penalty violation in California

2015(See Chavez v. Martinez (2003) 538 U.S. 760, 769 [plur. opn. of Thomas, J.] [the Fifth Amendment is not violated “absent use of the compelled statements in a criminal case against the witness”]; id. at p. 777 [conc. opn. of Souter, J.].) In sum, because the penalty exception will necessarily apply to statements that defendant makes in response to questions asked as part of the sex offender management program under compulsion of the section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) probation condition, the condition itself does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 5 2.

2014(See Chavez v. Martinez (2003) 538 U.S. 760, 769 [plur. opn. of Thomas, J.] [the Fifth Amendment is not violated “absent use of the compelled statements in a criminal case against the witness”]; id. at p. 777 [conc. opn. of Souter, J.].) In sum, because the penalty exception will necessarily apply to statements that defendant makes in response to questions asked as part of the sex offender management program under compulsion of the section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) probation condition, the condition itself does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 3.

2014To hold such parties to knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver for failure to make a timely and specific objection would be unfair to them.” (Note (1964) Hastings L.J. 369, 371.) It is no hardship, however, to require a layman to make known what facts are contested.’ (Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1020 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 908 ].)” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 163 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 893 ], italics added.) CCEC presented its concerns about the potential energy i

2014To hold such parties to knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver for failure to make a timely and specific objection would be unfair to them.” (Note (1964) Hastings L.J. 369, 371.) It is no hardship, however, to require a layman to make known what facts are contested.’ (Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1020 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 908 ].)” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 163 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 893 ], italics added.) CCEC presented its concerns about the potential energy i

2015Our high court reversed, stating " 'a contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of the public and prescribing a penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and void, and no action may be brought to enforce such contract' [citations]. . . ." (Loving & Evans, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 607 .) "It seems clear that the power of the arbitrator to determine the rights of the parties is dependent upon the existence of a valid contract under which such rights might arise. [Citations.] In the absence of a valid contract no such rights can arise and no power can be conferred

2015Our high court reversed, stating " 'a contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of the public and prescribing a penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and void, and no action may be brought to enforce such contract' [citations]. . . ." (Loving & Evans, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 607 .) "It seems clear that the power of the arbitrator to determine the rights of the parties is dependent upon the existence of a valid contract under which such rights might arise. [Citations.] In the absence of a valid contract no such rights can arise and no power can be conferred

2014To hold such parties to knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver for failure to make a timely and specific objection would be unfair to them.” (Note (1964) Hastings L.J. 369, 371.) It is no hardship, however, to require a layman to make known what facts are contested.’ (Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1020 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 908 ].)” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 163 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 893 ], italics added.) CCEC presented its concerns about the potential energy i

2014To hold such parties to knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver for failure to make a timely and specific objection would be unfair to them.” (Note (1964) Hastings L.J. 369, 371.) It is no hardship, however, to require a layman to make known what facts are contested.’ (Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1020 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 908 ].)” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 163 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 893 ], italics added.) CCEC presented its concerns about the potential energy i

1939(Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 [18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L.

1939(Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 [18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L.

2014Overbreadth Analysis “A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. [Citation.]” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.).) “ ‘A statute or regulation is overbroad if it “does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [governmental] control, but . . . sweeps within its ambit other activities that in the ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise” of protected expression and conduct.’ [Citations.

2014Overbreadth Analysis “A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. [Citation.]” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.).) “ ‘A statute or regulation is overbroad if it “does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [governmental] control, but . . . sweeps within its ambit other activities that in the ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise” of protected expression and conduct.’ [Citations.

2010In Azusa, although the agency had taken comments from staff and interested members of the public at its regularly scheduled public meeting, the court rejected the appellant's contention that this qualified as a "`public hearing ... before the issuance of the notice of determination.'" ( Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1188, 1210; see also Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Community Services Dist. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 181, 189-190 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] [holding that CEQA did not require a public comment period in connection with agency's determination that approval of a tentative agree

2010In Azusa, although the agency had taken comments from staff and interested members of the public at its regularly scheduled public meeting, the court rejected the appellant's contention that this qualified as a "`public hearing ... before the issuance of the notice of determination.'" ( Azusa, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1188, 1210; see also Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Community Services Dist. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 181, 189-190 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] [holding that CEQA did not require a public comment period in connection with agency's determination that approval of a tentative agree

2006First, it reasoned that because section 25540, which states the penalty for a violation of section 25401, requires a "willful" violation, section 25401 is a general intent crime, not one of strict liability. ( Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 507 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 .) Simon noted that general intent crimes ordinarily require mens rea or guilty knowledge. ( Id. at p. 519, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 ; see Pen.Code, § 20 ["In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence"].) After observing that criminal

2006First, it reasoned that because section 25540, which states the penalty for a violation of section 25401, requires a "willful" violation, section 25401 is a general intent crime, not one of strict liability. ( Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 507 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 .) Simon noted that general intent crimes ordinarily require mens rea or guilty knowledge. ( Id. at p. 519, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 ; see Pen.Code, § 20 ["In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence"].) After observing that criminal

2005(East Peninsula Ed. Council, Inc. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School Dist. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 155, 176-177 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 147 ] (Palos Verdes).) “To hold such parties to knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver for failure to make a timely and specific objection would be unfair for them.” (Id. at p. 177.) In the Palos Verdes case, the court found that the objectors’ complaints were sufficient to alert the agency to issues regarding the cumulative impacts of a proposed project that were later raised in a petition for a writ of mandate.

2005(East Peninsula Ed. Council, Inc. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School Dist. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 155, 176-177 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 147 ] (Palos Verdes).) “To hold such parties to knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver for failure to make a timely and specific objection would be unfair for them.” (Id. at p. 177.) In the Palos Verdes case, the court found that the objectors’ complaints were sufficient to alert the agency to issues regarding the cumulative impacts of a proposed project that were later raised in a petition for a writ of mandate.

1995(See, e.g., People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 271 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421 , 861 P.2d 1107 ] [failure to characterize the penalty factors as either aggravating or mitigating does not render the statute unconstitutional]; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th 792, 866 [failure to delete inapplicable penalty factors from jury instructions is not erroneous].) Defendant also argues the failure to require written findings by the jury on the aggravating factors it selected deprived him of his right to meaningful review of his sentence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; we have previously held t

1993(People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 990 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 , 846 P.2d 704 ] [failure to characterize the penalty factors as aggravating or mitigating does not render the statute unconstitutional]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 809 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 842 P.2d 1192 ] [jury need not be instructed to find that the aggravating outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Payton, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1075 [proportionality review is not constitutionally compelled]; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 445-446 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 731 , 802 P.2d 221 ] [

2015(See People v. Klatt (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 906 , review granted July 16, 2014, S218755; People v. Friday (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 8 , review granted July 16, 2014, S218288; People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1283 , review granted July 16, 2014, S218197.) 5 The penalty exception had been applied in cases where “the State not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him [or her] to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’ [Citation.]”

2015(Id. at pp. 437-438.) The probation condition itself “proscribed only false statements; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to answer particular questions and certainly contained no suggestion that his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal prosecution.” (Id. at p. 437.) Further, there was “no direct evidence that Murphy confessed because he feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained silent.” (Ibid.) The Murphy court explained how the penalty exception could apply to a probationer: “if the State, either ex

2015This automatic grant of immunity could complicate future prosecutions, because the prosecution would then bear “the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.” ( Kastigar, supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 461-462.) By contrast, with the waiver condition stricken, the penalty exception does not apply, and a probationer must affirmatively invoke the Fifth Amendment to enjoy its protections.

2015This automatic grant of immunity could complicate future prosecutions, because the prosecution would then bear “the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.” ( Kastigar, supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 461-462.) By contrast, with the waiver condition stricken, the penalty exception does not apply, and a probationer must affirmatively invoke the Fifth Amendment to enjoy its protections.

2011Business and Professions Code [section] 7028[, subdivision] (a) (‘It is a misdemeanor for a person to engage in the business or act in the capacity of a contractor within this state without having a license therefore, unless the person is particularly exempted from the provisions of this chapter.’); Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc. (1946) 27 Cal.2[d] 687, 689 [ 166 P.2d 265 ] (‘A contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of the public and prescribing' a penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and void, and no action may be brought to enforce such contra

1949As appellant maintains, it has been repeatedly declared in this state that "a contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of the public and prescribing a penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and void, and no action may be brought to enforce such contract" (Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 687, 689 [ 166 P.2d 265 ]; see, also, Haas v. Greenwald, 196 Cal. 236, 247 [ 237 P. 38 , 59 A.L.R. 1493 ]; Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App. 765, 774-776 [ 242 P. 90 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 335-337 [ 67 P.2d 114 ]; Phillips v. McIntosh, 51 Cal.App.

2015In State v. Eccles (1994) 179 Ariz. 226 5 (Eccles), the Arizona Supreme Court was presented with a waiver nearly identical to that required under subdivision (b)(3).

2015In State v. Eccles (1994) 179 Ariz. 226 (Eccles), the Arizona Supreme Court was presented with a waiver nearly identical to that required under subdivision (b)(3).

2022Under this general rule, where a law requires, for regulatory rather than revenue purposes, that one procure a license before offering or performing certain services and provides a penalty for violation, the contract of an unlicensed person to perform such services will not be upheld. [Citations.] ‘This rule is based on the rationale that “the public importance of discouraging such prohibited transactions outweighs equitable considerations of possible injustice between the parties.” ’ ” (MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412 , 435–436 (MW Er

2022Under this general rule, where a law requires, for regulatory rather than revenue purposes, that one procure a license before offering or performing certain services and provides a penalty for violation, the contract of an unlicensed person to perform such services will not be upheld. [Citations.] ‘This rule is based on the rationale that “the public importance of discouraging such prohibited transactions outweighs equitable considerations of possible injustice between the parties.” ’ ” (MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412 , 435–436 (MW Er

2017We have the discretion to reach issues present on appeal, even if they are moot, if they involve "issues of broad public interest that are likely to recur." ( Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072 , 1079, fn. 3, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 , 112 P.3d 623 .) The demurrer and equal protection issues presented in this appeal qualify as such.

2017We have the discretion to reach issues present on appeal, even if they are moot, if they involve "issues of broad public interest that are likely to recur." ( Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072 , 1079, fn. 3, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 , 112 P.3d 623 .) The demurrer and equal protection issues presented in this appeal qualify as such.

2017We review both claims de novo. ( Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185 , 1191, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 [demurrer]; California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 , 208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 , 254 P.3d 1019 [equal protection claim].) As a threshold matter, the People argue that defendant's challenge to his parole violation is now moot because he has finished serving the 150-day jail sentence that was the sole penalty for his violation.

2017We review both claims de novo. ( Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185 , 1191, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 [demurrer]; California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 , 208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 , 254 P.3d 1019 [equal protection claim].) As a threshold matter, the People argue that defendant's challenge to his parole violation is now moot because he has finished serving the 150-day jail sentence that was the sole penalty for his violation.

2017We review both claims de novo. ( Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185 , 1191, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 [demurrer]; California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 , 208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 , 254 P.3d 1019 [equal protection claim].) As a threshold matter, the People argue that defendant's challenge to his parole violation is now moot because he has finished serving the 150-day jail sentence that was the sole penalty for his violation.

2017We review both claims de novo. ( Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185 , 1191, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 [demurrer]; California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 , 208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 , 254 P.3d 1019 [equal protection claim].) As a threshold matter, the People argue that defendant's challenge to his parole violation is now moot because he has finished serving the 150-day jail sentence that was the sole penalty for his violation.

2003In 1986, we affirmed the guilt judgment but reversed the penalty because defense counsel, at defendant's instruction, had not presented any mitigating evidence or argument. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 542-543 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 .) In 1988, a jury again sentenced defendant to death.

2003In 1986, we affirmed the guilt judgment but reversed the penalty because defense counsel, at defendant's instruction, had not presented any mitigating evidence or argument. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 542-543 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 .) In 1988, a jury again sentenced defendant to death.

2006First, it reasoned that because section 25540, which states the penalty for a violation of section 25401, requires a "willful" violation, section 25401 is a general intent crime, not one of strict liability. ( Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 507 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 .) Simon noted that general intent crimes ordinarily require mens rea or guilty knowledge. ( Id. at p. 519, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 ; see Pen.Code, § 20 ["In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence"].) After observing that criminal

2006First, it reasoned that because section 25540, which states the penalty for a violation of section 25401, requires a "willful" violation, section 25401 is a general intent crime, not one of strict liability. ( Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 507 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 .) Simon noted that general intent crimes ordinarily require mens rea or guilty knowledge. ( Id. at p. 519, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 ; see Pen.Code, § 20 ["In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence"].) After observing that criminal

2001Under Missouri law, the prosecution was required to prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt at the penalty hearing, and the jury's penalty determination had "the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence." ( Bullington v. Missouri, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 439 , 101 S.Ct. 1852 .) Accordingly, the defendant could not be subject to retrial as to penalty after the trial court granted *65 his motion for new trial on the basis of guilt phase error.

2001Under Missouri law, the prosecution was required to prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt at the penalty hearing, and the jury's penalty determination had "the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence." ( Bullington v. Missouri, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 439 , 101 S.Ct. 1852 .) Accordingly, the defendant could not be subject to retrial as to penalty after the trial court granted *65 his motion for new trial on the basis of guilt phase error.