precise standard in Ohio

1981The precise test was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U. S. 306 , wherein the court held, at page 314, that a method for providing notice must be ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” The court held in this case that the notice provision in R.

1980The precise test was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306 , wherein the court held, at page 314, that a method for providing notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Our inquiry, therefore, must be directed to whether the notice provisions of R.

2008Where the court has scrupulously followed the required procedure, the defendant is bound by his statements in response to that court's inquiry." Ramos v. Rogers , 170 F.3d at 566 (emphasis in original, and citing Baker v. United States , 781 F.2d 85 , 90 ).

2008Where the court has scrupulously followed the required procedure, the defendant is bound by his statements in response to that court's inquiry." Ramos v. Rogers , 170 F.3d at 566 (emphasis in original, and citing Baker v. United States , 781 F.2d 85 , 90 ).

2006The court further noted the impossibility of laying down a precise rule to distinguish “substance’’ from “procedure.” Id.

1987The Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged “the impossibility of laying down a precise rule to distinguish ‘substance’ from ‘procedure.’ ” Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama (1949), 338 U.S. 294, 296 .

2024It also bears noting that the financial prejudice identified by appellant, while relevant, is not among the precise factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Barker, 407 U.S. 514 .

2008Id. at 491, 493 , 36 S.Ct. 630 , 60 L.Ed. 1117 .

2008Id. at 491, 493 , 36 S.Ct. 630 , 60 L.Ed. 1117 .

2005In re Merit Selection of Judges, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 104 , 551 N.E.2d 150 ; State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 522 , 728 N.E.2d 342 .

1999The precise standard for abuse of discretion as applied to custody cases was set forth in Bechtol as follows: "Where an award of custody is supported by a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence, such an award will not be reversed as being against the weight of the evidence by a reviewing court." Id. at syllabus.

1999This precise claim was considered and rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Rush (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 53 , which held that S.B.2 does not apply unless the offense for which sentence is imposed was committed after the effective date of S.B.2.

1984Comm. (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 49 , wherein the commission allowed Ohio Bell to expense seventy-five percent of its station connection charges and to capitalize the remaining twenty-five percent of such charges during the precise test year which also exists in the case at bar.

1982Elaborating on this distinction, the court stated at page 878 that: “This means that the procedures which Congress had in mind were to contain an extra preventative step, a safety catch or a rechecking mechanism.” In Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (C.A. 5, 1976), 537 F.2d 1296 , the court was faced with the precise error which has occurred here — the failure to fill in the blank space on a disclosure form provided for the cost of credit life insurance.

1936In Village of West Salem v Industrial Commission, 162 Wis. 57 , 155 NW 92 .9, L.R.A. 1918C 1077 , one Voeck was called upon by the village marshal to assist in the arrest of one Jones for violating the laws of the state.

1936In Village of West Salem v Industrial Commission, 162 Wis. 57 , 155 NW 92 .9, L.R.A. 1918C 1077 , one Voeck was called upon by the village marshal to assist in the arrest of one Jones for violating the laws of the state.

1914Whatever foundation such claims may have (we think absolutely none) they are strikingly answered by the homespun and common sense reasoning of Mr. Justice Brewer in the Prohibitory Amendatory Amendment in 24 Kans., 700 , which ■ involved the precise claim made here.

1903The cases of Wolfer v. Hemmer, 144 Ill. 554 [33 N. E.

1898This rule of law does not appear, in any case to have been controverted, and it seems reasonable and just, that where a judgment is recovered contrary to law, and prejudicial to a third party, he should have a right to avoid it.” Hunter, Assignee, v. Cl'd Stove Co., 31 Minn., 505 , is in point as involving the precise principle.

1888We doubt if any case can be found making such a proceeding as that here in question a crime. - Rapaljie on Contempts, sec. 21 et al., and 98; Dunham v. State, 6 Ia., 250 ; 4 Paige N. Y., 325; 113 Mass., 411 ; Swan’s Practice & Precedents, 1224; Wild’s Journal Entries, 206; Wilcox, Forms and Practice, 642; see also 1 Bishop on Criminal Law, sec. 1007 and 2, Ibid, secs. 264, 266, 270.