12 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1867–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beck v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013Henderson, 59 Va. App. at 656-59, 661, 663, 665 , 722 S.E.2d at 283-87 . 4 The second decision, relating to the weight of the evidence, and the third, relating to the appropriate penalty when a violation has been shown, are necessary in all probation revocation proceedings, whether testimonial hearsay is offered or not. 13 On appellate review, ordinarily, "the determination of the admissibility of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of that discretion." Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 384-85 , 484 S.E.2d 898, 905 (1997). 2013Henderson, 59 Va. App. at 656-59, 661, 663, 665 , 722 S.E.2d at 283-87 . 4 The second decision, relating to the weight of the evidence, and the third, relating to the appropriate penalty when a violation has been shown, are necessary in all probation revocation proceedings, whether testimonial hearsay is offered or not. 13 On appellate review, ordinarily, "the determination of the admissibility of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of that discretion." Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 384-85 , 484 S.E.2d 898, 905 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013Henderson, 59 Va. App. at 656-59, 661, 663, 665 , 722 S.E.2d at 283-87 . 4 The second decision, relating to the weight of the evidence, and the third, relating to the appropriate penalty when a violation has been shown, are necessary in all probation revocation proceedings, whether testimonial hearsay is offered or not. 13 On appellate review, ordinarily, "the determination of the admissibility of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of that discretion." Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 384-85 , 484 S.E.2d 898, 905 (1997). 2013Henderson, 59 Va. App. at 656-59, 661, 663, 665 , 722 S.E.2d at 283-87 . 4 The second decision, relating to the weight of the evidence, and the third, relating to the appropriate penalty when a violation has been shown, are necessary in all probation revocation proceedings, whether testimonial hearsay is offered or not. 13 On appellate review, ordinarily, "the determination of the admissibility of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of that discretion." Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 384-85 , 484 S.E.2d 898, 905 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Godwin v. Kernsgreen2 sentences1976Evidence pertaining to the alleged “separate oral agreement” was offered for the designed purpose of contradicting the “complete, unambiguous, unconditional written instrument”, Godwin v. Kerns, 178 Va. 447, 451 , 17 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1941), and we hold that it was error to admit parol evidence for that purpose. 1976Evidence pertaining to the alleged “separate oral agreement” was offered for the designed purpose of contradicting the “complete, unambiguous, unconditional written instrument”, Godwin v. Kerns, 178 Va. 447, 451 , 17 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1941), and we hold that it was error to admit parol evidence for that purpose. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Feely
neutral
2 sentences1867Commonwealth v. Feeley; 1 Va. Cas. 321 ; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Ibid. 34; United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 1867Commonwealth v. Feeley; 1 Va. Cas. 321 ; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Ibid. 34; United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. | 3 | 1867–1867 |
Davis v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1999Thus, the operative statute “defines the [offense] in terms of the court’s order and prohibits the person who has been declared an habitual offender from driving while *162 the order remains in effect.” 12 Va.App. at 249 , 402 S.E.2d at 712 . 1999Thus, the operative statute “defines the [offense] in terms of the court’s order and prohibits the person who has been declared an habitual offender from driving while *162 the order remains in effect.” 12 Va.App. at 249 , 402 S.E.2d at 712 . | 2 | 1993–1999 |
Donovan v. BD. OF ZON. APPEALS OF ROCKINGHAM
green
2 sentences2012The failure to screen an automobile graveyard is not identified as a circumstance which terminates the status of the use as a valid nonconforming use, nor is termination of such status listed as the penalty for violation of or failure to conform to the screening provisions contained in the zoning ordinance.” Id. 2012The Court concluded that the interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance by the Zoning Administrator as approved by the BZA was plainly wrong and based on erroneous principles of law: “Nothing in the ordinance provides that the failure to screen an automobile graveyard terminates a valid nonconforming use.” Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
F. S. Bowen Electric Co. v. Foley
green
2 sentences1955Whenever, therefore, the illegality of the contract appears, whether alleged in the pleadings or made known for the first *882 time in the evidence, it is fatal to the case. * * * The law will not enforce contracts founded in its violation.” Massie v. Dudley, supra, ( 173 Va., at p. 52 ; 3 S. E. (2d), at p. 180 .) This principle was adhered to in Hancock Company v. Stephens, 177 Va. 349 , 14 S. E. (2d) 332 ; State Realty Co. v. Wood, 190 Va. 321 , 57 S. E. (2d) 102 ; Bowen Electric Company v. Foley, 194 Va. 92 , 72 S. E. (2d) 388 . 1955Whenever, therefore, the illegality of the contract appears, whether alleged in the pleadings or made known for the first *882 time in the evidence, it is fatal to the case. * * * The law will not enforce contracts founded in its violation.” Massie v. Dudley, supra, ( 173 Va., at p. 52 ; 3 S. E. (2d), at p. 180 .) This principle was adhered to in Hancock Company v. Stephens, 177 Va. 349 , 14 S. E. (2d) 332 ; State Realty Co. v. Wood, 190 Va. 321 , 57 S. E. (2d) 102 ; Bowen Electric Company v. Foley, 194 Va. 92 , 72 S. E. (2d) 388 . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
State Realty Co. v. Wood
green
2 sentences1955Whenever, therefore, the illegality of the contract appears, whether alleged in the pleadings or made known for the first *882 time in the evidence, it is fatal to the case. * * * The law will not enforce contracts founded in its violation.” Massie v. Dudley, supra, ( 173 Va., at p. 52 ; 3 S. E. (2d), at p. 180 .) This principle was adhered to in Hancock Company v. Stephens, 177 Va. 349 , 14 S. E. (2d) 332 ; State Realty Co. v. Wood, 190 Va. 321 , 57 S. E. (2d) 102 ; Bowen Electric Company v. Foley, 194 Va. 92 , 72 S. E. (2d) 388 . 1955Whenever, therefore, the illegality of the contract appears, whether alleged in the pleadings or made known for the first *882 time in the evidence, it is fatal to the case. * * * The law will not enforce contracts founded in its violation.” Massie v. Dudley, supra, ( 173 Va., at p. 52 ; 3 S. E. (2d), at p. 180 .) This principle was adhered to in Hancock Company v. Stephens, 177 Va. 349 , 14 S. E. (2d) 332 ; State Realty Co. v. Wood, 190 Va. 321 , 57 S. E. (2d) 102 ; Bowen Electric Company v. Foley, 194 Va. 92 , 72 S. E. (2d) 388 . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Massie v. Dudley
green
2 sentences1955We said in Massie v. Dudley, 173 Va. 42, 53 , 3 S. E. (2d) 176 , 181: “In general, it seems to be well established that where a .licensing statute is a police regulation, having for its object the protection of the public, making it unlawful for a person to engage in a business without a license, and imposing a penalty for its violation, a contract made by an unlicensed person is void and unenforceable.” The reason for the rule is stated thus: “The law refuses to enforce illegal contracts, as a rule, not out of regard for the party objecting, nor for any wish to protect his interests, but from 1955We said in Massie v. Dudley, 173 Va. 42, 53 , 3 S. E. (2d) 176 , 181: “In general, it seems to be well established that where a .licensing statute is a police regulation, having for its object the protection of the public, making it unlawful for a person to engage in a business without a license, and imposing a penalty for its violation, a contract made by an unlicensed person is void and unenforceable.” The reason for the rule is stated thus: “The law refuses to enforce illegal contracts, as a rule, not out of regard for the party objecting, nor for any wish to protect his interests, but from | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Hancock Co. v. Stephens
green
2 sentences1955Whenever, therefore, the illegality of the contract appears, whether alleged in the pleadings or made known for the first *882 time in the evidence, it is fatal to the case. * * * The law will not enforce contracts founded in its violation.” Massie v. Dudley, supra, ( 173 Va., at p. 52 ; 3 S. E. (2d), at p. 180 .) This principle was adhered to in Hancock Company v. Stephens, 177 Va. 349 , 14 S. E. (2d) 332 ; State Realty Co. v. Wood, 190 Va. 321 , 57 S. E. (2d) 102 ; Bowen Electric Company v. Foley, 194 Va. 92 , 72 S. E. (2d) 388 . 1955Whenever, therefore, the illegality of the contract appears, whether alleged in the pleadings or made known for the first *882 time in the evidence, it is fatal to the case. * * * The law will not enforce contracts founded in its violation.” Massie v. Dudley, supra, ( 173 Va., at p. 52 ; 3 S. E. (2d), at p. 180 .) This principle was adhered to in Hancock Company v. Stephens, 177 Va. 349 , 14 S. E. (2d) 332 ; State Realty Co. v. Wood, 190 Va. 321 , 57 S. E. (2d) 102 ; Bowen Electric Company v. Foley, 194 Va. 92 , 72 S. E. (2d) 388 . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Allen v. City of Norfolk
green
2 sentences1954Allen v. City of Norfolk, 195 Va. 844 , 80 S. E. (2d) 605 , decided this day on rehearing. 1954Allen v. City of Norfolk, 195 Va. 844 , 80 S. E. (2d) 605 , decided this day on rehearing. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Rossberg v. State
green
2 sentences1937McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.), section •924 (F. N.), states the rule thus: “Where a city has concurrent powers with the State it may prescribe a penalty for the violation of its ordinances different from that prescribed by the State for the violation of a statute regarding the same subject matter.” See Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394 , 74 A. 581 , 134 Am. 1937McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.), section •924 (F. N.), states the rule thus: “Where a city has concurrent powers with the State it may prescribe a penalty for the violation of its ordinances different from that prescribed by the State for the violation of a statute regarding the same subject matter.” See Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394 , 74 A. 581 , 134 Am. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Jernigan v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1907Jernigan's Case, 104 Va. 850 , 52 S. E. 361 and authorities cited. 1907Jernigan's Case, 104 Va. 850 , 52 S. E. 361 and authorities cited. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.