penalty analysis in Massachusetts

2025For the same reason, we conclude that the statute is "sufficiently clear to give notice of the prohibited conduct." Commonwealth v. Reyes, 464 Mass. 245, 248 (2013).

2025Following the "basic principle of statutory construction that a statute must be read as a whole," Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 273 (1983), we conclude that the penalty clause applies to the entire series of elements, not just the intent to punish, harm or otherwise retaliate that immediately precedes the penalty clause.

2024While the motion judge held that clause unenforceable, we need not reach that issue because we conclude no default occurred. 5 Because we conclude, as discussed below, the motion judge did not err in ruling that Clarke satisfied his obligations under the Partnership Agreement, we need not decide if guaranteeing the Note and Mortgage was a condition precedent to Clarke accruing beneficial interest in the Trust. 7 Co., 39 Mass. App. Ct. 189, 192 (1995).

2018See Commonwealth v. Quint Q ., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 507 , 514, 998 N.E.2d 363 (2013). 15 General Laws c. 119, § 51F, provides, in pertinent part: "Any person employed in the central registry who permits the data and information stored in the registry to be released without authorization to persons other than those specified in the rules and regulations shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 2 1/2 years, or both." General Laws c. 119, § 51E, which provides for the confidentiality of written reports prepared by the department under §§ 51A -51D, also

2018See Commonwealth v. Quint Q ., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 507 , 514, 998 N.E.2d 363 (2013). 15 General Laws c. 119, § 51F, provides, in pertinent part: "Any person employed in the central registry who permits the data and information stored in the registry to be released without authorization to persons other than those specified in the rules and regulations shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 2 1/2 years, or both." General Laws c. 119, § 51E, which provides for the confidentiality of written reports prepared by the department under §§ 51A -51D, also

2014Where an administrative agency imposes a penalty it is authorized to enforce, “neither a trial court nor an appellate court is free to substitute its own discretion as to the matter; nor can the reviewing court interfere with the imposition of a penalty by an administrative tribunal because in the court’s own evaluation of the circumstances the penalty appears to be too harsh.” Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 401 Mass. 347, 355 (1987), quoting Levy v. Board of Registration & Discipline in Med., 378 Mass. 519, 529 (1979).

2014Where an administrative agency imposes a penalty it is authorized to enforce, “neither a trial court nor an appellate court is free to substitute its own discretion as to the matter; nor can the reviewing court interfere with the imposition of a penalty by an administrative tribunal because in the court’s own evaluation of the circumstances the penalty appears to be too harsh.” Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 401 Mass. 347, 355 (1987), quoting Levy v. Board of Registration & Discipline in Med., 378 Mass. 519, 529 (1979).

2014Utils., 391 Mass. 527, 538 (1984), the department is not required specifically to discuss the penalty factors in its order so long as the order demonstrates that the department has duly considered them.

2005Citing Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 511 (2000), the Commonwealth argues that the absence of statutory authorization for its expert to examine the defendant is not determinative.

2003Commonwealth v. Alicea, 428 Mass. 711, 716 (1999).

1998The Supreme Judicial Court described DDU confinement as a civil proceeding in Commonwealth v. Forte, supra at 676.

1985Id. at 76 . 7 But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 406-407 (1975), where the Supreme Court did not invoke the penalty analysis to uphold a one-year residency requirement for access to a State’s divorce courts, but instead applied “what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test.” Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 8 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, 493 & 746 (104th ed. 1983) (prices of one-family houses in northeastern United States rose by approximately 20% more than the consumer price index from 1970 to 1981). 9 The plaintiffs argue that

1985Id. at 76 . 7 But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 406-407 (1975), where the Supreme Court did not invoke the penalty analysis to uphold a one-year residency requirement for access to a State’s divorce courts, but instead applied “what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test.” Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 8 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, 493 & 746 (104th ed. 1983) (prices of one-family houses in northeastern United States rose by approximately 20% more than the consumer price index from 1970 to 1981). 9 The plaintiffs argue that