18 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1886–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marriott Financial Services, Inc. v. Capitol Funds, Inc.green2 sentences2013In such cases the Courts may examine the language and purposes of the statute, as well as the effects of avoiding contracts in violation thereof, and restrict the penalty for violation solely to that expressed within the statute itself. 288 N.C. 122, 128 , 217 S.E.2d 551, 555 (citing Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 (1919)); see also Hines v. Norcutt, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 (1918). 2013In such cases the Courts may examine the language and purposes of the statute, as well as the effects of avoiding contracts in violation thereof, and restrict the penalty for violation solely to that expressed within the statute itself. 288 N.C. 122, 128 , 217 S.E.2d 551, 555 (citing Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 (1919)); see also Hines v. Norcutt, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 (1918). | 2 | 2 |
Hines v. . Norcottgreen2 sentences2013In such cases the Courts may examine the language and purposes of the statute, as well as the effects of avoiding contracts in violation thereof, and restrict the penalty for violation solely to that expressed within the statute itself. 288 N.C. 122, 128 , 217 S.E.2d 551, 555 (citing Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 (1919)); see also Hines v. Norcutt, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 (1918). 2013In such cases the Courts may examine the language and purposes of the statute, as well as the effects of avoiding contracts in violation thereof, and restrict the penalty for violation solely to that expressed within the statute itself. 288 N.C. 122, 128 , 217 S.E.2d 551, 555 (citing Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 (1919)); see also Hines v. Norcutt, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 (1918). | 1 | 3 |
Fisher v. Gibson, Wardengreen2 sentences2007See State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St. 3d 419, 431-32 , 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (2001) (in holding that city lacked authority to enact an ordinance barring people convicted of a drug-related offense from a specified zone, stating that “there is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for violation of a state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the General Assembly”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 , 152 L. 2007See State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431-32 , 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (2001) (in holding that city lacked authority to enact an ordinance barring people convicted of a drug-related offense from a specified zone, stating that "there is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for violation of a state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the General Assembly"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 , 122 S.Ct. 1790 , 152 L.Ed.2d 649 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Greenwell v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corpgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St. 3d 419, 431-32 , 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (2001) (in holding that city lacked authority to enact an ordinance barring people convicted of a drug-related offense from a specified zone, stating that “there is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for violation of a state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the General Assembly”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 , 152 L. 2007See State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431-32 , 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (2001) (in holding that city lacked authority to enact an ordinance barring people convicted of a drug-related offense from a specified zone, stating that "there is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for violation of a state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the General Assembly"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 , 122 S.Ct. 1790 , 152 L.Ed.2d 649 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. Cleveland State Universitygreen2 sentences2007Ed. 2d 649 , 122 S. Ct. 1790 (2002). 2007See State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431-32 , 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (2001) (in holding that city lacked authority to enact an ordinance barring people convicted of a drug-related offense from a specified zone, stating that "there is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for violation of a state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the General Assembly"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 , 122 S.Ct. 1790 , 152 L.Ed.2d 649 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burnettgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431-32 , 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (2001) (in holding that city lacked authority to enact an ordinance barring people convicted of a drug-related offense from a specified zone, stating that "there is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for violation of a state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the General Assembly"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 , 122 S.Ct. 1790 , 152 L.Ed.2d 649 (2002). 2007See State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431-32 , 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (2001) (in holding that city lacked authority to enact an ordinance barring people convicted of a drug-related offense from a specified zone, stating that "there is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for violation of a state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the General Assembly"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 , 122 S.Ct. 1790 , 152 L.Ed.2d 649 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Knutton v. Cofieldgreen1 sentence2002See id. at 360-61, 160 S.E.2d at 34 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences1993The exclusionary rule as a penalty for violation of the Fourth Amendment, however, is not absolute. 2 For example, in the context of a criminal proceeding, the benefits produced by the suppression of “evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 , 82 L. 1993The exclusionary rule as a penalty for violation of the Fourth Amendment, however, is not absolute. 2 For example, in the context of a criminal proceeding, the benefits produced by the suppression of “evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 , 82 L. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. City of Charlottegreen2 sentences1966See Davis v. Charlotte, 242 N.C. 670 , 89 S.E. 2d 406 . 1966See Davis v. Charlotte, 242 N.C. 670 , 89 S.E. 2d 406 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. . Snuggs
neutral
2 sentences1947S. v. Snuggs, 85 N. C., 541 .” There can be no question that the statute under review has for its main purpose the promotion of the public interest, deals with public policy, and is intended to promote the welfare of the whole public rather than sow the seeds of private litigation. 1886State v. Snuggs, 85 N. C., 541 . | 3 | 1886–1947 |
Price v. . Edwards
green
2 sentences2013In such cases the Courts may examine the language and purposes of the statute, as well as the effects of avoiding contracts in violation thereof, and restrict the penalty for violation solely to that expressed within the statute itself. 288 N.C. 122, 128 , 217 S.E.2d 551, 555 (citing Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 (1919)); see also Hines v. Norcutt, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 (1918). 2013In such cases the Courts may examine the language and purposes of the statute, as well as the effects of avoiding contracts in violation thereof, and restrict the penalty for violation solely to that expressed within the statute itself. 288 N.C. 122, 128 , 217 S.E.2d 551, 555 (citing Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 (1919)); see also Hines v. Norcutt, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 (1918). | 2 | 1975–2013 |
Mandlebaum v. Gregovich
neutral
2 sentences1938Wood v. Krepps, supra , 141 P. 691, 692 ; Mandelbaum v. Gregovich , 17 Nev. 87 , 28 P. 121 ; Howard v. Lebby , 197 Ky. 324 , 246 S.W. 828 . 1938Wood v. Krepps, supra, 141 P., 691, 692 ; Mandelbaum v. Gregovich, 17 Nev., 87 , 28 P., 121 ; Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky., 324 , 246 S. W., 828 . | 2 | 1938–1938 |
Reynolds v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1938Wood v. Krepps, supra , 141 P. 691, 692 ; Mandelbaum v. Gregovich , 17 Nev. 87 , 28 P. 121 ; Howard v. Lebby , 197 Ky. 324 , 246 S.W. 828 . 1938Wood v. Krepps, supra, 141 P., 691, 692 ; Mandelbaum v. Gregovich, 17 Nev., 87 , 28 P., 121 ; Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky., 324 , 246 S. W., 828 . | 2 | 1938–1938 |
Thurman v. Kildall
neutral
2 sentences1938Wood v. Krepps, supra , 141 P. 691, 692 ; Mandelbaum v. Gregovich , 17 Nev. 87 , 28 P. 121 ; Howard v. Lebby , 197 Ky. 324 , 246 S.W. 828 . 1938Wood v. Krepps, supra, 141 P., 691, 692 ; Mandelbaum v. Gregovich, 17 Nev., 87 , 28 P., 121 ; Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky., 324 , 246 S. W., 828 . | 2 | 1938–1938 |
Howard v. Lebby
neutral
2 sentences1938Wood v. Krepps, supra, 141 P., 691, 692 ; Mandelbaum v. Gregovich, 17 Nev., 87 , 28 P., 121 ; Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky., 324 , 246 S. W., 828 . 1938Wood v. Krepps, supra, 141 P., 691, 692 ; Mandelbaum v. Gregovich, 17 Nev., 87 , 28 P., 121 ; Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky., 324 , 246 S. W., 828 . | 2 | 1938–1938 |
Hellen v. . Noe
neutral
2 sentences1918In S. v. Tweedy, 115 N. C., 705 , it is said: “It was competent for the town to enact the ordinance that no hogs should run at large within the, town limits and to prescribe a penalty for the violation of such ordinance, and it would make no difference if the owner of the hog should live outside of such limits,” citing Rose v. Hardie, 98 N. C., 44 ; Hellen v. Noe, 25 N. C., 493 ; Whitfield v. Longest, 28 N. C., 268 . 1916In S. v. Tweedy, 115 N. C., 705 , it is said: “It was competent for tbe town to enact tbe ordinance that no bogs should run at large within tbe town limits, and to prescribe a penalty for violation of such ordinance, and it would make no difference if tbe owner of tbe bog should live outside of such limits,” citing Rose v. Hardie, 98 N. C., 44 ; Hellen v. Noc, 25 N. C., 493 ; Whitfield v. Longest, 28 N. C., 268 . | 2 | 1916–1918 |
Whitfield v. . Longest
neutral
2 sentences1918In S. v. Tweedy, 115 N. C., 705 , it is said: “It was competent for the town to enact the ordinance that no hogs should run at large within the, town limits and to prescribe a penalty for the violation of such ordinance, and it would make no difference if the owner of the hog should live outside of such limits,” citing Rose v. Hardie, 98 N. C., 44 ; Hellen v. Noe, 25 N. C., 493 ; Whitfield v. Longest, 28 N. C., 268 . 1916In S. v. Tweedy, 115 N. C., 705 , it is said: “It was competent for tbe town to enact tbe ordinance that no bogs should run at large within tbe town limits, and to prescribe a penalty for violation of such ordinance, and it would make no difference if tbe owner of tbe bog should live outside of such limits,” citing Rose v. Hardie, 98 N. C., 44 ; Hellen v. Noc, 25 N. C., 493 ; Whitfield v. Longest, 28 N. C., 268 . | 2 | 1916–1918 |
Rose v. . Hardie
neutral
2 sentences1918In S. v. Tweedy, 115 N. C., 705 , it is said: “It was competent for the town to enact the ordinance that no hogs should run at large within the, town limits and to prescribe a penalty for the violation of such ordinance, and it would make no difference if the owner of the hog should live outside of such limits,” citing Rose v. Hardie, 98 N. C., 44 ; Hellen v. Noe, 25 N. C., 493 ; Whitfield v. Longest, 28 N. C., 268 . 1916In S. v. Tweedy, 115 N. C., 705 , it is said: “It was competent for tbe town to enact tbe ordinance that no bogs should run at large within tbe town limits, and to prescribe a penalty for violation of such ordinance, and it would make no difference if tbe owner of tbe bog should live outside of such limits,” citing Rose v. Hardie, 98 N. C., 44 ; Hellen v. Noc, 25 N. C., 493 ; Whitfield v. Longest, 28 N. C., 268 . | 2 | 1916–1918 |
Craig v. County of Chatham
green
2 sentences2007In short, I believe that the State's regulation of convicted sex offenders is "so comprehensive in scope that the General Assembly must have intended that [the statutes] comprise a `complete and integrated regulatory scheme' on a statewide basis, thus leaving no room for further local regulation." Craig, 356 N.C. at 50 , 565 S.E.2d at 179 (quoting N.C. 2007In short, I believe that the State's regulation of convicted sex offenders is "so comprehensive in scope that the General Assembly must have intended that [the statutes] comprise a `complete and integrated regulatory scheme' on a statewide basis, thus leaving no room for further local regulation." Craig, 356 N.C. at 50 , 565 S.E.2d at 179 (quoting N.C. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. . Wilson
green
2 sentences1979State v. Brown, 253 N.C. 195 , 116 S.E. 2d 349 (1960); State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545 , 15 S.E. 2d 9 (1941); State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130 , 4 S.E. 2d 440 (1939). 1979State v. Brown, 253 N.C. 195 , 116 S.E. 2d 349 (1960); State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545 , 15 S.E. 2d 9 (1941); State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130 , 4 S.E. 2d 440 (1939). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. . Taylor
neutral
2 sentences1979State v. Taylor, 124 N.C. 803 , 32 S.E. 548 (1899) (per curiam). 1979State v. Taylor, 124 N.C. 803 , 32 S.E. 548 (1899) (per curiam). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. . Calcutt
green
2 sentences1979State v. Brown, 253 N.C. 195 , 116 S.E. 2d 349 (1960); State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545 , 15 S.E. 2d 9 (1941); State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130 , 4 S.E. 2d 440 (1939). 1979State v. Brown, 253 N.C. 195 , 116 S.E. 2d 349 (1960); State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545 , 15 S.E. 2d 9 (1941); State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130 , 4 S.E. 2d 440 (1939). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences1979State v. Brown, 253 N.C. 195 , 116 S.E. 2d 349 (1960); State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545 , 15 S.E. 2d 9 (1941); State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130 , 4 S.E. 2d 440 (1939). 1979State v. Brown, 253 N.C. 195 , 116 S.E. 2d 349 (1960); State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545 , 15 S.E. 2d 9 (1941); State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130 , 4 S.E. 2d 440 (1939). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Ober v. . Katzenstein
green
2 sentences1975Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 ; Hines v. Norcott, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 ; Courtney v. Parker, 173 N.C. 479 , 92 S.E. 324 ; Ober v. Katzenstein, 160 N.C. 439 , 76 S.E. 476 ; 17 Am. 1975Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 ; Hines v. Norcott, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 ; Courtney v. Parker, 173 N.C. 479 , 92 S.E. 324 ; Ober v. Katzenstein, 160 N.C. 439 , 76 S.E. 476 ; 17 Am. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Courtney v. . Parker
green
2 sentences1975Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 ; Hines v. Norcott, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 ; Courtney v. Parker, 173 N.C. 479 , 92 S.E. 324 ; Ober v. Katzenstein, 160 N.C. 439 , 76 S.E. 476 ; 17 Am. 1975Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493 , 101 S.E. 33 ; Hines v. Norcott, 176 N.C. 123 , 96 S.E. 899 ; Courtney v. Parker, 173 N.C. 479 , 92 S.E. 324 ; Ober v. Katzenstein, 160 N.C. 439 , 76 S.E. 476 ; 17 Am. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State v. Cobb
green
2 sentences1971As Justice Sharp said so aptly in State v. Cobb, 262 N.C. 262, 266 , 136 S.E.2d 674 , 677: "A man's conduct must be judged by the law as it exists at the time his conduct is called into question and not by the law as he and others think it should be rewritten in the interest of social justice. * * * When a court, in effect, constitutes itself a superlegislative body, and attempts to rewrite the law according to its predilections and notions of enlightened legislation, it destroys the separation of powers and thereby upsets the delicate system of checks and balances which has heretofore formed 1971As Justice Sharp said so aptly in State v. Cobb, 262 N.C. 262, 266 , 136 S.E.2d 674 , 677: "A man's conduct must be judged by the law as it exists at the time his conduct is called into question and not by the law as he and others think it should be rewritten in the interest of social justice. * * * When a court, in effect, constitutes itself a superlegislative body, and attempts to rewrite the law according to its predilections and notions of enlightened legislation, it destroys the separation of powers and thereby upsets the delicate system of checks and balances which has heretofore formed | 1 | 1971–1971 |
State v. Cainan
neutral
1 sentence1903It is substantially like tbe one set out in State v. Cainan, 94 N. C., 880 . | 1 | 1903–1903 |
State v. . Tweedy
neutral
1 sentence1900In *119 State v. Tweedy, 115 N. C., 704 , it was held, -upon previous decisions, that it was competent for the town to pass such an ordinance, and to prescribe a penalty for its violation, whether the owner of the stock should live inside or outside of the corporate limits. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Broadfoot v. Town of Fayetteville
neutral
1 sentence1900In Broadfoot v. Town of Fayetteville, 121 N. C., 418 , it was held that the Legislature could discriminate, on this subject, between resident and non-resident owners of stock, as such discrimination is not forbidden by the Constitution of the State, or of the United States. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.