penalty violation in Louisiana

2025The supreme court further explained that “[e]ach case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances, and the trial judge is vested with much discretion in determining the penalty for violation of pre-trial and discovery orders.” Id. at p. 4, 752 So. 2d at 847 .

2024The supreme court further explained that “[e]ach case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances, and the trial judge is vested with much discretion in determining the penalty for violation of pre-trial and discovery orders.” Id. at p. 5, 752 So. 2d at 844 .

2002App. 3 Cir. 2/21/01), 780 So.2d 1197 , a divided five-judge panel of this court held that, while an employee may receive a separate penalty for a violation in regard to an indemnity benefits claim and a separate penalty for a violation in regard to a medical benefits claim, the employee in the case at bar was entitled to receive only one penalty for the insurer's failure in two respects regarding indemnity benefits, i.e., its miscalculation of indemnity benefits and its improper reduction of those benefits.

2002In our original opinion, Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water District, 00-762 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/21/01) , 780 So.2d 1197 , a divided five-judge panel of this court held that, while an employee may receive a separate penalty for a violation in regard to an indemnity benefits claim and a separate penalty for a violation in regard to a medical benefits claim, the employee in the case at bar was entitled to receive only one penalty for the insurer’s failure in two respects regarding indemnity benefits, i.e., its miscalculation of indemnity benefits and its improper reduction of those benefits.

1997In State v. Ward, 483 So.2d 578 (La.1986), this court addressed the issue of whether the prosecutor in the case-in-chief in the capital sentencing hearing may introduce evidence of the defendant's unrelated criminal conduct for which no conviction has been obtained.

1989State v. Brown, 514 So.2d 99, 105 (La.1987); State v. Ward, 483 So.2d 578 (La.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 871 , 107 S.Ct. 244 , 93 L.Ed.2d 168 (1986); State v. Jordan, 440 So.2d 716 (La.1983).

1997In State v. Hamilton, 478 So.2d 123 (La. 1985), this court recognized that due process requires pretrial notice to the defense of the prosecutor's intention to introduce evidence at the penalty hearing of other crimes committed by the defendant.

1992During the pretrial proceedings the prosecutor notified the defense, as required by State v. Hamilton, 478 So.2d 123 (La.1985), that he intended to introduce evidence at the penalty hearing of the following crimes allegedly committed by defendant: Unadjudicated Juvenile Conduct 1.

1988State v. Billiot, 254 La. 988 , 229 So.2d 72 (1969); Cornman v. Conway, 178 La. 357 , 151 So. 620 (1933); Finance Sec.

1988State v. Billiot, 254 La. 988 , 229 So.2d 72 (1969); Cornman v. Conway, 178 La. 357 , 151 So. 620 (1933); Finance Sec.

1988State v. Billiot, 254 La. 988 , 229 So.2d 72 (1969); Cornman v. Conway, 178 La. 357 , 151 So. 620 (1933); Finance Sec.

1988State v. Billiot, 254 La. 988 , 229 So.2d 72 (1969); Cornman v. Conway, 178 La. 357 , 151 So. 620 (1933); Finance Sec.

1987In the Jackson case, this court noted that the cases of State v. Williams, 358 So.2d 943 (La.1978) and State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976) proscribed the enhancement of the penalty for a violation of R.S. 14:95.1 under the Habitual Offender Law, R.S. 15:529.1.

1983State v. Williams, 358 So.2d 943 (La.1978) and State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976) proscribed the enhancement of the penalty for a violation of R.S. 14:95.1 under the Habitual Offender Law, reasoning that the legislature, in enacting R.S. 14:95.1, had already built into the statute enhancement of penalty provisions which previously applied to a violation of R.S. 14:95.

1987In the Jackson case, this court noted that the cases of State v. Williams, 358 So.2d 943 (La.1978) and State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976) proscribed the enhancement of the penalty for a violation of R.S. 14:95.1 under the Habitual Offender Law, R.S. 15:529.1.

1983State v. Williams, 358 So.2d 943 (La.1978) and State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976) proscribed the enhancement of the penalty for a violation of R.S. 14:95.1 under the Habitual Offender Law, reasoning that the legislature, in enacting R.S. 14:95.1, had already built into the statute enhancement of penalty provisions which previously applied to a violation of R.S. 14:95.

1985In State v. Smith, 400 So.2d 587 (La. 1981), and State v. Fuller , above, we affirmed defendant's convictions, but remanded to the trial court under Supreme Court Rule XXVIII § 5 for development of additional facts and for an initial determination by the trial court of the necessity of a new penalty hearing. [12] The motive underlying the remands in both Smith and Fuller was the avoidance of a future postconviction *728 application challenging the effectiveness of counsel based on the failure to present allegedly available evidence. [13] As noted earlier, whether additional evidence in mitigat

1984The rules of this court governing capital sentencing hearings have provided for this type of situation. [6] In State v. Smith, 400 So.2d 587 (La.1981), we affirmed defendant's conviction, but remanded to the trial court under Supreme Court Rule XXVIII, § 5, for development of additional facts (not introduced into evidence at the trial, but contained in the sentence investigation report of the probation and parole agent) and for an initial determination by the trial court of the necessity of a new penalty hearing. [7] Because (among other things) we were "not presently in a position to determin

1984State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158 (La.1983).

1983Our review of the trial court's instructions at the penalty hearing uncovered no improper instruction which might have injected into the jury's deliberations an arbitrary factor necessitating reversal of the sentence. cf. State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158 (La.1983); State v. David, 425 So.2d 1241 (La.1983); State v. Watson, 423 So.2d 1130 (La.1982).

2014In Duhon v. Snelling Personnel Serv., 97-347 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97) , 702 So.2d 922 , writ denied, 98-71 (La.3/13/98), 712 So.2d 883 , a panel of this court considered a case in which the claimant before it urged exclusion of an IME as in this case.

2014In Duhon v. Snelling Personnel Serv., 97-347 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97) , 702 So.2d 922 , writ denied, 98-71 (La.3/13/98), 712 So.2d 883 , a panel of this court considered a case in which the claimant before it urged exclusion of an IME as in this case.

2014In Duhon v. Snelling Personnel Serv., 97-347 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97) , 702 So.2d 922 , writ denied, 98-71 (La.3/13/98), 712 So.2d 883 , a panel of this court considered a case in which the claimant before it urged exclusion of an IME as in this case.

2013Employees, 464 So.2d 284 (La.1985), addressed a violation of Rule 3-1.1.

2013Responding to this identical argument, however, we, in Mulvey , recently found that “Rule 3-1.1 [of the Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal] does not provide a penalty for a violation thereof.” 12-1041, p. 10, 108 So.3d at 897 .

2013In Mulvey , we acknowledged the violation of the Rule by the police officer, but “decline [d] to create a penalty for Rule 3.1-1 where the assignment of error does have merit, and the Supreme Court has not held that a violation of Rule 3-1.1 alone requires the assignment of error to be deemed abandoned.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

2010This court affirmed defendant's conviction, but because evidence of possible mental retardation was presented at the penalty hearing for mitigation purposes only, this court could not resolve the issue definitively, although it found "reasonable ground to doubt whether defendant is mentally retarded." State v. Dunn, 2003-0821 (La.5/9/03), 847 So.2d 1183 . [1] While affirming the defendant's convictions for first degree murder, this court pretermitted Rule 28 review of the penalty phase and remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on defendant's mental status.

2010This court affirmed defendant’s conviction, but because evidence of possible mental retardation was presented at the penalty hearing for mitigation purposes only, this court could not resolve the issue definitively, although it found “reasonable ground to doubt whether defendant is mentally retarded.” State v. Dunn, 2003-0821 (La.5/9/03), 847 So.2d 1183 . 1 While affirming the defendant’s convictions for first degree murder, this court pretermitted Rule 28 review of the penalty phase and remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on defendant’s 15mental status.

2010State v. Dunn, 01-1635, pp. 27-31 (La.11/1/02), 831 So.2d 862, 884-888 .

2010State v. Dunn, 01-1635, pp. 27-31 (La.11/1/02), 831 So.2d 862, 884-888 .

2009In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the United States Supreme Court reviewed a murder and two rape cases and held the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in those three cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

2009In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the United States Supreme Court reviewed a murder and two rape cases and held the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in those three cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

2007Relying on Hamilton, supra, she declined to read into the statute a penalty not provided by the legislature.

2007This court's opinion on reconsideration of the case is reported at State v. Clark, 97-1064 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/25/98) , 735 So.2d 649 . [5] We note the last sentence of Paragraph (2) of La.R.S. 32:71(B) provides a different penalty for a violation of that particular Paragraph.

2007This court's opinion on reconsideration of the case is reported at State v. Clark, 97-1064 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/25/98) , 735 So.2d 649 . [5] We note the last sentence of Paragraph (2) of La.R.S. 32:71(B) provides a different penalty for a violation of that particular Paragraph.

2003However, we stated that the claim for penalties and attorney fees was “a separate ground or theory of recovery from a claim under uninsured motorist coverage[J” Citing the First Circuit’s rationale in Cantrelle Fence & Supply Co., supra, we further found that “the obligation arising out of the penalty statute is separate from the obligation arising out of the contractual relationship pursuant to the insurance policy.” Since the penalty claim is independent from the policy, we see no basis to distinguish whether the claimant is a policy holder or a third party.

2002Touehet requires a defendant to show “with a reasonable degree of specificity what type of expert is needed and for what purpose,” and “that it is more likely than not that the requested expert assistance will be required to answer a serious issue or question raised by either the prosecution’s or the defense’s case.” Id., 93-2839 at 14, 642 So.2d at 1221 .

2002Touehet requires a defendant to show “with a reasonable degree of specificity what type of expert is needed and for what purpose,” and “that it is more likely than not that the requested expert assistance will be required to answer a serious issue or question raised by either the prosecution’s or the defense’s case.” Id., 93-2839 at 14, 642 So.2d at 1221 .

2002We specifically observed that “[i]f she is able to meet the standards provided in Touehet , the trial court is to vacate defendant’s sentence, order a new penalty hearing, and order that state funds be procured so that the defendant may hire the requested experts to assist her defense at the sentencing hearing.” Frank , 99-0553 at 10, 803 So.2d at 11 .

2001David, 468 So.2d at 1137 ; La.

2001Id. (distinguishing its earlier opinion in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 , 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), where it held that, if a defendant receives a life sentence in the first instance, the defendant is essentially acquitted of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence).