penalty violation in Connecticut

2008“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant’s argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n.20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant’s argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n.20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008"Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes." State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn.App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant's argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n. 20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant’s argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n.20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008"Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes." State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn.App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant's argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n. 20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant’s argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n.20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant’s argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n.20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant’s argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n.20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant’s argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n.20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2008“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57 , 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant’s argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499 , 515 n.20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime

2000As we said in State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 485 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996), citing State v. Ross, supra, 264: “Even with the heightened appellate scrutiny appropriate for a death penalty case, the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravating circumstances must be reviewed, in the final analysis, by considering the evidence presented at the defen- danl’s penalty hearing in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts impliedly found by the jury.” The majority does not, in my reading, honor the jury’s findings.

2000As we said in State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 485 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996), citing State v. Ross, supra, 264: “Even with the heightened appellate scrutiny appropriate for a death penalty case, the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravating circumstances must be reviewed, in the final analysis, by considering the evidence presented at the defen- danl’s penalty hearing in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts impliedly found by the jury.” The majority does not, in my reading, honor the jury’s findings.

2001"One reliable . ., guide in determining whether a statutory provision is directory or mandatory is whether . ., failure . ., to comply with its provisions results in either a penalty or a requirement . . . [to] seek an extension of time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 681-82 . "[I]f . . . no language . . . expressly invalidates any action taken after noncompliance with the statutory provisions, the statute should be construed as directory." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Trahan , 45 Conn. App. 722 , 731 , 697 A.2d 1153 (1997) (traditionally the court looks beyond the u

2000Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 240 Conn. 671 , 681-82 (1997).

1997Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 222 Conn. 269, 273-74 , 610 A.2d 584 (1992); State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 238 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

1997Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 222 Conn. 269, 273-74 , 610 A.2d 584 (1992); State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 238 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

1997Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 222 Conn. 269, 273-74 , 610 A.2d 584 (1992); State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 238 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

1996Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 222 Conn. 269, 273-74 , 610 A.2d 584 (1992); State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 238 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

1997Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 222 Conn. 269, 273-74 , 610 A.2d 584 (1992); State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 238 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

1997Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 222 Conn. 269, 273-74 , 610 A.2d 584 (1992); State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 238 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

2022Rather, the court concluded that the claim was barred because ‘‘[t]he relief sought by [the] plaintiffs [namely, damages in excess of $20,000] is not what [the Unfair Insurance Practices] Act provides as a penalty for its violation.’’ Id., citing Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., 293 Pa. Super. 385 , 439 A.2d 165 (1981); see Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 387 (Pennsylvania act does not create private cause of action). 22 The majority points out that ‘‘this court consistently has applied the litigation privilege to attorneys, who, without a doubt, are in the business of

2022Rather, the court concluded that the claim was barred because ‘‘[t]he relief sought by [the] plaintiffs [namely, damages in excess of $20,000] is not what [the Unfair Insurance Practices] Act provides as a penalty for its violation.’’ Id., citing Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., 293 Pa. Super. 385 , 439 A.2d 165 (1981); see Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 387 (Pennsylvania act does not create private cause of action). 22 The majority points out that ‘‘this court consistently has applied the litigation privilege to attorneys, who, without a doubt, are in the business of

2022Rather, the court concluded that the claim was barred because ‘‘[t]he relief sought by [the] plaintiffs [namely, damages in excess of $20,000] is not what [the Unfair Insurance Practices] Act provides as a penalty for its violation.’’ Id., citing Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., 293 Pa. Super. 385 , 439 A.2d 165 (1981); see Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 387 (Pennsylvania act does not create private cause of action). 22 The majority points out that ‘‘this court consistently has applied the litigation privilege to attorneys, who, without a doubt, are in the business of

2013The court found that the parties, in 2004, agreed to a “nontaxable default penalty,” just as the parties had in Dougan v. Dougan, 301 Conn. 361, 364 , 21 A.3d 791 (2011).

2013The court found that the parties, in 2004, agreed to a “nontaxable default penalty,” just as the parties had in Dougan v. Dougan, 301 Conn. 361, 364 , 21 A.3d 791 (2011).

2004On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court: (1) improperly instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant of a capital felony based upon a theory of conspiratorial liability under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 , 66 S.Ct. 1180 , 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); (2) improperly charged the jury on an element of conspiratorial liability under the Pinkerton doctrine by failing to instruct the jury that, in order to find the defendant guilty of murder, it must find that the coconspirator intentionally caused the victims' deaths; (3) deprived the defendant of his federal an

2004On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court: (1) improperly instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant of a capital felony based upon a theory of conspiratorial liability under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 , 66 S.Ct. 1180 , 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); (2) improperly charged the jury on an element of conspiratorial liability under the Pinkerton doctrine by failing to instruct the jury that, in order to find the defendant guilty of murder, it must find that the coconspirator intentionally caused the victims' deaths; (3) deprived the defendant of his federal an

2004The defendant’s claims on appeal fall into ten general categories involving: (1) rulings pertaining to the jury selection phase of the penalty hearing; (2) the denial of the defendant’s motion to sever the cases; (3) the denial of the defendant’s motion to order a competency examination; (4) evidentiary rulings; (5) the state’s alleged nondisclosure of exculpatory materials in viola tion of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2004The defendant’s claims on appeal fall into ten general categories involving: (1) rulings pertaining to the jury selection phase of the penalty hearing; (2) the denial of the defendant’s motion to sever the cases; (3) the denial of the defendant’s motion to order a competency examination; (4) evidentiary rulings; (5) the state’s alleged nondisclosure of exculpatory materials in viola tion of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2001"One reliable . ., guide in determining whether a statutory provision is directory or mandatory is whether . ., failure . ., to comply with its provisions results in either a penalty or a requirement . . . [to] seek an extension of time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 681-82 . "[I]f . . . no language . . . expressly invalidates any action taken after noncompliance with the statutory provisions, the statute should be construed as directory." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Trahan , 45 Conn. App. 722 , 731 , 697 A.2d 1153 (1997) (traditionally the court looks beyond the u

2001"One reliable . ., guide in determining whether a statutory provision is directory or mandatory is whether . ., failure . ., to comply with its provisions results in either a penalty or a requirement . . . [to] seek an extension of time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 681-82 . "[I]f . . . no language . . . expressly invalidates any action taken after noncompliance with the statutory provisions, the statute should be construed as directory." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Trahan , 45 Conn. App. 722 , 731 , 697 A.2d 1153 (1997) (traditionally the court looks beyond the u

2000The defendant asserts that the issues in the penalty phase were limited to the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, and the admission of evidence to prove his involvement in the crimes, to which he had pleaded guilty, was improper. 16 The defendant also argues that the admission of his post-crime statements was improper. 17 “ ‘Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue.’ ” State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 305 , 664 A.2d 743 (1995).

2000The defendant asserts that the issues in the penalty phase were limited to the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, and the admission of evidence to prove his involvement in the crimes, to which he had pleaded guilty, was improper. 16 The defendant also argues that the admission of his post-crime statements was improper. 17 “ ‘Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue.’ ” State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 305 , 664 A.2d 743 (1995).

1997See General Statutes § 53a-46a (c); see also State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 268 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995) (“[o]n its face, [§ 53a-46a (c)] authorizes a judge presiding over a penalty hearing to exclude mitigating evidence only on the basis of a lack of relevancy” [emphasis in original]).

1997See General Statutes § 53a-46a (c); see also State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 268 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995) (“[o]n its face, [§ 53a-46a (c)] authorizes a judge presiding over a penalty hearing to exclude mitigating evidence only on the basis of a lack of relevancy” [emphasis in original]).

1996In State v. Ross, 237 Conn. 332, 335-36 , 677 A.2d 433 (1996) (Ross III), both the defendant and the state petitioned this court to answer certain reserved questions pertaining to the death penalty hearing that this court had ordered.

1996In State v. Ross, 237 Conn. 332, 335-36 , 677 A.2d 433 (1996) (Ross III), both the defendant and the state petitioned this court to answer certain reserved questions pertaining to the death penalty hearing that this court had ordered.

1995Sumara v. Liquor Control Commission , 165 Conn. 26 , 32 (1973); Spadaro v. Liquor Control Commission , 150 Conn. 68 (1962); DeMeo v. Zoning Commission , 148 Conn. 68 (1961).

1995Sumara v. Liquor Control Commission , 165 Conn. 26 , 32 (1973); Spadaro v. Liquor Control Commission , 150 Conn. 68 (1962); DeMeo v. Zoning Commission , 148 Conn. 68 (1961).

1995Specifically, he contends that the trial court’s jury charge and the language of the special verdict form submitted to the jury pursuant to § 53a-46a (e) 28 deprived him of his right to jury unanimity on the mitigating factors under State v. Daniels, supra, 207 Conn. 374 .