500 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
1 sentence1987On the other hand, a waiver by a minor, facing a first arrest and with below normal intelligence, might not be “knowing and intelligent.” The second reason for reversal is that the trial court failed to address fully the State’s position that an implied waiver occurred here under North Carolina v. Butler, supra. While the trial court noted that an implied waiver could be “inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated,” it held that this “is not such a case” without explanation. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Irving v. Mississippi
green
1 sentence1985This form of immunity is not triggered by prosecutorial misconduct, “but by the fact that the defendant is prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to his case.” Id. at 969 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Perry v. Sindermann
green
1 sentence1975Plaintiff directs our attention to Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and its holding that, even absent tenure, there may exist in a particular institution an unwritten “common law” equivalent to tenure, which is not merely an unprotected “subjective expectancy” but a property interest entitled to Fourteenth Amendment due process protection in the form of a hearing. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.