136 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1950–2022 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nunnery v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Nunnery, 127 Nev. at 770 , 263 P.3d at 249 (holding that "NRS 175.552 establishes broad parameters as to what constitutes admissible evidence at a penalty phase'' SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 )0) 1947A and "the decision to admit evidence at a penalty hearing is left to the discretion of the trial judge"). 2019Nunnery, 127 Nev. at 770 , 263 P.3d at 249 (holding that "NRS 175.552 establishes broad parameters as to what constitutes admissible evidence at a penalty phase'' SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 )0) 1947A and "the decision to admit evidence at a penalty hearing is left to the discretion of the trial judge"). | 8 | 10 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2018Nor does the failure to present such testimony undermine our confidence in the outcome of the penalty hearing, see id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."), particularly since any expert opinion would have been challenged on cross-examination with evidence that Rippo was found with weapons in his cell and had exposed himself to and threatened to kill a prison guard, the same as the witness who did testify at the penalty hearing. 2018Nor does the failure to present such testimony undermine our confidence in the outcome of the penalty hearing, see id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."), particularly since any expert opinion would have been challenged on cross-examination with evidence that Rippo was found with weapons in his cell and had exposed himself to and threatened to kill a prison guard, the same as the witness who did testify at the penalty hearing. | 5 | 8 |
Gallego v. Stategreen2 sentences2018First, Nunnery has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, show deficient performance considering the district court's wide discretion to admit evidence in a capital penalty hearing, see NRS 175.552(3); case law providing that evidence not normally admissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during a penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (providing that hearsay is generally admissible during capital penalty hearings); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) ("Evidence of character is admissible during a 2018First, Nunnery has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, show deficient performance considering the district court's wide discretion to admit evidence in a capital penalty hearing, see NRS 175.552(3); case law providing that evidence not normally admissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during a penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (providing that hearsay is generally admissible during capital penalty hearings); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) ("Evidence of character is admissible during a | 5 | 5 |
Kirksey v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Riker also cites Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (9th Cir.2003), which describes this court's affirmance of a dismissal of a successive petition. [47] See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 48 , 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004) ("We need not decide whether this failure [by counsel to challenge improper remarks by the prosecutor] was prejudicial since we have already determined that a new penalty hearing is necessary."); Allan v. State, 118 Nev. 19, 26 , 38 P.3d 175, 179 (2002) ("In light of this conclusion [that the district court erroneously ruled that the appellant could be impeached with 2005Riker also cites Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (9th Cir.2003), which describes this court's affirmance of a dismissal of a successive petition. [47] See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 48 , 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004) ("We need not decide whether this failure [by counsel to challenge improper remarks by the prosecutor] was prejudicial since we have already determined that a new penalty hearing is necessary."); Allan v. State, 118 Nev. 19, 26 , 38 P.3d 175, 179 (2002) ("In light of this conclusion [that the district court erroneously ruled that the appellant could be impeached with | 5 | 5 |
Emil v. Stategreen2 sentences2018First, Nunnery has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, show deficient performance considering the district court's wide discretion to admit evidence in a capital penalty hearing, see NRS 175.552(3); case law providing that evidence not normally admissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during a penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (providing that hearsay is generally admissible during capital penalty hearings); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) ("Evidence of character is admissible during a 2018First, Nunnery has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, show deficient performance considering the district court's wide discretion to admit evidence in a capital penalty hearing, see NRS 175.552(3); case law providing that evidence not normally admissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during a penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (providing that hearsay is generally admissible during capital penalty hearings); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) ("Evidence of character is admissible during a | 4 | 4 |
Thomas v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 48 , 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004) (“We need not decide whether this failure [by counsel to challenge improper remarks by the prosecutor] was prejudicial since we have already determined that a new penalty hearing is necessary.”); Allan v. State, 118 Nev. 19, 26 , 38 P.3d 175, 179 (2002) (“In light of this conclusion [that the district court erroneously ruled that the appellant could be impeached with his confession], we need not reach [appellant’s] other contentions.”). 2005See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 48 , 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004) (“We need not decide whether this failure [by counsel to challenge improper remarks by the prosecutor] was prejudicial since we have already determined that a new penalty hearing is necessary.”); Allan v. State, 118 Nev. 19, 26 , 38 P.3d 175, 179 (2002) (“In light of this conclusion [that the district court erroneously ruled that the appellant could be impeached with his confession], we need not reach [appellant’s] other contentions.”). | 4 | 4 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen2 sentences2004In light of our decision to remand Butler's appeal for a new penalty hearing, those remarks do not warrant further discussion. [39] Hernandez, 118 Nev. at 535 , 50 P.3d at 1115 . [40] Under NRS 177.055(2)(c), we must also consider whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstance in this case. 2004In light of our decision to remand Butler's appeal for a new penalty hearing, those remarks do not warrant further discussion. [39] Hernandez, 118 Nev. at 535 , 50 P.3d at 1115 . [40] Under NRS 177.055(2)(c), we must also consider whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstance in this case. | 4 | 4 |
Guy v. Stategreen2 sentences2011The decision to admit evidence at a penalty hearing is left to the discretion of the trial judge. 7 See NRS 175.552; Guy, 108 Nev. at 782 , 839 P.2d at 586 . 2011The decision to admit evidence at a penalty hearing is left to the discretion of the trial judge. 7 See NRS 175.552; Guy, 108 Nev. at 782 , 839 P.2d at 586 . | 3 | 5 |
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Furthermore, during a penalty hearing, “evidence may be presented concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances relative to the offense, defendant or victim and on any other matter which the court deems relevant to sentence, whether or not the evidence is ordinarily admissible.” NRS 175.552(3); see also Allen v. State, 99 Nev. 485, 488 , 665 P.2d 238, 240 (1983). 1998Furthermore, during a penalty hearing, “evidence may be presented concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances relative to the offense, defendant or victim and on any other matter which the court deems relevant to sentence, whether or not the evidence is ordinarily admissible.” NRS 175.552(3); see also Allen v. State, 99 Nev. 485, 488 , 665 P.2d 238, 240 (1983). | 3 | 5 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2018First, Nunnery has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, show deficient performance considering the district court's wide discretion to admit evidence in a capital penalty hearing, see NRS 175.552(3); case law providing that evidence not normally admissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during a penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (providing that hearsay is generally admissible during capital penalty hearings); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) ("Evidence of character is admissible during a 2018First, Nunnery has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, show deficient performance considering the district court's wide discretion to admit evidence in a capital penalty hearing, see NRS 175.552(3); case law providing that evidence not normally admissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during a penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (providing that hearsay is generally admissible during capital penalty hearings); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) ("Evidence of character is admissible during a | 3 | 4 |
State v. Hartegreen2 sentences2021See State v. Harte, 124 Nev. 969, 975, 194 P.3d 1263, 1267 (2008) (concluding that a new penalty hearing was the appropriate remedy when the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury had been invalidated). 2021See State v. Harte, 124 Nev. 969, 975, 194 P.3d 1263, 1267 (2008) (concluding that a new penalty hearing was the appropriate remedy when the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury had been invalidated). | 3 | 3 |
Pellegrini v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Relying on Mazzan v. State, 100 Nev. 74, 675 P.2d 409 (1984), and McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), Belcher contends that counsel's ineffectiveness is clear from the record before this court. "[W]e have generally declined to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal unless there has already been an evidentiary hearing or where an evidentiary hearing would be unnecessary." Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883, 34 P.3d 519, 534 (2001) (footnote omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.1 2020Relying on Mazzan v. State, 100 Nev. 74, 675 P.2d 409 (1984), and McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), Belcher contends that counsel's ineffectiveness is clear from the record before this court. "[W]e have generally declined to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal unless there has already been an evidentiary hearing or where an evidentiary hearing would be unnecessary." Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883, 34 P.3d 519, 534 (2001) (footnote omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.1 | 3 | 3 |
Hollaway v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Thus, I would not remand this matter for a new penalty hearing. [2] NOTES [1] 112 Nev. 1172 , 926 P.2d 265 (1996). [2] Id.; Evans v. State, Docket No. 29936, 113 Nev. 1622 , 970 P.2d 1102 (Order Dismissing Appeal, November 20, 1997). [3] Pangallo v. State, 112 Nev. 1533, 1536 , 930 P.2d 100, 102 (1996), limited on other grounds by Hart v. State, 116 Nev. 558 , 562-63, 1 P.3d 969, 972 (2000). [4] Id. [5] NRS 34.810. [6] Daniels v. State, 100 Nev. 579, 580 , 688 P.2d 315, 316 (1984), modified on other grounds by Varwig v. State, 104 Nev. 40 , 752 P.2d 760 (1988). [7] Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 9 2001Thus, I would not remand this matter for a new penalty hearing. [2] NOTES [1] 112 Nev. 1172 , 926 P.2d 265 (1996). [2] Id.; Evans v. State, Docket No. 29936, 113 Nev. 1622 , 970 P.2d 1102 (Order Dismissing Appeal, November 20, 1997). [3] Pangallo v. State, 112 Nev. 1533, 1536 , 930 P.2d 100, 102 (1996), limited on other grounds by Hart v. State, 116 Nev. 558 , 562-63, 1 P.3d 969, 972 (2000). [4] Id. [5] NRS 34.810. [6] Daniels v. State, 100 Nev. 579, 580 , 688 P.2d 315, 316 (1984), modified on other grounds by Varwig v. State, 104 Nev. 40 , 752 P.2d 760 (1988). [7] Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 9 | 3 | 3 |
McConnell v. Stategreen2 sentences2016After conducting an evidentiary hearing that included testimony from Collman's trial counsel, David Schieck 3 and Scott Bindrup, the district court granted Collman relief as to his claim that the State impermissibly based the torture aggravating circumstance on the felony upon which the felony-murder theory was based in violation of McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043 , 102 P.3d 606 (2004), and vacated the death sentence and ordered a new penalty hearing. 2016After conducting an evidentiary hearing that included testimony from Collman's trial counsel, David Schieck 3 and Scott Bindrup, the district court granted Collman relief as to his claim that the State impermissibly based the torture aggravating circumstance on the felony upon which the felony-murder theory was based in violation of McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043 , 102 P.3d 606 (2004), and vacated the death sentence and ordered a new penalty hearing. | 2 | 6 |
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Id. 2000See Rogers v. State, 101 Nev. 457, 466-67 , 705 P.2d 664, 670-71 (1985). | 2 | 4 |
United States v. Younggreen2 sentences2001Thus, I would not remand this matter for a new penalty hearing. [2] NOTES [1] 112 Nev. 1172 , 926 P.2d 265 (1996). [2] Id.; Evans v. State, Docket No. 29936, 113 Nev. 1622 , 970 P.2d 1102 (Order Dismissing Appeal, November 20, 1997). [3] Pangallo v. State, 112 Nev. 1533, 1536 , 930 P.2d 100, 102 (1996), limited on other grounds by Hart v. State, 116 Nev. 558 , 562-63, 1 P.3d 969, 972 (2000). [4] Id. [5] NRS 34.810. [6] Daniels v. State, 100 Nev. 579, 580 , 688 P.2d 315, 316 (1984), modified on other grounds by Varwig v. State, 104 Nev. 40 , 752 P.2d 760 (1988). [7] Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 9 2001Thus, I would not remand this matter for a new penalty hearing. [2] NOTES [1] 112 Nev. 1172 , 926 P.2d 265 (1996). [2] Id.; Evans v. State, Docket No. 29936, 113 Nev. 1622 , 970 P.2d 1102 (Order Dismissing Appeal, November 20, 1997). [3] Pangallo v. State, 112 Nev. 1533, 1536 , 930 P.2d 100, 102 (1996), limited on other grounds by Hart v. State, 116 Nev. 558 , 562-63, 1 P.3d 969, 972 (2000). [4] Id. [5] NRS 34.810. [6] Daniels v. State, 100 Nev. 579, 580 , 688 P.2d 315, 316 (1984), modified on other grounds by Varwig v. State, 104 Nev. 40 , 752 P.2d 760 (1988). [7] Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 9 | 2 | 4 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences2020A penalty hearing jury should not hear dubious or tenuous evidence regarding prior convictions, Jones v. State, 101 Nev. 573, 578 , 707 P.2d 1128, 1132 (1985), or hearsay "supported solely by impalpable or highly suspect evidence," Young v. State, 103 Nev. 233, 237 , 737 P.2d 512, 515 (1987). 2020A penalty hearing jury should not hear dubious or tenuous evidence regarding prior convictions, Jones v. State, 101 Nev. 573, 578 , 707 P.2d 1128, 1132 (1985), or hearsay "supported solely by impalpable or highly suspect evidence," Young v. State, 103 Nev. 233, 237 , 737 P.2d 512, 515 (1987). | 2 | 3 |
Johnson v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2021Cf. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1988) (concluding that a death sentence had to be reexamined where one of the aggravating circumstances was based on a prior conviction for a violent felony and the conviction had since been reversed, declining to consider whether the aggravating circumstance could be sustained based solely on evidence of the conduct underlying the reversed conviction where the prosecutor did not introduce any such evidence, and noting that "[s]ince that conviction has been reversed, unless and until petitioner should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of 2021Cf. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1988) (concluding that a death sentence had to be reexamined where one of the aggravating circumstances was based on a prior conviction for a violent felony and the conviction had since been reversed, declining to consider whether the aggravating circumstance could be sustained based solely on evidence of the conduct underlying the reversed conviction where the prosecutor did not introduce any such evidence, and noting that "[s]ince that conviction has been reversed, unless and until petitioner should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of | 2 | 2 |
Summers v. Stategreen2 sentences2018First, Nunnery has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, show deficient performance considering the district court's wide discretion to admit evidence in a capital penalty hearing, see NRS 175.552(3); case law providing that evidence not normally admissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during a penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (providing that hearsay is generally admissible during capital penalty hearings); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) ("Evidence of character is admissible during a 2018First, Nunnery has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, show deficient performance considering the district court's wide discretion to admit evidence in a capital penalty hearing, see NRS 175.552(3); case law providing that evidence not normally admissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during a penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (providing that hearsay is generally admissible during capital penalty hearings); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) ("Evidence of character is admissible during a | 2 | 2 |
Pellegrini v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Pellegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 631 , 764 P.2d 484, 488 (1988). 2020Pellegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 631 , 764 P.2d 484, 488 (1988). | 2 | 2 |
| Mason v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Rippo v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Bridges v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Boyde v. Californiagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Restaurantgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Nunnery v. Eighth Judicial District Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Hidalgo v. Eighth Judicial District Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Maresca v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Jimenez v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Lane v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Allan v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Evans v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Leonard v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Bejarano v. Warden, Nevada State Prisongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| McGuire v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Emmons v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Howard v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Milligan v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Deutscher v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mazzan v. State
green
2 sentences2020Relying on Mazzan v. State, 100 Nev. 74, 675 P.2d 409 (1984), and McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), Belcher contends that counsel's ineffectiveness is clear from the record before this court. "[W]e have generally declined to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal unless there has already been an evidentiary hearing or where an evidentiary hearing would be unnecessary." Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883, 34 P.3d 519, 534 (2001) (footnote omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.1 2020Relying on Mazzan v. State, 100 Nev. 74, 675 P.2d 409 (1984), and McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), Belcher contends that counsel's ineffectiveness is clear from the record before this court. "[W]e have generally declined to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal unless there has already been an evidentiary hearing or where an evidentiary hearing would be unnecessary." Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883, 34 P.3d 519, 534 (2001) (footnote omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.1 | 4 | 1989–2020 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2006The claims on appeal that were raised in the petition below are as follows: the jury was improperly instructed regarding the premeditation and deliberation necessary to support a first-degree murder conviction; the jury was not instructed that it had to unanimously find aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; the prosecutor committed misconduct during the penalty hearing; the under-sentence-of-imprisonment aggravator pursuant to NRS 200.033(1) was invalid because Bejarano was on probation from a misdemeanor (as opposed to a felony) conviction at the time of the murder; the prevent 2003We therefore affirm the district court’s order vacating Bennett’s sentence of death and ordering a new penalty hearing. 49 Rose, Leavitt and Maupin, JL, concur. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). | 4 | 2001–2006 |
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2019He claimed he demonstrated good cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bars based on *559 Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). 2019He claimed he demonstrated good cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bars based on *559 Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Robins v. State
green
2 sentences1996In Robins v. State, 106 Nev. 611 , 798 P.2d 558 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970 (1991), this court held that evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible at a penalty hearing once any aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 1996In Robins v. State, 106 Nev. 611 , 798 P.2d 558 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970 (1991), this court held that evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible at a penalty hearing once any aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | 3 | 1992–2016 |
Flanagan v. State
green
2 sentences1989Finally, Emil contends that prosecutorial misconduct during final argument of the penalty hearing deprived him of a fair hearing because the prosecutor argued the circumstances of Emil’s prior murder conviction to inflame the passion of the jury. 4 Moreover, Emil claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor impermissibly misleading the jury on the question of youth as a mitigating factor. 5 *868 In Flanagan v. State, 104 Nev. 105 , 754 P.2d 836 (1988), a death penalty case involving prosecutorial misconduct, this court stated that “[a]t the sentencing phase, it is most important that the ju 1989Finally, Emil contends that prosecutorial misconduct during final argument of the penalty hearing deprived him of a fair hearing because the prosecutor argued the circumstances of Emil’s prior murder conviction to inflame the passion of the jury. 4 Moreover, Emil claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor impermissibly misleading the jury on the question of youth as a mitigating factor. 5 *868 In Flanagan v. State, 104 Nev. 105 , 754 P.2d 836 (1988), a death penalty case involving prosecutorial misconduct, this court stated that “[a]t the sentencing phase, it is most important that the ju | 3 | 1988–1996 |
Woodson v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences1988Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), ruled that the relevant factors to be considered by a jury in imposing a penalty for a capital crime are “the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.” Therefore we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the appellant’s character even though such evidence did not consist of aggravating circumstances. 1988Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), ruled that the relevant factors to be considered by a jury in imposing a penalty for a capital crime are “the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.” Therefore we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the appellant’s character even though such evidence did not consist of aggravating circumstances. | 3 | 1983–1988 |
| Schoels v. State green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| Redeker v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. County of Clark green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Redeker v. Dist. Ct. green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Browning v. State green | 2 | 2004–2008 |
| Witter v. State red | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Riveland v. Ball green | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| Deutsch v. Whitley green | 2 | 1990–1990 |
| McCoy v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Lader v. Warden, Northern Nevada Correctional Center green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.