penalty violation in Idaho

1990In State v. Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580 , 207 P. 1071 (1922), this Court summarized the law of criminal intent as it had developed in Idaho to that time: At common law a crime possessed the element of an evil intention together with an unlawful act, but the rule is well established that it is competent for the legislature to prohibit the doing of a particular act and to provide a penalty for the violation of the prohibition. (1 Wharton's Criminal Law, 11th ed., sec. 143, p. 187.) This court held in State v. Keller, 8 Ida. 699 , 70 Pac. 1051 , that: "Wicked or wilful intent to violate the criminal l

1990In State v. Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580 , 207 P. 1071 (1922), this Court summarized the law of criminal intent as it had developed in Idaho to that time: At common law a crime possessed the element of an evil intention together with an unlawful act, but the rule is well established that it is competent for the legislature to prohibit the doing of a particular act and to provide a penalty for the violation of the prohibition. (1 Wharton’s Criminal Law, 11th ed., sec. 143, p. 187.) This court held in State v. Keller, 8 Ida. 699 , 70 Pac. 1051 , that: “Wicked or wilful intent to violate the criminal l

1990In State v. Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580 , 207 P. 1071 (1922), this Court summarized the law of criminal intent as it had developed in Idaho to that time: At common law a crime possessed the element of an evil intention together with an unlawful act, but the rule is well established that it is competent for the legislature to prohibit the doing of a particular act and to provide a penalty for the violation of the prohibition. (1 Wharton's Criminal Law, 11th ed., sec. 143, p. 187.) This court held in State v. Keller, 8 Ida. 699 , 70 Pac. 1051 , that: "Wicked or wilful intent to violate the criminal l

1990In State v. Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580 , 207 P. 1071 (1922), this Court summarized the law of criminal intent as it had developed in Idaho to that time: At common law a crime possessed the element of an evil intention together with an unlawful act, but the rule is well established that it is competent for the legislature to prohibit the doing of a particular act and to provide a penalty for the violation of the prohibition. (1 Wharton's Criminal Law, 11th ed., sec. 143, p. 187.) This court held in State v. Keller, 8 Ida. 699 , 70 Pac. 1051 , that: "Wicked or wilful intent to violate the criminal l

2017The cases in which the United States Supreme Court has applied the classic penalty exception have involved situations where “the state not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’ ” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 , 104 S.Ct. at 1146 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 424 (quoting Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806 , 97 S.Ct. at 2136 , 53 L.Ed.2d at 7-8 ).

2017The cases in which the United States Supreme Court has applied the classic penalty exception have involved situations where “the state not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’ ” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 , 104 S.Ct. at 1146 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 424 (quoting Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806 , 97 S.Ct. at 2136 , 53 L.Ed.2d at 7-8 ).

2017The cases in which the United States Supreme Court has applied the classic penalty exception have involved situations where “the state not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’ ” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 , 104 S.Ct. at 1146 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 424 (quoting Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806 , 97 S.Ct. at 2136 , 53 L.Ed.2d at 7-8 ).

2017The cases in which the United States Supreme Court has applied the classic penalty exception have involved situations where “the state not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’ ” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 , 104 S.Ct. at 1146 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 424 (quoting Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806 , 97 S.Ct. at 2136 , 53 L.Ed.2d at 7-8 ).

2017Id. at 780-81 , 391 P.3d at 665-66 .

2017Id. at 780-81 , 391 P.3d at 665-66 .

1967This court in State v. Parker, 81 Idaho 51 , 336 P.2d 318 , held that the revocation of a driver’s license is not a part of the penalty provided for violation of our statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated such that the jurisdiction of the justice court was exceeded.

1967This court in State v. Parker, 81 Idaho 51 , 336 P.2d 318 , held that the revocation of a driver’s license is not a part of the penalty provided for violation of our statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated such that the jurisdiction of the justice court was exceeded.

1965Defendants also alleged the total amount of payments made by them, claiming forfeiture of such payments would impose a penalty under the doctrine announced in Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451 , 272 P.2d 1020 (1954), and prayed for restitution and damages.

1965Defendants also alleged the total amount of payments made by them, claiming forfeiture of such payments would impose a penalty under the doctrine announced in Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451 , 272 P.2d 1020 (1954), and prayed for restitution and damages.

1963Continuing in Graves v. Cupic, this Court held: “ * * * Generally where the defaulting purchaser has had possession of the property the damage due the vendor is enhanced by the rental value during such occupation.” (Citing Nelson v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354 , 218 P.2d 345 ; Williamson v. Smith, 74 Idaho 79 , 256 P.2d 784 .) In the present case the trial court set aside the so-called penalty clause of the contract as being unconscionable in the light of the court’s calculations of the amount which *127 otherwise would be retained by plaintiffs.

1963Continuing in Graves v. Cupic, this Court held: “ * * * Generally where the defaulting purchaser has had possession of the property the damage due the vendor is enhanced by the rental value during such occupation.” (Citing Nelson v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354 , 218 P.2d 345 ; Williamson v. Smith, 74 Idaho 79 , 256 P.2d 784 .) In the present case the trial court set aside the so-called penalty clause of the contract as being unconscionable in the light of the court’s calculations of the amount which *127 otherwise would be retained by plaintiffs.

1963Continuing in Graves v. Cupic, this Court held: “ * * * Generally where the defaulting purchaser has had possession of the property the damage due the vendor is enhanced by the rental value during such occupation.” (Citing Nelson v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354 , 218 P.2d 345 ; Williamson v. Smith, 74 Idaho 79 , 256 P.2d 784 .) In the present case the trial court set aside the so-called penalty clause of the contract as being unconscionable in the light of the court’s calculations of the amount which *127 otherwise would be retained by plaintiffs.

1963Continuing in Graves v. Cupic, this Court held: “ * * * Generally where the defaulting purchaser has had possession of the property the damage due the vendor is enhanced by the rental value during such occupation.” (Citing Nelson v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354 , 218 P.2d 345 ; Williamson v. Smith, 74 Idaho 79 , 256 P.2d 784 .) In the present case the trial court set aside the so-called penalty clause of the contract as being unconscionable in the light of the court’s calculations of the amount which *127 otherwise would be retained by plaintiffs.

1962In Kearns v. Aragon, supra, the Court stated: “Nor is the object of an administrative proceeding to revoke a liquor license intended as a punishment of the licensee.

1953After reviewing those facts, it was held that the forfeiture provision was not a penalty under the rule above stated.” 243 P.2d at page 450 .