form instruction in Maryland

2005In Ross v. Pick, supra, 199 Md. [341] at 351[, 86 A.2d 463 (1952) ], we set out this principle in the form of a presumption....

1977In Ross v. Pick, supra, 199 Md. at 351 , we set out this principle in the form of a presumption and in language *178 which we have from time to time quoted and in content which we have consistently applied: Where parents claim the custody of a child, there is a prima fade presumption that the child’s welfare will be best subserved in the care and custody of its parents rather than in the custody of others, and the burden is then cast upon the parties opposing them to show the contrary. 4 See DeGrange v. Kline, supra, 254 Md. at 242-243 ; McClary v. Follett, Jr., supra, 226 Md. at 442 ; Trenton

2020Repeatedly, in its brief filed in the Court of Special Appeals, in discussing the award of permanent partial disability for tinnitus, the County argued that “tinnitus is a form of hearing loss covered under the occupational deafness statute and nowhere else under the Act.” Brief for Appellant Montgomery Cty., Montgomery Cty. v. Bowen, 243 Md.

2010The Supreme Court of Iowa began its analysis by observing that, “[a]s the particular form of an instruction is left to the discretion of the trial court, [the Court] reviewfs] the [trial] court’s ruling on the defendant’s request for an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).

2009As we observed in O’Leary v. Shipley, 313 Md. 189 , 545 A.2d 17 (1988), there are two tests used to determine whether a government employer lawfully discharged an employee for exercising her or his political rights: the Pickering test and the Elrod/Branti test.

2009As we observed in O’Leary v. Shipley, 313 Md. 189 , 545 A.2d 17 (1988), there are two tests used to determine whether a government employer lawfully discharged an employee for exercising her or his political rights: the Pickering test and the Elrod/Branti test.

2005Id. at 468-69 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 .

2005Id. at 468-69 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 .

2004There must be such an inquiry as will satisfy the Court that the witness is competent to testify but the form of that inquiry rests in the discretion of the trial court.” Odom, 736 F.2d at 111 (quoting Gerry, 515 F.2d at 137 (internal citations omitted)).

2004SlimAmerica, 77 F.Supp.2d at 1276 .

1999Neither does Lucas, 116 Md.App. at 559 , 698 A.2d at 1145 , cited by appellant as the proper form of instruction, help him, for the simple reason that the State does not dispute that such an instruction is a correct statement of law.

1999Neither does Lucas, 116 Md.App. at 559 , 698 A.2d at 1145 , cited by appellant as the proper form of instruction, help him, for the simple reason that the State does not dispute that such an instruction is a correct statement of law.

1996Under this form of immunity, government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of their discretionary functions when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 U.S. at 818 .

1995This was so, the Court said because the only purpose of Rule 4—327(f) was to restate the common law in the form of a rule, ie., to “recognize the right of a jury to append to its verdict a recommendation of mercy,” but not to imbue a defendant with “a ‘right’ to require an instruction informing them of this prerogative.” Id. at 49 , 650 A.2d at 729 .

1995This was so, the Court said because the only purpose of Rule 4—327(f) was to restate the common law in the form of a rule, ie., to “recognize the right of a jury to append to its verdict a recommendation of mercy,” but not to imbue a defendant with “a ‘right’ to require an instruction informing them of this prerogative.” Id. at 49 , 650 A.2d at 729 .

1977We see nothing here that brings the case within Brown v. State, 6 Md.

1977In Ross v. Pick, supra, 199 Md. at 351 , we set out this principle in the form of a presumption and in language *178 which we have from time to time quoted and in content which we have consistently applied: Where parents claim the custody of a child, there is a prima fade presumption that the child’s welfare will be best subserved in the care and custody of its parents rather than in the custody of others, and the burden is then cast upon the parties opposing them to show the contrary. 4 See DeGrange v. Kline, supra, 254 Md. at 242-243 ; McClary v. Follett, Jr., supra, 226 Md. at 442 ; Trenton

1977In Ross v. Pick, supra, 199 Md. at 351 , we set out this principle in the form of a presumption and in language *178 which we have from time to time quoted and in content which we have consistently applied: Where parents claim the custody of a child, there is a prima fade presumption that the child’s welfare will be best subserved in the care and custody of its parents rather than in the custody of others, and the burden is then cast upon the parties opposing them to show the contrary. 4 See DeGrange v. Kline, supra, 254 Md. at 242-243 ; McClary v. Follett, Jr., supra, 226 Md. at 442 ; Trenton

1977In Ross v. Pick, supra, 199 Md. at 351 , we set out this principle in the form of a presumption and in language *178 which we have from time to time quoted and in content which we have consistently applied: Where parents claim the custody of a child, there is a prima fade presumption that the child’s welfare will be best subserved in the care and custody of its parents rather than in the custody of others, and the burden is then cast upon the parties opposing them to show the contrary. 4 See DeGrange v. Kline, supra, 254 Md. at 242-243 ; McClary v. Follett, Jr., supra, 226 Md. at 442 ; Trenton

1975The distinction between the two torts has survived the Revolution and appears in Maryland case law in the form of a presumption: “There is, however, a distinction between oral and written or printed defamation, and the presumption that words are defamatory arises much more readily in cases of libel than in cases of slander.” Bowie v. Evening News, 148 Md. 569, 574 ; See also Greenbelt Coop.

1971For cases involving this form of waiver, see Swift v. State, 224 Md. 300, 305 ; Scott v. State, 2 Md.

1971For cases involving this form of waiver, see Swift v. State, 224 Md. 300, 305 ; Scott v. State, 2 Md.

1969Co., 24 Md. 108 (1866). 1 Basically the same instruction as was given in this case was given in Von Schlegell v. Ford, 167 Md. 584 , 175 A. 589 (1934).

1969Co., 24 Md. 108 (1866). 1 Basically the same instruction as was given in this case was given in Von Schlegell v. Ford, 167 Md. 584 , 175 A. 589 (1934).

1969Co., 24 Md. 108 (1866). 1 Basically the same instruction as was given in this case was given in Von Schlegell v. Ford, 167 Md. 584 , 175 A. 589 (1934).

1964Maryland Rules of Procedure, Rule 554 e; State, Use of Charuhas v. Heffelfinger, 226 Md. 493, 497 , 174 A. 2d 336 .

1964Maryland Rules of Procedure, Rule 554 e; State, Use of Charuhas v. Heffelfinger, 226 Md. 493, 497 , 174 A. 2d 336 .

1961Westpark contends that, under Messina v. Moeller, 214 Md. 110 , 133 A. 2d 75 (1957), the special clause converted the Seaton document to an option.

1961Westpark contends that, under Messina v. Moeller, 214 Md. 110 , 133 A. 2d 75 (1957), the special clause converted the Seaton document to an option.

1953In this connection, the cases indicate that no distinction is to be drawn between convictions and charges which result in acquittal, but the line is sharply drawn between “the general talk of people about defendant, rather than the witness’ own knowledge of him, the form of inquiry, ‘Have you heard?’ has general approval, and ‘Do you know?’ is not allowed.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 482 , 69 S. Ct. 213, 221 , 93 L.

1953In this connection, the cases indicate that no distinction is to be drawn between convictions and charges which result in acquittal, but the line is sharply drawn between “the general talk of people about defendant, rather than the witness’ own knowledge of him, the form of inquiry, ‘Have you heard?’ has general approval, and ‘Do you know?’ is not allowed.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 482 , 69 S. Ct. 213, 221 , 93 L.

1936Fowble cannot be imputed to the plaintiff and forms no bar to the right of recovery of the plaintiff in this case.” The form of such an instruction has been approved by this court (McAdoo v. State, 136 Md. 452 , 111 A. 476 ), and it is not subject to the argued criticism that it improperly segregated facts involved in its hypotheses.

1936Fowble cannot be imputed to the plaintiff and forms no bar to the right of recovery of the plaintiff in this case.” The form of such an instruction has been approved by this court (McAdoo v. State, 136 Md. 452 , 111 A. 476 ), and it is not subject to the argued criticism that it improperly segregated facts involved in its hypotheses.

1932The rule of highest intermediate value up to the time of trial formerly prevailed in that state. * * * The hardship which arose from estimating the damages by the highest price up to the time of trial, which might be years after the transaction occurred, was often so great that the Court of Appeals of New York was constrained to introduce *614 a material modification in the form of the rule, and to hold the true and just measure of damages in these cases tó he the highest intermediate value of the stock between the time of its conversion and a reasonable time after the owner has received notic

1932The rule of highest intermediate value up to the time of trial formerly prevailed in that state. * * * The hardship which arose from estimating the damages by the highest price up to the time of trial, which might be years after the transaction occurred, was often so great that the Court of Appeals of New York was constrained to introduce *614 a material modification in the form of the rule, and to hold the true and just measure of damages in these cases tó he the highest intermediate value of the stock between the time of its conversion and a reasonable time after the owner has received notic

1928The appellants’ third prayer imposed upon the appellee the burden of establishing the “state of facts alleged in the declaration,” and instructed the jury to find for the appellantg if the testimony should “leave the minds of the jury in a state of even balance as to the truth of the allegations in the declaration.” The prayer was approved in this form in Pillard v. Chesapeake Steamship Co., 124 Md. 468, 475 , where it was accepted as the ordinary form of an instruction on the burden of proof in negligence cases, but no mention was made in the decision of the prayer’s reference to the “state o

1928Co., 137 Md. 605 , where it was approved sub silentio, is not conclusive of its propriety, since that must always be determined with reference to the nature and state of the proof in the particular case before the jury.