penalty violation in Colorado

1958Observe the comment of this court in City of Greeley v. Hamman, supra [ 12 Colo. 94 , 20 P. 2 ]: "But where the judgment, when against the defendant, may, as under this ordinance, include imprisonment in the first instance, the question becomes more embarrassing.

1899Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94 .

2001In Sears, 942 P.2d at 1347 , a division of this court held that "where the gravamen of the disputed conduct is a violation of the Act or a violation of a rule enacted by the director, the penalty set forth in § 8-48-804(1) applies only when the Act does not create a specific penalty for the violation." There, the division was not "persuaded by claimant's argument that it was employer's failure to investigate which formed the basis for her request for penalties and that, therefore, the failure to perform that duty was an independent basis for the imposition of penalties under § 8-48-804(1)." In

2001In Sears, 942 P.2d at 1347 , a division of this court held that "where the gravamen of the disputed conduct is a violation of the Act or a violation of a rule enacted by the director, the penalty set forth in § 8-48-804(1) applies only when the Act does not create a specific penalty for the violation." There, the division was not "persuaded by claimant's argument that it was employer's failure to investigate which formed the basis for her request for penalties and that, therefore, the failure to perform that duty was an independent basis for the imposition of penalties under § 8-48-804(1)." In

1913The supreme court of California In re Woods’ Estate, supra, under a statute in effect the same as ours, forbidding marriage within one. year after divorce, and providing that such remarriage within the time named should be void, held that such statute had no extra-territorial effect, did not apply to a marriage contract entered into in the state of Nevada in evasion of that statute, and further, that said statute did not enter into and become a paid of said decree so as to suspend the operation of the same during the year, but was a prohibition pure and simple against the marriage of either pa

1913The supreme court of California In re Woods’ Estate, supra, under a statute in effect the same as ours, forbidding marriage within one. year after divorce, and providing that such remarriage within the time named should be void, held that such statute had no extra-territorial effect, did not apply to a marriage contract entered into in the state of Nevada in evasion of that statute, and further, that said statute did not enter into and become a paid of said decree so as to suspend the operation of the same during the year, but was a prohibition pure and simple against the marriage of either pa

2021COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA84 Court of Appeals No. 20CA1523 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado WC No. 5-065-586 Delta County Memorial Hospital, Petitioner, v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Robert C.

2020While his appeal was pending, however, the General Assembly had amended the statute under which he had been convicted and sentenced, and the amended provision “substantially reduce[d] the penalty for violation thereof.” Id.

1992Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 , 106 S.Ct. 1749, 1755-56 , 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986).

1992Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 , 106 S.Ct. 1749, 1755-56 , 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986).

1985See § 16-10-101, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.). [11] In Strickland , the Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for determining the merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the United States Constitution: "that counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 104 S.Ct. at 2064 .

1967Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U.S. 282 , 10 S. Ct. 93 , 33 L.

1967Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U.S. 282 , 10 S. Ct. 93 , 33 L.

1951No instruction so advising the jury was tendered by defendant, and the objections to the court’s instructions lack clarity. - Counsel call our attention to the opinion of Walton v. Canon City, 13 Colo. App. 77 , 56 Pac. 671 , wherein is the statement: “In this proceeding upon appeal, therefore, the jury is substituted for the police magistrate.

1943Not being advised by the complaint that he would be called upon to defend against a violation of section 52-A, it was error for the court to admit this section in evidence or to impose by judgment a fine against defendant for its violation. *539 In the casé of Cornelius v. People, 89 Colo. 451 , 3 P. (2d) 1072 , defendant was charged with violating the provisions of section 3 of a municipal ordinance, and on the trial was convicted of violating section 6.

1943Not being advised by the complaint that he would be called upon to defend against a violation of section 52-A, it was error for the court to admit this section in evidence or to impose by judgment a fine against defendant for its violation. *539 In the casé of Cornelius v. People, 89 Colo. 451 , 3 P. (2d) 1072 , defendant was charged with violating the provisions of section 3 of a municipal ordinance, and on the trial was convicted of violating section 6.

1942In the case of McGilion v. United Brotherhood, 77 N. H., 590, 89 Atl. 301 , wherein under generally similar circumstances the conclusion we have reached was expressed, the opinion states concerning the three months’ penalty clause: “This provision may seem to be a harsh one, but it is what he agreed to.

1937The act itself in section 1 thereof provides that "When any person * * * shall contract for, exact or receive directly or indirectly, as interest or for the use of the money loaned, any sum of money or other thing of value in excess of one per cent (1%) per month on the amount actually loaned * * * such bond, bill, note or other evidence of debt, * * * shall be void and non-enforcible, * * *." In People v. Friederich , 67 Colo. 69 , 185 Pac. 657 , we held that a statute providing for the protection of girls under the age of 16 years was void because it did not come within the title, "An Act fo

1903In this state the general rule of law prevails, that negotiable commercial paper, although invalid as between the immediate parties, is valid as to third persons obtaining it for value before maturity, and without notice of its infirmities, unless so declared by statute. —Boughner v. Meyer, 5 Colo. 71 .