form instruction (Kentucky) · Go Syfert
← Kentucky issues

form instruction in Kentucky

73 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2025 16 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (17)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Stonegreen
ky · 2009 · cited in 14 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2010–2024
2 sentences

2024“Generally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” Fairley v. Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 792, 802 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009)). -9- The main thrust of Workman’s appeal on this issue is that a recent Supreme Court case, Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. 140 , 142 S. Ct. 681 , 211 L.

2024We must determine whether the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). 6 “Generally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009).

1314
Purcell v. Commonwealthgreen
ky · 2004 · cited in 5 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2009–2017
2 sentences

2017The Commonwealth argued that this was a false claim and that he was instead 4 The Commonwealth also argues that Rucker opened the door to this evidence by putting his mental state at issue during opening statement “Generally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party's use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party!s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009] (citing Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Ky. 2004]]-.

2017"Generally stated, ‘opening the door' to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party's use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009) (citing Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Ky. 2004)). lAfhile evidence of conversations occurring prior to Farris’s death, would be relevant to Rucker’s state of mind at the time he committed the offense, messages written after Rucker killed Farris and disposed of her body are generally

45
Yanero v. Davisgreen
ky · 2001 · cited in 5 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2011–2025
2 sentences

2025This form of immunity shields only “the negligent performance by a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment . . . ; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee’s authority[.]” Id. “[A]t their core, discretionary acts are those involving quasi-judicial or policy-making decisions.” Marson v. Thomason, 438 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Ky. 2014).

2024Because these immunities are “functionally the same” in the context of this appeal, id., and the terms are often used interchangeably, see Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519 , we will refer to the form of immunity at issue in this appeal as “sovereign immunity.” -20- institutions to the Department via the same KRS 45.237 et seq. procedure.

25
Soto v. Commonwealthgreen
ky · 2004 · cited in 2 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024Accordingly, KRE 106 “allows a party to introduce the remainder of a statement offered by an adverse party for the purpose of putting the statement in its proper context and avoiding a misleading impression.” Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 865-66 (Ky. 2004).

2024Accordingly, KRE 106 “allows a party to introduce the remainder of a statement offered by an adverse party for the purpose of putting the statement in its proper context and avoiding a misleading impression.” Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 865-66 (Ky. 2004).

22
Norris v. Commonwealthgreen
ky · 2002 · cited in 2 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2016–2022
2 sentences

2022See Norris v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 411, 414 (Ky. 2002) (“In a typical case, a witness will make an inadmissible 17 assertion and the opposing party is then permitted to introduce evidence to the contrary.”); Stone v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009) (“Generally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.”).

2016As we recognized in Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky.2009), “[gjenerally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” As this Court has further explained, “when one party introduces improper evidence, such ‘opens the door’ for the other party to introduce improper evidence in rebuttal whose only claim to admission is that it explains or rebuts the prior inadmissible evidence.” Metcalf v. Commo

22
Nowak v. Josephgreen
kyctapphigh · 1938 · cited in 2 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1942–1942
2 sentences

1942The opinion in that case set out the form of an instruction that should be given when instructing the jury on statutory rate of speed and duties of the driver of a motor vehicle, but later, in the case of Nowak v. Joseph, 275 Ky. 470 , 121 S. W. (2d) 939, 941 , the form of instruction prescribed in the Toon case, supra, was modified and an approved in *92 struction pertaining to questions like and similar to the one here involved relating to the duties of drivers of motor vehicles, was prescribed as indicated in that opinion.

1942The opinion in that case set out the form of an instruction that should be given when instructing the jury on statutory rate of speed and duties of the driver of a motor vehicle, but later, in the case of Nowak v. Joseph, 275 Ky. 470 , 121 S. W. (2d) 939, 941 , the form of instruction prescribed in the Toon case, supra, was modified and an approved in *92 struction pertaining to questions like and similar to the one here involved relating to the duties of drivers of motor vehicles, was prescribed as indicated in that opinion.

12
Lexington Public Library v. Clarkgreen
ky · 2002 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Library v. Clark, 90 S.W.3d 53, 62-63 (Ky. 2002) (noting that in absence of documents or a privilege log, court was unable on writ petition “to determine by de novo review whether any of the communications fall within the lawyer-client privilege”).

11
Marson v. Thomasongreen
ky · 2014 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025This form of immunity shields only “the negligent performance by a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment . . . ; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee’s authority[.]” Id. “[A]t their core, discretionary acts are those involving quasi-judicial or policy-making decisions.” Marson v. Thomason, 438 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Ky. 2014).

11
Patton v. Bickfordgreen
· 2016 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025Immunity is provided for discretionary acts because the “courts should not be called upon to pass judgment on policy decisions made by members of coordinate branches of government in the context of tort actions, because such actions furnish an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social, political or economic policy.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519 . -5- By contrast, immunity from tort liability is not afforded to government officials “for the negligent performance of a ministerial act.” Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Ky. 2016), as modified on denial of rehearing (Aug. 24, 2017).

2025Immunity is provided for discretionary acts because the “courts should not be called upon to pass judgment on policy decisions made by members of coordinate branches of government in the context of tort actions, because such actions furnish an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social, political or economic policy.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519 . -5- By contrast, immunity from tort liability is not afforded to government officials “for the negligent performance of a ministerial act.” Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Ky. 2016), as modified on denial of rehearing (Aug. 24, 2017).

11
John Fairley III v. Commonwealth of Kentuckygreen
ky · 2017 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024“Generally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” Fairley v. Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 792, 802 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009)). -9- The main thrust of Workman’s appeal on this issue is that a recent Supreme Court case, Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. 140 , 142 S. Ct. 681 , 211 L.

11
Commonwealth v. Englishgreen
ky · 1999 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024We must determine whether the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). 6 “Generally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009).

11
Graham v. Commonwealthgreen
moctapp · 2019 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that “opening the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” Graham v. Commonwealth, 571 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Ky. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

11
Yates v. Commonwealthgreen
ky · 1997 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See Yates v. Commonwealth, 958 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1997) (holding RCr 7.26(1) only requires production of statements; no requirement limits testimony to the four corners of a document).

11
Commonwealth v. Pratergreen
ky · 2010 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Purcell v. Commonipealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Ky. 2004) overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Prater, 324 S.W.3d 393, 400-01 (Ky·. 2010) (citing Kentucky Rule 9f Evidence (KRE) 405(a)).

11
Metcalf v. Commonwealthgreen
ky · 2005 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016As we recognized in Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky.2009), “[gjenerally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” As this Court has further explained, “when one party introduces improper evidence, such ‘opens the door’ for the other party to introduce improper evidence in rebuttal whose only claim to admission is that it explains or rebuts the prior inadmissible evidence.” Metcalf v. Commo

11
Thomas v. Commonwealthgreen
kyctapphigh · 1936 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1960–1960
11
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Hurstgreen
kyctapp · 1925 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1936–1936
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (63)

CaseCitedYears
Utilities Appliance Co. v. Toon's Administrator green
kyctapphigh · 1932
2 sentences

1935The form of instruction given in the case at bar ■on the question of rate iof speed was held erroneous, in the case of Utilities Appliance Co. v. Toon’s Adm’r, 241 Ky. 823 , 45 S. W. (2d) 478, 479 , wherein the Kappa Case and the Hornek Bros.

1935The form of instruction given in the case at bar ■on the question of rate iof speed was held erroneous, in the case of Utilities Appliance Co. v. Toon’s Adm’r, 241 Ky. 823 , 45 S. W. (2d) 478, 479 , wherein the Kappa Case and the Hornek Bros.

41935–1935
Murray v. Commonwealth green
ky · 2013
2 sentences

2023Also known as the doctrine of curative admissibility, “‘opening the door’ . . . is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.’” Id. at 343-44 (quoting Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009)) (emphasis added).

2023Also known as the doctrine of curative admissibility, “‘opening the door’ . . . is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.’” Id. at 343-44 (quoting Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009)) (emphasis added).

22023–2023
Cox v. Howard green
kyctapp · 1953
2 sentences

2014Our predecessor Court’s opinion in Cox v. Howard suggests that we should look beyond the form of the claim asserted in a declaratory action to ascertain whether the underlying purpose of a petition falls within an area covered by an exclusive statutory remedy. 261 S.W.2d 673 (Ky.1953).

2014Our predecessor Court's opinion in Cox v. Howard suggests that we should look beyond the form of the claim asserted in a declaratory action to ascertain whether the underlying purpose of a petition falls within an area covered by an exclusive statutory remedy. 261 S.W.2d 673 (Ky. 1953) : In Howard, the Court dismissed a party's petition for a declaration, which sought a recount of primary election ballots.

22014–2014
Osborne v. Bullitt County Board of Education green
kyctapphigh · 1967
2 sentences

1977Moreover, Justice Lukowsky, writing for the Court, further concluded that the process of judicial review provided by subsection six of the above mentioned statute and the form of hearing mandated by Osborne v. Bullitt County Board of Education, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 607 (1967) clads the tenured teacher adversely affected by board action with additional and sufficient blankets of protection.

1975The process of judicial review provided by KRS 161.790(6) and the form of hearing mandated by our decision in Osborne v. Bullitt County Board of Education, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 607 (1967) cloak a “tenured teacher” adversely affected by board action with additional and sufficient blankets of protection.

21975–1977
Taulbee v. Moore neutral
kyctapp · 1899
2 sentences

1964The form in question was taken from Taulbee v. Moore, 106 Ky. 749 , 51 S.W. 564 , 21 K.L.R. 378 (1899), but as pointed out in footnote (1) to § 216 of Stanley, the court later commented in Forbes v. Hunter, 31 K.L.R. 285, 102 S.W. 246 (1907), that perhaps it would be better to tell the jury that the measure of damages is the sum required in order to make the building conform to the contract.

1964The form in question was taken from Taulbee v. Moore, 106 Ky. 749 , 51 S.W. 564 , 21 K.L.R. 378 (1899), but as pointed out in footnote (1) to § 216 of Stanley, the court later commented in Forbes v. Hunter, 31 K.L.R. 285, 102 S.W. 246 (1907), that perhaps it would be better to tell the jury that the measure of damages is the sum required in order to make the building conform to the contract.

21964–1964
Connor v. Commonwealth neutral
kyctapp · 1904
2 sentences

1932Connor v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 497 , 81 S. W. 259 , 26 Ky. Law Rep. 398 .” And in the very recent case of Greenbury Hall v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 717 , 47 S. W. (2d) 538 , decided March 11,1932, an instruction practically identical to the one complained of here was held not to be prejudicial or erroneous.

1932Connor v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 497 , 81 S. W. 259 , 26 Ky. Law Rep. 398 .” And in the very recent case of Greenbury Hall v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 717 , 47 S. W. (2d) 538 , decided March 11,1932, an instruction practically identical to the one complained of here was held not to be prejudicial or erroneous.

21931–1932
Hemphill v. New York green
scotus · 2022
1 sentence

2024“Generally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.” Fairley v. Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 792, 802 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009)). -9- The main thrust of Workman’s appeal on this issue is that a recent Supreme Court case, Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. 140 , 142 S. Ct. 681 , 211 L.

12024–2024
Maggard v. Kinney green
moctapp · 2019
1 sentence

2021Id.

12021–2021
Coomer v. CSX Transportation, Inc. green
ky · 2010
1 sentence

2021Id. at 371 .

12021–2021
Commonwealth v. Callahan green
ky · 1984
1 sentence

1999Id . (citing Commonwealth v. Callahan, Ky., 675 S.W.2d 391 (1984)). *492 Again, the argument is utterly without merit.

11999–1999
Resthaven Memorial Cemetery, Inc. v. Volk green
kyctapphigh · 1941
2 sentences

1984Consequently the decision in Resthaven Memorial Cemetery v. Volk, 286 Ky. 291 , 150 S.W.2d 908 (1941), applies, and the five-year statute of limitations is proper because it relates to the interference with a right not otherwise enumerated in the limitation statute.

1984Consequently the decision in Resthaven Memorial Cemetery v. Volk, 286 Ky. 291 , 150 S.W.2d 908 (1941), applies, and the five-year statute of limitations is proper because it relates to the interference with a right not otherwise enumerated in the limitation statute.

11984–1984
Carr v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation green
kyctapphigh · 1961
2 sentences

1984If we use the object vs. form test set out in Carr, supra , to decide what right is protected, it would be the right to be free from harassment intentionally invading the plaintiff's rights and causing emotional distress, with or without personal injury.

1984If we use the object vs. form test set out in Carr, supra, to decide what right is protected, it would be the right to be free from harassment intentionally invading the plaintiff’s rights and causing emotional distress, with or without personal injury.

11984–1984
Orr v. Coleman green
kyctapphigh · 1970
1 sentence

1974Hence the form of instruction set forth in Orr v. Coleman, supra, at 455 S.W.2d 61, 62 , is preferable to the one used by the trial court in this case.

11974–1974
Jarboe v. Harting green
kyctapphigh · 1965
1 sentence

1970It was couched in the same language recommended in Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20 , 69 S.W. 1096 , 24 K.L.R. 791, 59 L.R.A. 277 (1902) and used in such relatively recent cases as Engle v. Clarke, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 13 (1961) and Jarboe v. Harting, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 775 (1965).

11970–1970
Engle v. Clarke green
kyctapphigh · 1961
1 sentence

1970It was couched in the same language recommended in Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20 , 69 S.W. 1096 , 24 K.L.R. 791, 59 L.R.A. 277 (1902) and used in such relatively recent cases as Engle v. Clarke, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 13 (1961) and Jarboe v. Harting, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 775 (1965).

11970–1970
Burk v. Foster green
kyctapp · 1902
11970–1970
Brown Hotel v. Levitt green
kyctapphigh · 1948
11968–1968
Laine v. Commonwealth green
kyctapphigh · 1941
11964–1964
Pate's Administrator v. Joe green
kyctapp · 1829
11962–1962
Turner v. Turner neutral
kyctapp · 1822
11962–1962
Gwinn v. Radford neutral
kyctapp · 1822
11962–1962
Howard's Will neutral
kyctapp · 1827
11962–1962
McCue v. Turner green
kyctapphigh · 1934
11962–1962
Humphries v. Gray neutral
kyctapphigh · 1947
11961–1961
Abbott v. Commonwealth green
kyctapphigh · 1947
11960–1960
Mahan v. Commonwealth green
kyctapp · 1955
11960–1960
Baldwin v. Wiggins green
kyctapphigh · 1956
11960–1960
Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc. green
kyctapphigh · 1959
11960–1960
Goins v. Hudson, Jailer neutral
kyctapphigh · 1932
11957–1957
Sizemore v. Hoskins neutral
kyctapp · 1951
11957–1957
Nickell v. Commonwealth green
kyctapphigh · 1955
11957–1957
Ken-Ten Coach Lines, Inc. v. Siler neutral
kyctapphigh · 1946
11955–1955
Berry v. Irwin neutral
kyctapphigh · 1927
11952–1952
Johnson v. Porter, Administratrix neutral
kyctapphigh · 1925
11950–1950
Taylor v. Commonwealth neutral
kyctapp · 1916
11943–1943
Harkleroad v. Commonwealth green
kyctapp · 1925
11943–1943
Button v. Pinckley neutral
kyctapphigh · 1933
11941–1941
Cumberland Grocery Company v. Hewlett neutral
kyctapphigh · 1929
11941–1941
Talbott v. Commonwealth neutral
kyctapp · 1878
11940–1940
Patton v. Commonwealth green
kyctapphigh · 1930
11939–1939

Statutes the citing opinions construe

KY § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 418.040 (4) KY § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 508.010 (4) KY § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 12.010 (3) KY § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 501.060 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 259 (1858–2025) IL 108 (1878–2025) MO 93 (1886–2025) TX 87 (1880–2026) KY 73 (1922–2025) PA 67 (1892–2026) NY 66 (1867–2024) FL 48 (1925–2020) IN 44 (1917–2025) WA 34 (1915–2019) NJ 34 (1898–2025) MA 31 (1923–2025) NC 31 (1903–2021) AL 31 (1859–2015) MS 28 (1923–2019) LA 28 (1904–2024) AZ 27 (1903–2023) OH 26 (1856–2024) MI 26 (1877–2025) MD 25 (1920–2023) OR 25 (1912–2023) IA 25 (1904–2026) NM 24 (1906–2025) CT 20 (1931–2022) WI 19 (1925–2025) AR 19 (1908–2025) ID 17 (1892–2025) SD 17 (1921–2024) CO 16 (1964–2025) WV 15 (1893–2024) TN 15 (1896–2024) GA 14 (1904–2026) KS 13 (1903–2010) DC 13 (1971–2020) VT 13 (1975–2026) OK 11 (1912–2011) NV 11 (1914–2022) VA 10 (1912–2019) WY 9 (1929–2008) NE 9 (1909–1996) DE 9 (1952–2024) MN 8 (1932–2014) ND 7 (1927–2025) MT 6 (1887–1986) UT 6 (1969–2020) HI 5 (1969–2016) ME 5 (1972–2021) AK 5 (1992–2016) SC 3 (1904–1953) RI 2 (1903–1997)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check