penalty hearing in Pennsylvania

2014Compare Commonwealth v. Tharp, — Pa. -, 101 A.3d 736, 756 (2014) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective because he conducted a deficient investigation into mitigating evidence, presented no testimonial evidence during the penalty hearing, and, instead, relied on the defendant’s guilt phase testimony of abuse and domestic violence when ample life history and mental health mitigation evidence was readily available); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425 , 856 A.2d 767, 787-788 (2004) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective for engaging in little or no investigation of mitigation evidence

2012Appendix Sampling of Capital Cases in which Relief Has Been Granted in the Pennsylvania State Courts • Commonwealth v. King, — Pa. -, — A.3d - (2012) (reflecting the Commonwealth’s decision to discontinue the appeal from the award of a new penalty hearing, directed on a PCRA court’s finding of a failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence) • Commonwealth v. Keaton, — Pa.-, 45 A.3d 1050, 1091-93 (2012) (new penalty award affirmed, where trial counsel maintained a “myopic focus only on the guilt phase”; failed to obtain life-history and mental-health records or otherwise conduct an ad

2022See id. “[P]articularly in close cases, a developed post-conviction record accompanied by specific factual findings and legal conclusions is an essential tool necessary to sharpen the issues.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1121-22 (Pa. 2008) (vacating an award of a new penalty hearing and remanding for further proceedings).

2014See id. “[P]articularly in close cases, a developed post-conviction record accompanied by specific factual findings and legal conclusions is an essential tool necessary to sharpen the issues.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1121-22 (Pa. 2008) (vacating an award of a new penalty hearing and remanding for further proceedings).

2016It is well-established that “[w]here the issues in a case are moot, any opinion issued would be merely advisory and, therefore, inappropriate.” Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 79 A.3d 510, 519 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Moore, 860 A.2d 88, 100 (Pa. 2004) (holding that where a defendant is granted a new penalty hearing, all remaining penalty phase issues are rendered moot).

2016It is well-established that “[wjhere the issues in a case are moot, any opinion issued would be merely advisory and, therefore, inappropriate.” Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 621 Pa. 509 , 79 A.3d 510, 519 (2013) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Moore, 580 Pa. 279 , 860 A.2d 88,100 (2004) (holding that where a defendant is granted a new penalty hearing, all remaining penalty phase issues are rendered moot).

1996Commonwealth v. Marshall, 534 Pa. 488, 502 , 633 A.2d 1100, 1107 (1993) (during the penalty hearing, the prosecutor is accorded reasonable latitude and may employ oratorical flair in arguing for a sentence of death).

1996Commonwealth v. Marshall, 534 Pa. 488, 502 , 633 A.2d 1100, 1107 (1993) (during the penalty hearing, the prosecutor is accorded reasonable latitude and may employ oratorical flair in arguing for a sentence of death).

2014Compare Commonwealth v. Tharp, — Pa. -, 101 A.3d 736, 756 (2014) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective because he conducted a deficient investigation into mitigating evidence, presented no testimonial evidence during the penalty hearing, and, instead, relied on the defendant’s guilt phase testimony of abuse and domestic violence when ample life history and mental health mitigation evidence was readily available); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425 , 856 A.2d 767, 787-788 (2004) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective for engaging in little or no investigation of mitigation evidence

2012Appendix Sampling of Capital Cases in which Relief Has Been Granted in the Pennsylvania State Courts • Commonwealth v. King, — Pa. -, — A.3d - (2012) (reflecting the Commonwealth’s decision to discontinue the appeal from the award of a new penalty hearing, directed on a PCRA court’s finding of a failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence) • Commonwealth v. Keaton, — Pa.-, 45 A.3d 1050, 1091-93 (2012) (new penalty award affirmed, where trial counsel maintained a “myopic focus only on the guilt phase”; failed to obtain life-history and mental-health records or otherwise conduct an ad

2005See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 , 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2543 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). [3] For example, one of the Commonwealth witnesses at the penalty hearing stated that Appellant confessed to her that he had "snapped" on the night in question, and there was evidence from other witnesses consistent with this observation, including testimony that Appellant had been drinking heavily, he was dazed and glassy-eyed, his manner had become subdued (which was in contrast with his usual demeanor after consuming alcohol), and he had spoken to his father's grave

2005See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 , 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2543 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). [3] For example, one of the Commonwealth witnesses at the penalty hearing stated that Appellant confessed to her that he had "snapped" on the night in question, and there was evidence from other witnesses consistent with this observation, including testimony that Appellant had been drinking heavily, he was dazed and glassy-eyed, his manner had become subdued (which was in contrast with his usual demeanor after consuming alcohol), and he had spoken to his father's grave

2015In reviewing the PORA court’s determination, “we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence, which includes the evidence presented at the penalty hearing and the evidence that would have been presented had counsel conducted a proper investigation.” [Com. v. Gibson ] Gibson II [ 610 Pa. 332 ], 19 A.3d [512] at 526 [ (2011) ]; see also Lesko, 15 A.3d at 384-85 (emphasizing that Strickland prejudice in this context requires consideration of context of case, including gravity of aggravating circumstances and strength of mitigating circumstances found

2015In reviewing the PCRA court's determination, “we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence, which includes the evidence presented at the penalty hearing and the evidence that would have been presented had counsel conducted a proper investigation.” Gibson II, 19 A.3d at 526; see also Lesko, 15 A.3d at 384–85 (emphasizing that Strickland prejudice in this context requires consideration of context of case, including gravity of aggravating circumstances and strength of mitigating circumstances found by jury).

2022See Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272 ; see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 987 A.2d 638 , 667 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that sentencing counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence that merely would have been cumulative of evidence that was presented during a penalty hearing).

2014See Spotz, supra; Commonwealth v. Miller, 605 Pa. 1, 49 , 987 A.2d 638, 667 (2009) (“This Court has consistently held that trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence that merely would have been cumulative of evidence that was presented during a penalty hearing.”) (citations omitted).

2021In Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1136 (Pa. 2009), for example, the petitioner appealed from the PCRA court’s order denying him a new trial but granting a new penalty hearing.

2010At the penalty hearing, the defense relied upon two mitigating factors, namely, the age of the defendant at the time of the incident (twenty-one), id. at § 9711(e)(4), and any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense ("the catchall mitigator").

2009See generally Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 248 , 732 A.2d 1167, 1189 (1999) (explaining that the full ineffectiveness inquiry pertaining to the asserted failure to present adequate mitigation will entail a comparison of the mitigation evidence that was presented in the penalty phase of trial in relation to that which the defendant later claims); accord Malloy, 579 Pa. at 461 , 856 A.2d at 789 (”[I]n considering whether appellant was prejudiced we must consider not only the evidence and argument presented at the penalty phase, but also the evidence and argument that would have been pr

2009See generally Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 248 , 732 A.2d 1167, 1189 (1999) (explaining that the full ineffectiveness inquiry pertaining to the asserted failure to present adequate mitigation will entail a comparison of the mitigation evidence that was presented in the penalty phase of trial in relation to that which the defendant later claims); accord Malloy, 579 Pa. at 461 , 856 A.2d at 789 (”[I]n considering whether appellant was prejudiced we must consider not only the evidence and argument presented at the penalty phase, but also the evidence and argument that would have been pr

2014See id. “[P]articularly in close cases, a developed post-conviction record accompanied by specific factual findings and legal conclusions is an essential tool necessary to sharpen the issues.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1121-22 (Pa. 2008) (vacating an award of a new penalty hearing and remanding for further proceedings).

2014See id. “[P]articularly in close cases, a developed post-conviction record accompanied by specific factual findings and legal conclusions is an essential tool necessary to sharpen the issues.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1121-22 (Pa. 2008) (vacating an award of a new penalty hearing and remanding for further proceedings).

2018In reviewing the PCRA court's determination, "we reweigh the evidence in aggravation *159 against the totality of available mitigating evidence, which includes the evidence presented at the penalty hearing and the evidence that would have been presented had counsel conducted a proper investigation." Commonwealth v. Gibson , 610 Pa. 332 , 19 A.3d 512 , 526 (2011).

2018In reviewing the PCRA court's determination, "we reweigh the evidence in aggravation *159 against the totality of available mitigating evidence, which includes the evidence presented at the penalty hearing and the evidence that would have been presented had counsel conducted a proper investigation." Commonwealth v. Gibson , 610 Pa. 332 , 19 A.3d 512 , 526 (2011).

2012Appendix Sampling of Capital Cases in which Relief Has Been Granted in the Pennsylvania State Courts • Commonwealth v. King, — Pa. -, — A.3d - (2012) (reflecting the Commonwealth’s decision to discontinue the appeal from the award of a new penalty hearing, directed on a PCRA court’s finding of a failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence) • Commonwealth v. Keaton, — Pa.-, 45 A.3d 1050, 1091-93 (2012) (new penalty award affirmed, where trial counsel maintained a “myopic focus only on the guilt phase”; failed to obtain life-history and mental-health records or otherwise conduct an ad

2012Appendix Sampling of Capital Cases in which Relief Has Been Granted in the Pennsylvania State Courts • Commonwealth v. King, — Pa. -, — A.3d - (2012) (reflecting the Commonwealth’s decision to discontinue the appeal from the award of a new penalty hearing, directed on a PCRA court’s finding of a failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence) • Commonwealth v. Keaton, — Pa.-, 45 A.3d 1050, 1091-93 (2012) (new penalty award affirmed, where trial counsel maintained a “myopic focus only on the guilt phase”; failed to obtain life-history and mental-health records or otherwise conduct an ad

2020Relying on Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069 (Pa. 2001), 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a); 2502(b); 903(a)(1); 2901(a)(3); and 903(a)(1), respectively. 2 Appellant was 20 years old at the time of the crime. [J-24-2020] - 5 abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.3d 385 (Pa. 2003), wherein this Court ordered a new penalty hearing because the jury did not find the (e)(1) mitigator despite the parties’ stipulation to its existence, we concluded that the jury herein was obliged to find the (e)(1) mitigator, and should have been directed to do so by the trial court.

2016Appellant cites the mandatory statutory language and relies heavily upon Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069 (Pa. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Freeman, supra, where this Court ordered a new penalty hearing because the jury did not find the (e)(1) mitigator despite the parties’ stipulation to its existence.

2019Commonwealth v. Ballard, 622 Pa. 177 , 80 A.3d 380, 406 (2013), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 940 , 134 S.Ct. 2842 , 189 L.Ed.2d 824 (2014).

2019Hairston , 84 A.3d at 672 ; Ballard , 80 A.3d at 406 .

2014Specifically, “[a]t the penalty hearing, the defense relied upon two mitigating factors, namely, the age of the defendant at the time of the incident (twenty-one), id. at Sec. 9711(e)(4), and any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense (“the catchall mitigator”).

2014Specifically, “[a]t the penalty hearing, the defense relied upon two mitigating factors, namely, the age of the defendant at the time of the incident (twenty-one), id. at Sec. 9711(e)(4), and any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense (“the catchall mitigator”).

2013Id. at 535-36 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see generally, Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 461 , 856 A.2d 767, 789 (2004)).

2013Id. at 535-36 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see generally, Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 461 , 856 A.2d 767, 789 (2004)).

2004In LaCava , however, this Court held that improper remarks injecting external considerations during the penalty phase did warrant a new penalty hearing, in part because the remarks could have impermissibly influenced the jury’s balancing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in favor of a death sentence. 666 A.2d at 237 .

2004In LaCava , however, this Court held that improper remarks injecting external considerations during the penalty phase did warrant a new penalty hearing, in part because the remarks could have impermissibly influenced the jury's balancing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in favor of a death sentence. 666 A.2d at 237 .

2009This evidence seems to me to much more clearly implicate what the United States Supreme Court has characterized as "the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit acts that are attributable to ... emotional and mental problems may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse," Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2947 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), compared with what Dr. Tepper apparently regards as his effort to make the best of an untenable situation at the penalty hearing.

2009This evidence seems to me to much more clearly implicate what the United States Supreme Court has characterized as "the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit acts that are attributable to ... emotional and mental problems may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse," Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2947 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), compared with what Dr. Tepper apparently regards as his effort to make the best of an untenable situation at the penalty hearing.

1994See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 523 Pa. 556, 573 , 568 A.2d 590, 598 (1989) (permissible to refer to defendant as “a systematic, brutal, calculating killer.”) Appellant’s next allegation of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty hearing is the prosecutor’s reference during closing argument to “aggravating circumstances” in the plural when only one aggravating circumstance was charged.

1994See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 523 Pa. 556, 573 , 568 A.2d 590, 598 (1989) (permissible to refer to defendant as “a systematic, brutal, calculating killer.”) Appellant’s next allegation of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty hearing is the prosecutor’s reference during closing argument to “aggravating circumstances” in the plural when only one aggravating circumstance was charged.

2001Two Pennsylvania decisions touch on the limitations of admissible relevant evidence in a penalty hearing, Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188 , 555 A.2d 846 (1989), and Commonwealth v. Fisher, 545 Pa. 233 , 681 A.2d 130 (1996).

2001Two Pennsylvania decisions touch on the limitations of admissible relevant evidence in a penalty hearing, Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188 , 555 A.2d 846 (1989), and Commonwealth v. Fisher, 545 Pa. 233 , 681 A.2d 130 (1996).