penalty violation in Oklahoma

1939Cr. 201 , 127 P. 20 , in an opinion written by Judge Doyle, the court again said: “ ‘The Legislature of this state would have authority to provide as a part of the penalty for the violation of law the payment of costs and the enforcement of the payment by imprisonment.

1929Cr. 201 , 127 Pac. 20, 23 , had held: “Under Bill of Rights, § 13, supra, permitting imprisonment for the nonpayment of fines and penalties imposed for the violation of law the Legislature of this state would have authority to provide as a part of the penalty for the violation of law the payment of costs and the enforcement of the payment by imprisonment.

1945L. 123, 43 A. 443 , it is held: “ Tf a section of an ordinance which provides a penalty for the violation thereof is invalid, the whole of the ordinance becomes nugatory.’ ” In the oral argument on rehearing, our attention was called to the case of Ex parte Monroe, 13 Okla.

1925Held, .that the whole ordinance was therefore rendered inoperative.” In the City of Omaha v. Harmon (Neb.) 78 N. W. 623 , it is held: “A city ordinance imposing an occupation tax and providing a method for Its enforcement which is illegal is wholly inoperative.” In the case of Massinger v. City of Milville (N. J.) 43 Atl. 443 , it is held: “If a section of an ordinance which provides a penalty for the violation thereof is invalid, the whole of the ordinance becomes nugatory.” We next come to the proposition as to whether the defendant by undertaking to erect and build a drive-in filling statio

1945Co. v. City of Minden, 51 Neb. 870 , 71 N. W. 995 , the court said: “ (A city ordinance imposed an occupational tax, and provided only an illegal method for its enforcement.

1925The following oases hold that if the penalty clause of an ordinance is admittedly void, the whole ordinance must fail: In the case of German-American Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Minden (Neb.) 71 N. W. 995 , the court said: “A city ordinance imposed an occupation tax and provided only an illegal method’for its enforcement.

1989Cf Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla.1985).

1989Cf. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1985).

1985In WRG Construction Company v. Hoebel, 600 P.2d 334 (Okl.1979), this Court recognized that the common law definition of damages governing actions in tort, now codified at 23 O.S.1981 § 3, is applicable to the penalty clause of 85 O.S.1981 § 6, supra, providing for damages for violation of § 5 of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

1980Title 47 O.S. 11 -1007 [ 47-11-1007 ] (1980) allows for enforcement on "private property accessible to the public and where the public is invited or public property that is designated and posted as a reserved area for parking motor vehicles of a physically disabled person." The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Laughlin v. City of Tulsa, Okl.Cr., 492 P.2d 1131 , 1132 (1972) and quoted Laughlin in Houston v. State, Okl.Cr., P.2d (August 14, 1980), that ". . . .

1980This instruction was in compliance with our earlier ruling in Mook v. City of Tulsa, Okl.Cr., 565 P.2d 1065 (1977), where we said the Juvenile Act compels the conclusion that no child be sentenced to incarceration in a criminal action in the absence of certification proceedings.

1950Pope’s Dig. § 9589.” In the case of Jewel Tea Co., Inc., v. City of Troy, Ill., et al., 7 Cir., 80 F. 2d 366 , an injunction was sought and one of the issues raised by petitioner was held not proper in the particular proceeding, the petitioner not being under arrest, and the expression concerning the issue by the court, of course, amounted to dicta.

1950Const. Art. 1, § 24.” The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103 , 155 S. W. 2d 719 , held: “A city ordinance providing for the collection of garbage, waste, trash, and refuse, and providing a penalty for violation thereof, was not void on ground that it provided for ‘imprisonment for debt’, since there was no imprisonment for debt but merely punishment for violation of law.

1950Const. Art. 1, § 24.” The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103 , 155 S. W. 2d 719 , held: “A city ordinance providing for the collection of garbage, waste, trash, and refuse, and providing a penalty for violation thereof, was not void on ground that it provided for ‘imprisonment for debt’, since there was no imprisonment for debt but merely punishment for violation of law.

1945Cr. 62 , 162 P. 233 .” *360 In the case of Mar] and Refining Co. v. City of Hobart, 113 Okla. 36 , 237 P. 857, 858 , the Supreme Court of this state said: “The following cases hold that, if the penalty clause of an ordinance is admittedly void, the whole ordinance must fail: “In the case of German-American Fire Ins.

1945Cr. 62 , 162 P. 233 .” *360 In the case of Mar] and Refining Co. v. City of Hobart, 113 Okla. 36 , 237 P. 857, 858 , the Supreme Court of this state said: “The following cases hold that, if the penalty clause of an ordinance is admittedly void, the whole ordinance must fail: “In the case of German-American Fire Ins.

1945Cr. 62 , 162 P. 233 .” *360 In the case of Mar] and Refining Co. v. City of Hobart, 113 Okla. 36 , 237 P. 857, 858 , the Supreme Court of this state said: “The following cases hold that, if the penalty clause of an ordinance is admittedly void, the whole ordinance must fail: “In the case of German-American Fire Ins.

1945L. 123, 43 A. 443 , it is held: “ Tf a section of an ordinance which provides a penalty for the violation thereof is invalid, the whole of the ordinance becomes nugatory.’ ” In the oral argument on rehearing, our attention was called to the case of Ex parte Monroe, 13 Okla.

1940Cr. 78 , 201 P. 537, 541 , this court holds: “* * * That in all cases involving a penalty for the violation of a municipal ordinance, pending before a municipal judge, prosecutions should be predicated and maintained upon a verified written complaint.” This decision is based upon section 17, of the Bill of Rights, Okla.

1938S. 1931, which provided a penalty for the violation of other sections of the 1915 waste-prevention statute, because said statute contained no definition of • the term “waste.” The rule followed in that instance was quoted from the opinion in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 , 70 L.

1938S. 1931, which provided a penalty for the violation of other sections of the 1915 waste-prevention statute, because said statute contained no definition of • the term “waste.” The rule followed in that instance was quoted from the opinion in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 , 70 L.

1935Cr. 168 , 117 Pac. 726 , Avherein it was held that: “ ‘The poAver to punish by fine and imprisonment until such fine is paid does not include the power to add to such fine the costs of the prosecution and adjudge that, upon a failure to pay such costs, they shall be satisfied by imprisonment as a part of the fine.’ “Costs were unknown to the common law, and the power to impose costs must be found in the statute or it does not exist. * * * “Under Bill of Rights, § 13, supra, permitting imprisonment for the nonpayment of fines and penalties imposed for the violation of law the Legislature of thi

1933The validity of all of this statute except that portion referring to a penalty for violation thereof and a section relating to economic waste has been upheld in the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commission, 76 L.

1930Bonner, 75 Ill. 315 , the Supreme Court of Illinois construed a similar statutory provision of the state of North Carolina prohibiting marriage between white persons and Indians, and fixing a penalty for the violation 1 hereof.

1925Johnson v. Hulings, 103 Pa. 498 , 49 Am.

1925Held, .that the whole ordinance was therefore rendered inoperative.” In the City of Omaha v. Harmon (Neb.) 78 N. W. 623 , it is held: “A city ordinance imposing an occupation tax and providing a method for Its enforcement which is illegal is wholly inoperative.” In the case of Massinger v. City of Milville (N. J.) 43 Atl. 443 , it is held: “If a section of an ordinance which provides a penalty for the violation thereof is invalid, the whole of the ordinance becomes nugatory.” We next come to the proposition as to whether the defendant by undertaking to erect and build a drive-in filling statio

1925Held, .that the whole ordinance was therefore rendered inoperative.” In the City of Omaha v. Harmon (Neb.) 78 N. W. 623 , it is held: “A city ordinance imposing an occupation tax and providing a method for Its enforcement which is illegal is wholly inoperative.” In the case of Massinger v. City of Milville (N. J.) 43 Atl. 443 , it is held: “If a section of an ordinance which provides a penalty for the violation thereof is invalid, the whole of the ordinance becomes nugatory.” We next come to the proposition as to whether the defendant by undertaking to erect and build a drive-in filling statio

1925In the case of City of Carthage v. Munsell, 203 Ill. 474 , 67 N. E. 831, 832 , it is said: “ ‘Nuisance’ may be thus classified: First, those which in their nature are nuisances per se, or so denounced by the common law or by statute; second, those which in their nature are not nuisances, but may become so by reason of their locality, surroundings, or the manner in which .they may be conducted ; third, those which in their nature *38 may be nuisances, but as to which ^ there may be honest differences of opinion in impartial minds.” We think that the instant case comes more nearly within the sec

1925In the case of City of Carthage v. Munsell, 203 Ill. 474 , 67 N. E. 831, 832 , it is said: “ ‘Nuisance’ may be thus classified: First, those which in their nature are nuisances per se, or so denounced by the common law or by statute; second, those which in their nature are not nuisances, but may become so by reason of their locality, surroundings, or the manner in which .they may be conducted ; third, those which in their nature *38 may be nuisances, but as to which ^ there may be honest differences of opinion in impartial minds.” We think that the instant case comes more nearly within the sec

1925Ex parte Daugherty, supra, and cases therein cited; Ex parte Johnson, 20 Okla.

1921Pond Creek v. Haskell, 21 Okla. 711 , 97 Pac. 338 ; Insurance Co. of North America v; Welch, 49 Okla. 620 , 154 Pac. 48 , Ann.

1921Pond Creek v. Haskell, 21 Okla. 711 , 97 Pac. 338 ; Insurance Co. of North America v; Welch, 49 Okla. 620 , 154 Pac. 48 , Ann.

1921Pond Creek v. Haskell, 21 Okla. 711 , 97 Pac. 338 ; Insurance Co. of North America v; Welch, 49 Okla. 620 , 154 Pac. 48 , Ann.

1921Pond Creek v. Haskell, 21 Okla. 711 , 97 Pac. 338 ; Insurance Co. of North America v; Welch, 49 Okla. 620 , 154 Pac. 48 , Ann.

1920Por the reasons stated in tire opinions of the court in the eases of Ex parte Johnson, 13 Okla.

1918Anno.) This section of the statute provides: “In all cases where, by reason of the provisions of section two, article twenty-two, of the Constitution of this state, the title to .any real property in the state shall fail to vest in the grantee under any deed,” etc. The section of the Constitution referred to prohibits any corporation doing business in-'this state from buying or acquiring the character of lands in question here; hut the provision does not prescribe a penalty for its violation, and was held by this court in the case of State v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 64 Okla. 267 , 167 Pac. 756

1918Anno.) This section of the statute provides: “In all cases where, by reason of the provisions of section two, article twenty-two, of the Constitution of this state, the title to .any real property in the state shall fail to vest in the grantee under any deed,” etc. The section of the Constitution referred to prohibits any corporation doing business in-'this state from buying or acquiring the character of lands in question here; hut the provision does not prescribe a penalty for its violation, and was held by this court in the case of State v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 64 Okla. 267 , 167 Pac. 756

1911C.) 32 Fed. 722 , was a suit to recover a penalty for the violation of an act passed by the Legislature of Missouri in 1881 (Laws 1881, p. 77), requiring every railroad company in the state engaged in the transportation of passengers or property at all crossings and intersections of other roads at the same grade to erect, build, and maintain, either jointly with the railroad company whose road is crossed or separately by each railroad company, a depot, etc., under penalty of a forfeiture of a sum certain for failure so to do.

1896In the case of Chaffee v. United States, 18 Wall. 516 , the suit was to recover a penalty for violation of the internal revenue laws, under the statute of 1864, which provided: “And any person who shall have in his custody or possession any goods, wares, merchandise, * * subject to duty as aforesaid, for the purpose of selling the same with the design of avoiding payment of the duties *434 imposed thereon, shall be liable to a penalty of $500, or not less than double the amount of duties fraudulently attempted to be evaded, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Justice Field

1896In the case of Chaffee v. United States, 18 Wall. 516 , the suit was to recover a penalty for violation of the internal revenue laws, under the statute of 1864, which provided: “And any person who shall have in his custody or possession any goods, wares, merchandise, * * subject to duty as aforesaid, for the purpose of selling the same with the design of avoiding payment of the duties *434 imposed thereon, shall be liable to a penalty of $500, or not less than double the amount of duties fraudulently attempted to be evaded, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Justice Field