penalty clause in West Virginia

2025As this Court stated in Guthrie, typically, “placing sentencing matters before the jury is an issue prejudicial to the fact-finding function of the jury.” 194 W.

2021As such, it would be an ex post facto violation to apply a law that increases the penalty for a violation of probation to a probationer who committed his or her crimes before the law became effective regardless of the date of the violation of probation. 68 So.3d at 409 n.2 (emphasis added).

2013Bank of Virginia v. Dole, 763 F.2d 644 , 651 n. 6 (4th Cir.1985) (“Civil penalties may be considered ‘quasi-criminal’ in nature.”); United States v. Sanchez, 520 F.Supp. 1038, 1040 (S.D.Fla.1981) (“At the outset, the Court would note that while technically these cases are civil actions, the imposition of a fine as a penalty for violation of the law can be considered ‘quasi-criminal’ in nature.”).

2010Disproportionate Sentencing Appellant contends that the penalty for a violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8D-5 is overly harsh in comparison to other crimes in this state and in comparison to the penalties set by other jurisdictions for sexual offenses committed by “persons in a position of trust.” Based on his “good character, his strong support group, and the psychologist’s report, [and] the time frames of the accusations,” Appellant argues that the twenty-year minimum sentence imposed by the trial court violates the constitutional requirement that “penalties shall be proportioned to the ch

2010Disproportionate Sentencing Appellant contends that the penalty for a violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8D-5 is overly harsh in comparison to other crimes in this state and in comparison to the penalties set by other jurisdictions for sexual offenses committed by “persons in a position of trust.” Based on his “good character, his strong support group, and the psychologist’s report, [and] the time frames of the accusations,” Appellant argues that the twenty-year minimum sentence imposed by the trial court violates the constitutional requirement that “penalties shall be proportioned to the ch

1970Myers v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 431 , 175 S.E.2d 637 , is the last in a long series of prior decisions of this Court involving the requirement of Article VI, Section 30, of the Constitution of West Virginia that no act of the legislature “shall embrace more than one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.” That case involved an act of the legislature which, according to the title of the act, related “to the administration and financial affairs of the state and to the department of finance and administration, its powers and duties.” The act created and defined a criminal offense and *641 pro

1970Myers v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 431 , 175 S.E.2d 637 , is the last in a long series of prior decisions of this Court involving the requirement of Article VI, Section 30, of the Constitution of West Virginia that no act of the legislature “shall embrace more than one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.” That case involved an act of the legislature which, according to the title of the act, related “to the administration and financial affairs of the state and to the department of finance and administration, its powers and duties.” The act created and defined a criminal offense and *641 pro

1941It further held that where coal miners refused to accept renewals of existing contracts, not because the renewal contract imposed substantial disadvantages, but simply because they sought elimination of the penalty clause, or insertion of the closed shop clause, there was a labor dispute and not a lockout, and that miners were not entitled to unemployment benefits under the Kentucky statute; and further held that, *654 “The purpose of Unemployment Compensation Act was to provide employment for unfortunate victims of a maladjusted economy who are unable to obtain suitable work at a living wage,

1941It further held that where coal miners refused to accept renewals of existing contracts, not because the renewal contract imposed substantial disadvantages, but simply because they sought elimination of the penalty clause, or insertion of the closed shop clause, there was a labor dispute and not a lockout, and that miners were not entitled to unemployment benefits under the Kentucky statute; and further held that, *654 “The purpose of Unemployment Compensation Act was to provide employment for unfortunate victims of a maladjusted economy who are unable to obtain suitable work at a living wage,

1903The only exception to the rule is that when a law imposes a penalty for the prohibited act, and it clearly appears that the legislature intended no more than to impose the penalty for the violation of the law, a contract made in violation of the statute is not void.” He further says: “The authorities on this question are reviewed in Mor. on Corp. section 663-666, and that author announces as his conclusion therefrom that, ‘unless it appear affirmatively that the legislature intended to render the forbidden act or contract absolutely void in legal contemplation it will not be so held'; citing B