penalty violation in Maryland

1989Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275 , 208 A.2d 575 (1965).

1989Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275 , 208 A.2d 575 (1965).

2007On the issue, and directly following the excerpt upon which the Majority relies, the court commented: "It would seem therefore that the clause in this case should be read to eliminate any duty of mitigation, that what Lake River is doing is attempting to rewrite the clause to make it more reasonable, and that since actually the clause is designed to give Lake River the full damages it would incur from breach (and more) even if it made no effort to find a substitute use for the equipment that it bought to perform the contract, this is just one more piece of evidence that it is a penalty clause

2007On the issue, and directly following the excerpt upon which the Majority relies, the court commented: "It would seem therefore that the clause in this case should be read to eliminate any duty of mitigation, that what Lake River is doing is attempting to rewrite the clause to make it more reasonable, and that since actually the clause is designed to give Lake River the full damages it would incur from breach (and more) even if it made no effort to find a substitute use for the equipment that it bought to perform the contract, this is just one more piece of evidence that it is a penalty clause

2024Id. at 11 .

2015The Court thus construed the relatively recent amendment of the sentencing provision of the narrower statute—the Worthless Check Act—to also apply to the broad *701 er statute—the False Pretenses Act—in those circumstances. 231 Md. at 516 , 191 A.2d 428 . 35 Waye does not appear to be pertinent to Mr. Oglesby’s case.

2015The Court thus construed the relatively recent amendment of the sentencing provision of the narrower statute—the Worthless Check Act—to also apply to the broad *701 er statute—the False Pretenses Act—in those circumstances. 231 Md. at 516 , 191 A.2d 428 . 35 Waye does not appear to be pertinent to Mr. Oglesby’s case.

2013A court must examine the reasonableness of the amount fixed as liquidated damages “from the standpoint of the parties at the time the contract was made.” Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 663 , 332 A.2d 651 (1975).

2013A court must examine the reasonableness of the amount fixed as liquidated damages “from the standpoint of the parties at the time the contract was made.” Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 663 , 332 A.2d 651 (1975).

2013Appellant asserts that the circuit court’s error in entering the default judgment was not harmless. (b) Standard of Review “[W]here [a trial court] order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [an appellate court] must determine whether the [trial] court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Jackson v. 2109 Brandywine, LLC, 180 Md.App. 535, 567 , 952 A.2d 304 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 444 , 959 A.2d 793 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). (c) Law (i) Sanctions Maryland Rule 2-504 provides, in pertinent

2013Appellant asserts that the circuit court’s error in entering the default judgment was not harmless. (b) Standard of Review “[W]here [a trial court] order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [an appellate court] must determine whether the [trial] court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Jackson v. 2109 Brandywine, LLC, 180 Md.App. 535, 567 , 952 A.2d 304 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 444 , 959 A.2d 793 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). (c) Law (i) Sanctions Maryland Rule 2-504 provides, in pertinent

2013Appellant asserts that the circuit court’s error in entering the default judgment was not harmless. (b) Standard of Review “[W]here [a trial court] order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [an appellate court] must determine whether the [trial] court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Jackson v. 2109 Brandywine, LLC, 180 Md.App. 535, 567 , 952 A.2d 304 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 444 , 959 A.2d 793 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). (c) Law (i) Sanctions Maryland Rule 2-504 provides, in pertinent

2013Appellant asserts that the circuit court’s error in entering the default judgment was not harmless. (b) Standard of Review “[W]here [a trial court] order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [an appellate court] must determine whether the [trial] court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Jackson v. 2109 Brandywine, LLC, 180 Md.App. 535, 567 , 952 A.2d 304 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 444 , 959 A.2d 793 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). (c) Law (i) Sanctions Maryland Rule 2-504 provides, in pertinent

2013Therefore, when a reviewing court is called to determine the validity of a liquidated damages provision, the court conducts “a more searching inquiry into the propriety and reasonableness of the agreement itself, under the auspices of the so-called penalty doctrine, than would be conducted in any more typical contract case.” Willard, 169 Md.App. at 123 , 899 A.2d 940 (footnote and citations omitted).

2013Therefore, when a reviewing court is called to determine the validity of a liquidated damages provision, the court conducts “a more searching inquiry into the propriety and reasonableness of the agreement itself, under the auspices of the so-called penalty doctrine, than would be conducted in any more typical contract case.” Willard, 169 Md.App. at 123 , 899 A.2d 940 (footnote and citations omitted).

2006Md.Code (2003), § 3-108(b)(1) of the Public Safety Article. [14] Collective bargaining is defined as "[n]egotiation between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, and fringe benefits." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (8th ed.1999). [15] The Commission relies on Tippery v. Montgomery County Police Dept., 112 Md.App. 332, 346-47 , 685 A.2d 788, 795-96 (1996), which quotes this Court's language in Younkers v. Prince George's County, 333 Md. 14, 17 , 633 A.2d 861, 862 (1993), reversing in part Prince George

2006Md.Code (2003), § 3-108(b)(1) of the Public Safety Article. [14] Collective bargaining is defined as "[n]egotiation between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, and fringe benefits." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (8th ed.1999). [15] The Commission relies on Tippery v. Montgomery County Police Dept., 112 Md.App. 332, 346-47 , 685 A.2d 788, 795-96 (1996), which quotes this Court's language in Younkers v. Prince George's County, 333 Md. 14, 17 , 633 A.2d 861, 862 (1993), reversing in part Prince George

2001See, e.g., State v. Beyer, 218 Neb. 33 , 352 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1984); State v. Fair Lawn Service Center, Inc. 20 N.J. 468 , 120 A.2d 233, 235 (1956); Johnston v. State, 100 Ala. 32 , 14 So. 629 (1894); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68 , 73 A.2d 705 (1950).

2001See, e.g., State v. Beyer, 218 Neb. 33 , 352 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1984); State v. Fair Lawn Service Center, Inc. 20 N.J. 468 , 120 A.2d 233, 235 (1956); Johnston v. State, 100 Ala. 32 , 14 So. 629 (1894); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68 , 73 A.2d 705 (1950).

2001See, e.g., State v. Beyer, 218 Neb. 33 , 352 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1984); State v. Fair Lawn Service Center, Inc. 20 N.J. 468 , 120 A.2d 233, 235 (1956); Johnston v. State, 100 Ala. 32 , 14 So. 629 (1894); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68 , 73 A.2d 705 (1950).

2001However, the term `beyond a reasonable doubt' is something more than a standard for evaluating conflicting facts and inferences; in the context of a penalty hearing, it also conveys to the jury the concept that the values upon which the criminal justice system is built do not permit the ultimate sanction to be imposed unless the conclusion is free of substantial doubt." Id. at 275 .

2001However, the term ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is something more than a standard for evaluating conflicting facts and inferences; in the context of a penalty hearing, it also conveys to the jury the concept that the values upon which the criminal justice system is built do not permit the ultimate sanction to be imposed unless the conclusion is free of substantial doubt.” Id. at 275 .

1996Burson , 504 U.S. at 211 . 4 The penalty for a violation is imprisonment for up to 60 days, a fine of between $50 and $500, or both.

1992Nor was the bill, as amended, limited to "a natural or adoptive parent, or anyone acting on behalf of the parent." It applies to "a person," and so reaches any person, whether acting on behalf of a parent or not. [7] For purpose of decision here, we make no distinction with respect to "sell," "barter," and "trade." [8] The majority in Runkles v. State, 87 Md.

1989And finally, in Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679 , 406 A.2d 1310 (1979), another case involving a public accountant’s non-competition agreement, the Court struck out as a penalty clause a requirement that a breaching employee pay each year for three years, fifty percent of the annual fees he received from servicing the plaintiff’s former clients after the termination of his employment.

1989And finally, in Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679 , 406 A.2d 1310 (1979), another case involving a public accountant’s non-competition agreement, the Court struck out as a penalty clause a requirement that a breaching employee pay each year for three years, fifty percent of the annual fees he received from servicing the plaintiff’s former clients after the termination of his employment.

1987In Mitchell v. State, supra, 82 Md. at 529 , 34 A. 246 , appellant’s counsel offered the interesting commentary that the practice in Baltimore City in the late nineteenth century was “to give not more than two years in jail for any misdemeanor, the punishment of which was not provided for in the Code.” Counsel did concede that the practice in the counties may have been different, and that in 1894 Chief Judge Harlan of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City had imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment for a misdemeanor. 3 And in the very early case of State v. Falkenham, supra, 73 Md. at 466

1987In Mitchell v. State, supra, 82 Md. at 529 , 34 A. 246 , appellant’s counsel offered the interesting commentary that the practice in Baltimore City in the late nineteenth century was “to give not more than two years in jail for any misdemeanor, the punishment of which was not provided for in the Code.” Counsel did concede that the practice in the counties may have been different, and that in 1894 Chief Judge Harlan of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City had imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment for a misdemeanor. 3 And in the very early case of State v. Falkenham, supra, 73 Md. at 466

1987In Mitchell v. State, supra, 82 Md. at 529 , 34 A. 246 , appellant’s counsel offered the interesting commentary that the practice in Baltimore City in the late nineteenth century was “to give not more than two years in jail for any misdemeanor, the punishment of which was not provided for in the Code.” Counsel did concede that the practice in the counties may have been different, and that in 1894 Chief Judge Harlan of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City had imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment for a misdemeanor. 3 And in the very early case of State v. Falkenham, supra, 73 Md. at 466

1987In Mitchell v. State, supra, 82 Md. at 529 , 34 A. 246 , appellant’s counsel offered the interesting commentary that the practice in Baltimore City in the late nineteenth century was “to give not more than two years in jail for any misdemeanor, the punishment of which was not provided for in the Code.” Counsel did concede that the practice in the counties may have been different, and that in 1894 Chief Judge Harlan of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City had imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment for a misdemeanor. 3 And in the very early case of State v. Falkenham, supra, 73 Md. at 466

1974It provides vendee an “unconditional right to cancel the contract and receive immediate refund of all payments and deposits made on account of or in contemplation of the contract,” in the event vendor fails to record the contract as required. 6 The Chancellor gives no indication to us whether he has ruled that that section has been waived or whether, indeed, he has determined that it is a “right so charged or colored with the public interest [that waiver] will not be allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate.” Brooklyn Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 69

1893Phelps, 27 Ala., 55 , overruling.the previous case of Mayor and Aldermen of Mobile vs.