form instruction in Pennsylvania

1974The instant charge is substantially similar to the one which received this Court’s approval in Commonwealth v. Darnell, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 461 (1955). *90 As we have repeatedly observed, “A trial judge should warn the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony but the form of instruction lies within the discretion of the court.” Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 276, 277 (1947) ; Commonwealth v. Darnell, supra; Commonwealth v. McKenna, 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 317 (1965).

1968In the Brown case, supra, this court stated: “Of course, a trial judge should warn the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony (Com. v. McCloskey, 273 Pa. 456, 461 , 117 A. 192 ) but the form of instruction lies within the discretion of the court.” (at 228) As recently as Commonwealth v. McKenna, 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 317 , 213 A. 2d 223 (1965), we have had opportunity to reiterate that rule, stating that the “form of the instruction warning the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony lies within the discretion of the court.” McKenna, supra, at 323 .

1957“Of course, a trial judge should warn the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony . . . but the form of instruction lies within the discretion of the court.” Com. v. Brown, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 226 , 44 A. 2d 524 .

1957“Of course, a trial judge should warn the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony . . . but the form of instruction lies within the discretion of the court.” Com. v. Brown, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 226 , 44 A. 2d 524 .

2016J.B., 107 A.3d at 19 .

2016J.B., 107 A.3d at 19 .

1999In my view, however, this form of analysis departs from the fundamental inquiry, namely, whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search and seizure `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (citations omitted), and creates the potential for confusion among police officers in the course of day-to-day encounters.

1999In my view, however, this form of analysis departs from the fundamental inquiry, namely, whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search and seizure `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (citations omitted), and creates the potential for confusion among police officers in the course of day-to-day encounters.

1999Nor am I able to meaningfully distinguish the quantum of information that was available to the officers in Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50 , 735 A.2d 673 (1999), a case in which the Court found that the defendant's flight from police did have significance in the totality of the circumstances, from that which was available here. [3] Accordingly, I would hold that the circumstances present in this case formed an objectively reasonable basis for suspicion, thus justifying the investigatory detention.

1999Nor am I able to meaningfully distinguish the quantum of information that was available to the officers in Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50 , 735 A.2d 673 (1999), a case in which the Court found that the defendant's flight from police did have significance in the totality of the circumstances, from that which was available here. [3] Accordingly, I would hold that the circumstances present in this case formed an objectively reasonable basis for suspicion, thus justifying the investigatory detention.

1991Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Quarles, 361 Pa.Super. 272 , 522 A.2d 579 (1987), the appellant argued that the trial court’s charge was defective because it did not specifically tell the jury that the alibi testimony offered by the appellant’s witness “did not have to be totally accepted to acquit” the appellant.

1991Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Quarles, 361 Pa.Super. 272 , 522 A.2d 579 (1987), the appellant argued that the trial court’s charge was defective because it did not specifically tell the jury that the alibi testimony offered by the appellant’s witness “did not have to be totally accepted to acquit” the appellant.

1991Like the Johnson court before it, the Bright court rejected this argument, stating, “appellant is merely contesting the form of the instruction rather than its substance.” Bright, 361 Pa.Super. at 267 , 522 A.2d 573 .

1991Like the Johnson court before it, the Bright court rejected this argument, stating, “appellant is merely contesting the form of the instruction rather than its substance.” Bright, 361 Pa.Super. at 267 , 522 A.2d 573 .

1978As stated in Yealy at page 216: “[I]f a public officer acts maliciously or wantonly; if the work which he performs be done rather to injure a private individual than to discharge a public duty; he is responsible for the consequences.” Various lower court cases have since focused upon this question (see the discussion in DuBree, Jr., Exr. v. Commonwealth et al., supra, at pages 572-573) and several years ago our Superior Court reaffirmed the existence of a form of immunity for public officials: Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Superior Ct. 47 , 302 A. 2d 491 (1973).

1978As stated in Yealy at page 216: “[I]f a public officer acts maliciously or wantonly; if the work which he performs be done rather to injure a private individual than to discharge a public duty; he is responsible for the consequences.” Various lower court cases have since focused upon this question (see the discussion in DuBree, Jr., Exr. v. Commonwealth et al., supra, at pages 572-573) and several years ago our Superior Court reaffirmed the existence of a form of immunity for public officials: Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Superior Ct. 47 , 302 A. 2d 491 (1973).

1978The Commonwealth Court, consistent with those precedents, enunciated in DuBree at page 574: “Upon a careful review and evaluation of these precedents, it appears to us that the doctrines expounded in Burton, supra, and Yealy, supra, are still the law of Pennsylvania and must be adhered to by this Court, and, since we continue to credit the Commonwealth with sovereign immunity, it is still as true as it was in the 19th century that such immunity would be unvailing [sic] if there were not also some form of immunity granted to those officers and employees whom the Commonwealth must necessarily em

1973The Court in Meads, supra, cited neither Burton, supra, nor Yealy, supra, and it should be noted that, when very recently faced with this issue, the Superior Court chose to hold that a form of immunity does exist for public officials.

1968In the Brown case, supra, this court stated: “Of course, a trial judge should warn the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony (Com. v. McCloskey, 273 Pa. 456, 461 , 117 A. 192 ) but the form of instruction lies within the discretion of the court.” (at 228) As recently as Commonwealth v. McKenna, 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 317 , 213 A. 2d 223 (1965), we have had opportunity to reiterate that rule, stating that the “form of the instruction warning the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony lies within the discretion of the court.” McKenna, supra, at 323 .

1968In the Brown case, supra, this court stated: “Of course, a trial judge should warn the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony (Com. v. McCloskey, 273 Pa. 456, 461 , 117 A. 192 ) but the form of instruction lies within the discretion of the court.” (at 228) As recently as Commonwealth v. McKenna, 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 317 , 213 A. 2d 223 (1965), we have had opportunity to reiterate that rule, stating that the “form of the instruction warning the jury of the corrupt source of an accomplice’s testimony lies within the discretion of the court.” McKenna, supra, at 323 .

1930In the opinion of President Judge Rice, in Corey v. Edgewood Borough (No. 1), 18 Pa. Superior Ct. 216, 222 , is embodied the rule of construction pursued in this state as well as many other states, to be followed in this case: “The primary rule of construction applicable to a clause in a deed in the form of an exception or reservation is to gather the intention of the parties from the words by reading, not simply a single clause, but the entire context, and where the meaning is doubtful, by considering such circumstances as they are presumed to have considered. . . .

1909In doing this, we must view the nature of the thing insured, its situation and the circumstances surrounding it; as was said in Corey v. Edgewood Borough, No. 1, 18 Pa. Superior Ct. 216 : “The primary rule of construction applicable to a clause in the form of an exception or reservation, is to gather the intention of the parties from the words, by reading not simply a single clause but the entire context, and where the meaning is doubtful by considering such circumstances as are presumed to have been considered.” And it must also be presumed that the insurance company was cognizant of the appa

2025In adopting this form of immunity, the Court reasoned that “quasi-judicial immunity, as with judicial immunity, is necessary to ensure that 14 agency adjudicatory decisions will be rendered independently, free from external pressures, harassment or intimidation.” Id. at 1359 .

2023In a PCRA proceeding, "an appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the burden of persuasion as to whether there is a race-neutral explanation for the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges." Reid, 99 A.3d at 459 (citing Uderra, 862 A.2d at 86 ).

2023Therefore, "[w]hen a Batson claim is not raised at trial, the only collateral challenge available in such a circumstance would be a derivative claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness." Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 769 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 5 Where a Batson claim is raised for the first time during a PCRA proceeding, necessarily in the form of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant "must demonstrate 'actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence,' as well as meeting the 'performance and prejudice' standard for demonstrating

2020Krepps, 112 A.3d at 1257 .

2018See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Kelly, supra. In this regard, the court reasoned: Mr. Hrywnak was under the obligation to retain an attorney for the hearing at hand.

2014See, Cook supra; Mendez, supra; Parker, supra. - 19 - J-S57024-14 In his final issue, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in the form of its instruction to the jury about the relevance of certain evidence of Appellant’s other bad acts.

2014See, Cook supra; Mendez, supra; Parker, supra. - 19 - J-S57024-14 In his final issue, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in the form of its instruction to the jury about the relevance of certain evidence of Appellant’s other bad acts.