form instruction in California

2025(See People v. Lamer (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1471 [applying harmless error standard enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836 to defendant’s claim that trial court erred in instructing jury it could draw an adverse inference from defendant’s failure to deny or explain evidence against him].) Indeed, Hampton admitted that he had fired the fatal shots and that he had reflected (i.e., premeditated and deliberated) before doing so, for example, during the period of time in which he raised and lowered his gun as a form of warning to Hayes.

2019"Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ." ( People v. Russell , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 , 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 ; accord, People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1219-1220, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 , and cases cited; People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335 , 349, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 ; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 , 462-463, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 ; **890 People v. Sojka , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 738 , 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Under this st

2023It did not “‘affect[] the framework within which the trial proceed[ed]’ . . . ” (Weaver, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 295 .) It was “‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’” (Ibid.) “The effect of this form of error can be quantitatively assessed in light of the evidence to determine whether the error was prejudicial or harmless.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 174 .) There is no doubt that any violation of the RJA is harmless in this case.

2015(People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 317 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 29, fn. 7 .) However, in a noncapital case, a trial court’s erroneous failure to fully instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is reviewed for prejudice under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 : “A conviction of the charged offense may be reversed in consequence of this form of error only if, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ [citation], it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occu

2015VI, § 13), it appears “reasonably probable” the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred.’” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 111 ; see People v. Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 955 ; see also People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 556 .) Here, the evidence that Listo acted dispassionately in shooting Rodriguez after Rodriguez had provoked a fight with Vargas and Arevalo and while Rodriguez was on top of, and apparently pummeling, the much smaller and younger Arevalo, was at most equivocal.

2014VI, § 13), it appears "reasonably probable" the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred.' " (Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 111 .) Based on our review of the record, if the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding involuntary manslaughter, that error was harmless under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 .

2016Otherwise, the summary procedure could be used to allow the very form of challenge and protracted litigation the testator sought to prevent.” (Estate of Ferber (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 244, 251 (Ferber).) In reviewing the trial court’s ruling that the proposed petition would not constitute a contest, we apply a de novo standard.

2009Otherwise, the summary procedure [provided by section 21320] could be used to allow the very form of challenge and protracted litigation the [trustor] sought to prevent.” (Estate of Ferber (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 244, 251 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 774 ], citation omitted; accord, Estate of Davies (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1173 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 ] (Davies); Estate of Kaila (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1135-1137 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 ].) A. No Contest Clauses “An in terrorem or no contest clause in a will or trust instrument creates a condition upon gifts and dispositions provided therein. ... [A] no

2013(Id. at p. 48.) Due process similarly requires transparency. ―‗Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.‘‖ (Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80 [ 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 ].) ―Although . . . due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing ‗appropriate to the nature of the case,‘ [citation], and ‗depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings [if any],‘ [citation], [this] Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its for

2013(Id. at p. 48.) Due process similarly requires transparency. ―‗Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.‘‖ (Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80 [ 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 ].) ―Although . . . due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing ‗appropriate to the nature of the case,‘ [citation], and ‗depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings [if any],‘ [citation], [this] Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its for

1949While it is true that mere advice or assurances by a private attorney will not vitiate a plea entered in reliance thereon (see, People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 16 [ 45 P. 986 ]; In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522, 531 [ 150 P. 2d 448 ]; People v. Gottlieb, 25 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [ 77 P.2d 489 ]) we are of the view that a contrary rule should prevail if the statements of the attorney amount to an unqualified factual representation (which is untrue) that the state or a responsible officer thereof, such as a judge of competent authority or a district attorney, has entered into a bargain purporting to comm

1949While it is true that mere advice or assurances by a private attorney will not vitiate a plea entered in reliance thereon (see, People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 16 [ 45 P. 986 ]; In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522, 531 [ 150 P. 2d 448 ]; People v. Gottlieb, 25 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [ 77 P.2d 489 ]) we are of the view that a contrary rule should prevail if the statements of the attorney amount to an unqualified factual representation (which is untrue) that the state or a responsible officer thereof, such as a judge of competent authority or a district attorney, has entered into a bargain purporting to comm

1949While it is true that mere advice or assurances by a private attorney will not vitiate a plea entered in reliance thereon (see, People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 16 [ 45 P. 986 ]; In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522, 531 [ 150 P. 2d 448 ]; People v. Gottlieb, 25 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [ 77 P.2d 489 ]) we are of the view that a contrary rule should prevail if the statements of the attorney amount to an unqualified factual representation (which is untrue) that the state or a responsible officer thereof, such as a judge of competent authority or a district attorney, has entered into a bargain purporting to comm

1949While it is true that mere advice or assurances by a private attorney will not vitiate a plea entered in reliance thereon (see, People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 16 [ 45 P. 986 ]; In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522, 531 [ 150 P. 2d 448 ]; People v. Gottlieb, 25 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [ 77 P.2d 489 ]) we are of the view that a contrary rule should prevail if the statements of the attorney amount to an unqualified factual representation (which is untrue) that the state or a responsible officer thereof, such as a judge of competent authority or a district attorney, has entered into a bargain purporting to comm

1949While it is true that mere advice or assurances by a private attorney will not vitiate a plea entered in reliance thereon (see, People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 16 [ 45 P. 986 ]; In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522, 531 [ 150 P. 2d 448 ]; People v. Gottlieb, 25 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [ 77 P.2d 489 ]) we are of the view that a contrary rule should prevail if the statements of the attorney amount to an unqualified factual representation (which is untrue) that the state or a responsible officer thereof, such as a judge of competent authority or a district attorney, has entered into a bargain purporting to comm

1949While it is true that mere advice or assurances by a private attorney will not vitiate a plea entered in reliance thereon (see, People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 16 [ 45 P. 986 ]; In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522, 531 [ 150 P. 2d 448 ]; People v. Gottlieb, 25 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [ 77 P.2d 489 ]) we are of the view that a contrary rule should prevail if the statements of the attorney amount to an unqualified factual representation (which is untrue) that the state or a responsible officer thereof, such as a judge of competent authority or a district attorney, has entered into a bargain purporting to comm

2025Right against self-incrimination “[T]he privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment prohibits any comment on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial that invites or allows the jury to infer 14. guilt therefrom, whether in the form of an instruction by the court or a remark by the prosecution.” (Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 662 .) The test for reviewing comments about the privilege is the reasonable likelihood standard, under which we inquire “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the [comments] in violation of [the privilege].” (Id

2024In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment prohibits any comment on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial that invites or allows the jury to infer guilt therefrom, whether in the form of an instruction by the court or a remark by the prosecution. (380 U.S. at pp. 611-615.) We evaluate claims of Griffin error by inquiring whether there is “a reasonable likelihood that any of the [prosecutor’s] comments could have been understood, within its context, to refer to defendant’s failure to testify.” (People v. Clair (1992)

1959(Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.2d 652, 657 [ 320 P.2d 500 ]; see 4 Cal.Jur.2d 423, § 557.) However, we find no fault with any of the instructions given.

1959(Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.2d 652, 657 [ 320 P.2d 500 ]; see 4 Cal.Jur.2d 423, § 557.) However, we find no fault with any of the instructions given.

2025(Id. at p. 827; see also Katz, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1034 [“Plaintiff’s cause of action for injunction seeks to restrain levy of the tax.

2025(Id. at p. 827; see also Katz, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1034 [“Plaintiff’s cause of action for injunction seeks to restrain levy of the tax.

2023(Tobacco Cases I, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106 ; accord Coast Plaza, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684–685.) To identify the controversy, the court examines “the specific acts of alleged wrongdoing and not just the form of the claim.” (Drell v. Cohen (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 24 , 29–30 (Drell); Bigler v. Harker School (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 727, 739, 741 (Bigler) [inquiry focuses on an examination of the conduct and the circumstances alleged, not merely the label of the cause of action; it is the dispute, not the named cause of action, that is the focus of the inquiry].) Rather than interpre

2021(Tobacco Cases I, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106 ; accord Coast Plaza, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684–685.) To identify the controversy, the court examines “the specific acts of alleged wrongdoing and not just the form of the claim.” (Drell v. Cohen (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 24 , 29–30.) Rather than interpreting the written agreement at this step in the analysis, the court assesses the nature of the dispute as pled in the complaint.

2023(Tobacco Cases I, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106 ; accord Coast Plaza, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684–685.) To identify the controversy, the court examines “the specific acts of alleged wrongdoing and not just the form of the claim.” (Drell v. Cohen (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 24 , 29–30 (Drell); Bigler v. Harker School (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 727, 739, 741 (Bigler) [inquiry focuses on an examination of the conduct and the circumstances alleged, not merely the label of the cause of action; it is the dispute, not the named cause of action, that is the focus of the inquiry].) Rather than interpre

2023But all the alleged conduct by SJWC causing damage to the Kweis and their property, including but also beyond the driveway—the present controversy—concerns SJWC’s claimed misuse and overuse of the easements for ingress and egress during the specified period of the Project, and related negligence. ( Drell, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 29–30 [to identify the controversy, court examines the specific acts of alleged wrongdoing and not just the form of the claim].) The nature of the dispute is thus unrelated to respective payment obligations for the routine repair and regular maintenance of specif

2019"Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ." ( People v. Russell , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 , 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 ; accord, People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1219-1220, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 , and cases cited; People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335 , 349, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 ; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 , 462-463, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 ; **890 People v. Sojka , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 738 , 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Under this st

2019"Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ." ( People v. Russell , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 , 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 ; accord, People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1219-1220, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 , and cases cited; People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335 , 349, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 ; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 , 462-463, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 ; **890 People v. Sojka , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 738 , 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Under this st

1990"Certainly error, constitutional error, ... casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless.... [T]he beneficiary of a constitutional error [is required] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." ( Ibid. [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 ].) As Justice Scalia stated in his concurring opinion in Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 218 , 109 S.Ct. 2419 ], "the harmless-error analysis applicable in assessing a mandatory conclusive presumption is wholly unlike the typical form

1990"Certainly error, constitutional error, ... casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless.... [T]he beneficiary of a constitutional error [is required] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." ( Ibid. [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 ].) As Justice Scalia stated in his concurring opinion in Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 218 , 109 S.Ct. 2419 ], "the harmless-error analysis applicable in assessing a mandatory conclusive presumption is wholly unlike the typical form

2022A conviction of the charged offense may be reversed, in consequence of this form of error only if, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence” [citation], it appears “reasonably probable” the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred.’ ” (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 93 .) There must be “a reasonable probability, not a mere theoretical possibility, that the instructional error affected the outcome of the trial.” (Id. at p. 94.) Even if we assume the jury may not have convicted Ruben as a direct perpetrator of counts 8 a

2021A conviction of the charged offense may be reversed, in consequence of this form of error only if, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence” [citation], it appears “reasonably probable” the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred.’ ” (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 93 .) There must be “a reasonable probability, not a mere theoretical possibility, that the instructional error affected the outcome of the trial.” (Id. at p. 94.) Even if we assume the jury may not have convicted Ruben as a direct perpetrator of counts 8 a

2022(See Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 462 [‘ “[certainty] instruction has merit in so far as it deals with the testimony of a witness who expressed doubt about the accuracy of her identification. . . .” ’].) The misleading effect we are concerned with here— that the jury is prompted to believe there is a strong correlation between certainty and accuracy despite empirical research showing just the opposite— is not present when a witness has expressed doubt regarding the identification.” (Lemcke, at p. 669, fn. 19.) Although the Supreme Court has instructed trial courts to omit the certainty fac

2021(People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 462 .) But since then, the court has “acknowledg[ed] that this form of instruction has the potential to mislead jurors.” (People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644 (Lemcke).) The court reasoned that jurors often assume that a certain identification is more likely to be accurate, an assumption that CALCRIM No. 315 tends to reinforce, even though “[t]here is near unanimity in the empirical research that ‘ “ ‘under most circumstances, witness confidence or certainty is not a good indicator of identification accuracy.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lemcke, at pp. 665-666.

2019"Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ." ( People v. Russell , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 , 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 ; accord, People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1219-1220, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 , and cases cited; People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335 , 349, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 ; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 , 462-463, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 ; **890 People v. Sojka , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 738 , 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Under this st

2019"Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ." ( People v. Russell , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 , 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 ; accord, People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1219-1220, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 , and cases cited; People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335 , 349, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 ; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 , 462-463, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 ; **890 People v. Sojka , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 738 , 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Under this st

2015(Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 ; Peregrine Funding, supra, at p. 672 .) Determining the gravamen of the claims requires examination of the specific acts of alleged wrongdoing and not just the form of the claim.

2015(Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494 ]; Peregrine Funding, supra, at p. 672.) Determining the gravamen of the claims requires examination of the specific acts of alleged wrongdoing and not just the form of the claim.

2014I should be completely outraged at the discovery violation that’s occurred here.” 10 “‘In Griffin [v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ], the United States Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment prohibits any comment on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial that invites or allows the jury to infer guilt therefrom, whether in the form of an instruction by the court or a remark by the prosecution.’ [Citation.] In People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287 . . . , the California Supreme Court explained that ‘it is [Gr

2014I should be completely outraged at the discovery violation that’s occurred here.” 10 “‘In Griffin [v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ], the United States Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment prohibits any comment on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial that invites or allows the jury to infer guilt therefrom, whether in the form of an instruction by the court or a remark by the prosecution.’ [Citation.] In People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287 . . . , the California Supreme Court explained that ‘it is [Gr

2020(People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007 , 1012–1013.) Relying on Reliford, other decisions have rejected such challenges to CALJIC No. 2.50.02, the previous form instruction on evidence about prior domestic violence admitted under section 1109, as well as more recent form instructions on both sections 1108 and 1109.

2020(People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007 , 1012–1013.) Relying on Reliford, other decisions have rejected such challenges to CALJIC No. 2.50.02, the previous form instruction on evidence about prior domestic violence admitted under section 1109, as well as more recent form instructions on both sections 1108 and 1109.