64 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1878–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Christy v. Petrusgreen2 sentences2022Our conclusion that section 610.120 does not authorize a private cause of action for damages is further buttressed by section 610.115, RSMo 2000, which provides that “[a] person who knowingly violates any provision of section 610.100, 610.105, 610.106, or 610.120 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” A “statute which creates a criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation, will not be construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of the common law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear implication to have been the legislative intent.” Christy v. Petrus, 2022Our conclusion that section 610.120 does not authorize a private cause of action for damages is further buttressed by section 610.115, RSMo 2000, which provides that “[a] person who knowingly violates any provision of section 610.100, 610.105, 610.106, or 610.120 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” A “statute which creates a criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation, will not be construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of the common law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear implication to have been the legislative intent.” Christy v. Petrus, | 7 | 12 |
Grand Bissell Towers, Inc. v. Joan Gagnon Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2021See id. at 379 n.4. 2016See Grand Bissell Towers, Inc. v. Joan Gagnon Enters., Inc., 657 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Mo.App.E.D.1983) (discussing Missouri’s adoption of the Restatement of Contracts rules for determining if liquidated damages are actually a penalty.) The liquidated damages clause at issue states: If Tenant fails to conduct its business operations at the Premises during the Minimum Store hours for more than three (3) consecutive business days, it is agreed and understood that Landlord shall have been deprived of an important right under this Lease and, as a result thereof, shall suffer damages in an 'amount which | 2 | 3 |
State v. Nunleygreen2 sentences2011This is demonstrated by this Court specifically remanding for a new penalty hearing and imposition of sentence but not a new plea hearing." Id. at 919 . 2011This is demonstrated by this Court specifically remanding for a new penalty hearing and imposition of sentence but not a new plea hearing.” Id. at 919 . | 1 | 2 |
Shqeir v. Equifax, Inc.green2 sentences2008The Missouri Supreme Court has held that a statute that ‘‘creates a criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation, will not be construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of the common law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear implication to have been the legislative intent. ...” Shqeir v. Equifax, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Mo. banc 1982). 1985Feely cites as the rule the principle in Shqeir v. Equifax, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. banc 1982) 1.c. 947[1]: “[A] statute which creates a criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation will not be construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of the common law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear implication to have been the legislative intent. 2 Another and correlative principle, however, tempers that stricture [as Shqeir, supra, 1 .c. 948] acknowledges: When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by the requirement or proscription of ce | 1 | 2 |
Heller v. Lutzgreen2 sentences1926See Heller v. Lutz, 254 Mo. 704 , where this court held that a statute declaring that assignments of wages and salaries not yet earned was constitutional. 1924In Heller v. Lutz, 254 Mo. 704 , it appears, that an employee of defendant became indebted to plaintiff and, on August 16, 1911, to secure said indebtedness, gave to plaintiff a written assignment of all money or wages due, or to become due to him from defendant within a period of six months from the date of said assignment. | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Kraft General Foods, Inc.green1 sentence2022Our conclusion that section 610.120 does not authorize a private cause of action for damages is further buttressed by section 610.115, RSMo 2000, which provides that “[a] person who knowingly violates any provision of section 610.100, 610.105, 610.106, or 610.120 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” A “statute which creates a criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation, will not be construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of the common law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear implication to have been the legislative intent.” Christy v. Petrus, | 1 | 1 |
Otte v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence2022Our conclusion that section 610.120 does not authorize a private cause of action for damages is further buttressed by section 610.115, RSMo 2000, which provides that “[a] person who knowingly violates any provision of section 610.100, 610.105, 610.106, or 610.120 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” A “statute which creates a criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation, will not be construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of the common law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear implication to have been the legislative intent.” Christy v. Petrus, | 1 | 1 |
In re L.D. v. Daileygreen1 sentence2022Our conclusion that section 610.120 does not authorize a private cause of action for damages is further buttressed by section 610.115, RSMo 2000, which provides that “[a] person who knowingly violates any provision of section 610.100, 610.105, 610.106, or 610.120 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” A “statute which creates a criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation, will not be construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of the common law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear implication to have been the legislative intent.” Christy v. Petrus, | 1 | 1 |
Burst v. RW Beal & Co., Inc.green1 sentence2016Beal & Co., Inc., 771 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Mo.App.E.D.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Missouri TLC, LLCgreen1 sentence2016Thus, an enforceable late-fee provision must be a “reasonable prediction for the harm caused by the breach.” Phillips v. Missouri TLC, LLC, 468 S.W.3d 398, 407-08 (Mo.App.S.D.2015). | 1 | 1 |
Addison v. Jestergreen1 sentence1998See also Addison v. Jester, 758 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Mo.App.1988)(detailing the provisions of §§ 480.030 and 408.060, and determining that § 408.030 provides both the limits by which the contract rate may be measured and the penalty for the violation). | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Kansas Citygreen2 sentences1990Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Mo.banc 1962); 93 A.L.R.2d 1012 (1964). 1990Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Mo.banc 1962); 93 A.L.R.2d 1012 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
Goldberg v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc.green1 sentence1989In support of my position I cite Goldberg v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Mo.App.1984) which stands for the proposition that an amount used as liquidated damages must bear some relationship to a reasonable forecast of probable damages or to an amount which damages are likely to result from such a breach. | 1 | 1 |
King v. Mooreheadgreen1 sentence1987King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 78 (Mo.App.1973). | 1 | 1 |
A.B. v. Frankgreen1 sentence1984A.B. v. Frank, 657 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. banc 1983); § 1.160, RSMo (1978); see State v. Thornton, 651 S.W.2d 164 (Mo.App.1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thorntongreen1 sentence1984A.B. v. Frank, 657 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. banc 1983); § 1.160, RSMo (1978); see State v. Thornton, 651 S.W.2d 164 (Mo.App.1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Dobbert v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
Dawkins v. Nabisco, Inc.green1 sentence1983See Dob-bert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1976), reh. denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Bullington v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. St. Charles Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wolf v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Worksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buchanan v. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Diffley v. Royal Papers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014“The provision must be fixed on the basis of compensation, otherwise it is construed as a penalty clause designed primarily to compel performance.” Id. at 247 . 2014“While the label the parties attach to a provision is not conclusive, it is a circumstance to be considered when deciding whether the provision is to be considered liquidated damages or a penalty.” Id. | 4 | 1999–2014 |
Heman v. Gilliam
neutral
2 sentences1924In the leading case of Hernan v. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 258 , it- was held that a contract for the performance of work in the *657 way of a street improvement which first specified a definite' time for the completion of the work, followed by a penalty clause for the failure to complete it within the time designated, in the absence of a requirement by ordinance of the city that the work shall be completed within a definite time, may be complied with by the performance and completion of the work within a reasonable time. 1904The principles to be deduced from an analysis of the case of Hernán v. Gilliam, supra, applicable to the interpretation of this contract,, may. briefly be thus stated: A contract for the performance of work in the way of street improvement of a city, first specifying a definite time for the completion of the work, then followed by a penalty clause for failure to complete it within the time designated, in the absence of a requirement by an ordinance of the city .that the work shall be completed within a definite time, may be complied with by the performance and completion of the work within a r | 2 | 1904–1924 |
Paddock v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1908It is a penalty allowed in all cases of a class, and the objection that the law is special legislation is not well taken.” Afterward the Supreme Court, following the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Railroad v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 , held the provision allowing the recovery by the plaintiff of an attorney’s fee unconstitutional. [Paddock v. Railway, 155 Mo. 524 .] But this ruling was placed on the ground that a penalty could not be inflicted on one class of litigants and not on others and is wholly foreign to the question of whether the remedies provided for breaches of the 1906But in the later case of Paddock v. Railway, 155 Mo. 524 , the Supreme Court, following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Gulf, etc., Railway v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 , held the provision for the recovery of an attorney’s fee in an action of this character to be in conflict with the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void, and overruled the Perkins case. | 2 | 1906–1908 |
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Co. v. Ellis
green
2 sentences1908It is a penalty allowed in all cases of a class, and the objection that the law is special legislation is not well taken.” Afterward the Supreme Court, following the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Railroad v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 , held the provision allowing the recovery by the plaintiff of an attorney’s fee unconstitutional. [Paddock v. Railway, 155 Mo. 524 .] But this ruling was placed on the ground that a penalty could not be inflicted on one class of litigants and not on others and is wholly foreign to the question of whether the remedies provided for breaches of the 1906But in the later case of Paddock v. Railway, 155 Mo. 524 , the Supreme Court, following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Gulf, etc., Railway v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 , held the provision for the recovery of an attorney’s fee in an action of this character to be in conflict with the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void, and overruled the Perkins case. | 2 | 1906–1908 |
Barnett v. Atlantic & Pacific Railroad
neutral
2 sentences1892Barnett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56 , and eases cited; Cummings v. Railroad, 70 Mo. 570 ; Spealman v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 434 ; Humes v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 221 . 1890Barnett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56 , and cases cited ; Cummings v. Railroad, 70 Mo. 570 ; Spealman v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 434 ; Humes v. Railroad, supra. The statute in question is as much a police regulation as is the double-damage section, and the attorney’s fee may be lawfully imposed as a penalty for the violation of the law. | 2 | 1890–1892 |
Cummings v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1892Barnett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56 , and eases cited; Cummings v. Railroad, 70 Mo. 570 ; Spealman v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 434 ; Humes v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 221 . 1890Barnett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56 , and cases cited ; Cummings v. Railroad, 70 Mo. 570 ; Spealman v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 434 ; Humes v. Railroad, supra. The statute in question is as much a police regulation as is the double-damage section, and the attorney’s fee may be lawfully imposed as a penalty for the violation of the law. | 2 | 1890–1892 |
Spealman v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1892Barnett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56 , and eases cited; Cummings v. Railroad, 70 Mo. 570 ; Spealman v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 434 ; Humes v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 221 . 1890Barnett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56 , and cases cited ; Cummings v. Railroad, 70 Mo. 570 ; Spealman v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 434 ; Humes v. Railroad, supra. The statute in question is as much a police regulation as is the double-damage section, and the attorney’s fee may be lawfully imposed as a penalty for the violation of the law. | 2 | 1890–1892 |
Sadler v. State
green
1 sentence2017“However, the provision must be formulated to compensate the plaintiff for damages he would suffer as a result of a breach of the contract; otherwise courts will construe it as a penalty clause designed primarily to compel performance and will refuse to enforce it.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
City of Richmond Heights v. Waite
green
2 sentences2016“The provision must be fixed on the basis of compensation, or else it is construed as a penalty clause primarily designed to compel performance.” Id. 2016“The provision must be fixed on the basis of compensation, or else it is construed as a penalty clause primarily designed to compel performance.” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Star Development Corporation v. Urgent Care Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016While the label the parties attach to a provision -is not conclusive, it is a circumstance to be considered when deciding whether the provision is to be considered liquidated damages or a penalty.” 429 S.W.3d at 492 . (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Honeycutt
green
1 sentence2013Section 566.150 is written in the style of all other provisions of the criminal code, such as § 571.070, 10 which criminalizes the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and which this Court held is a criminal statute. 11 See Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 425-29 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Dawson v. Delaware
green
2 sentences2001In this regard, the Court observed that before the penalty hearing, the state claimed that its expert witness would show that the Aryan Brotherhood was a “gang that is associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and that advocates the murder of fellow inmates,” id. at 165 , 112 S.Ct. 1093 , and the Court then noted that “[i]f credible and otherwise admissible evidence to that effect had been presented, we would have a much different case.” Id. 2001In this regard, the Court observed that before the penalty hearing, the state claimed that its expert witness would show that the Aryan Brotherhood was a “gang that is associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and that advocates the murder of fellow inmates,” id. at 165 , 112 S.Ct. 1093 , and the Court then noted that “[i]f credible and otherwise admissible evidence to that effect had been presented, we would have a much different case.” Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Gardner
green
1 sentence1996We have recently addressed these identical issues in State v. Gardner, 932 S.W.2d 858 (Mo.App.E.D. 1996). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| City of Charleston Ex Rel. Brady v. McCutcheon green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Rosen v. Alside, Inc. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Royster v. Baker green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Parker v. Lowery green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Gilbert v. Edwards green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| State v. Tourville green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| State Ex Rel. Watkins v. Cassell green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| State v. Tacey green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Everett v. Littleton Construction Co. green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Mezullo v. Maletz green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Glencoe Lime & Cement Co. v. City of St. Louis green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Keim v. Union Railway & Transit Co. neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Gray v. McDonald green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Hutchinson v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Miller v. Harpster green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Fish v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Neill v. Gates green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Hund v. Rackliffe neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Gilsonite Construction Co. v. Arkansas McAlester Coal Co. neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| McQuiddy v. Brannock neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Ramlose green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| British-American Portland Cement Co. v. Citizens Gas Co. green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Bassen v. Monckton green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Merine v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. neutral | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Board of Commisioners v. Peter neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Stevens v. Kansas City green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Delaney v. Police Court green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.