precise rule in Georgia

2022We therefore decline to take this opportunity to consider the precise standard of review for determining whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under Paragraph XVII. 25 495 U. S. 103, 108-109 (110 SCt 1691, 109 LE2d 98) (1990)).

2022We therefore decline to take this opportunity to consider the precise standard of review for determining whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under Paragraph XVII. 25 495 U. S. 103, 108-109 (110 SCt 1691, 109 LE2d 98) (1990)).

2022See also Gordon, 257 Ga. at 440 (2); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 57, 62 (5) (573 SE2d 362) (2002).

2022See also Gordon, 257 Ga. at 440 (2); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 57, 62 (5) (573 SE2d 362) (2002).

2022See also Gordon, 257 Ga. at 440 (2); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 57, 62 (5) ( 573 SE2d 362 ) (2002).

2022See also Gordon, 257 Ga. at 440 (2); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 57, 62 (5) (573 SE2d 362) (2002).

2019On the other hand, Goldberg requires that the hearing officer rest his decision "solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing," 397 U.S. at 271 (II), 90 S.Ct. 1011 , but Goldberg says nothing about the precise standard of proof against which the evidence must be assessed, other than its comment that the only function of the informal hearing is "to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of benefits." Id. at 267 (II), 90 S.Ct. 1011 .

2019On the other hand, Goldberg requires that the hearing officer rest his decision "solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing," 397 U.S. at 271 (II), 90 S.Ct. 1011 , but Goldberg says nothing about the precise standard of proof against which the evidence must be assessed, other than its comment that the only function of the informal hearing is "to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of benefits." Id. at 267 (II), 90 S.Ct. 1011 .

2024Based on the record, we discern no abuse of discretion. 11 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of A. A., 253 Ga. App. 858, 862 (3) ( 560 SE2d 763 ) (2002). 7 As the Husband appears to concede, “trial courts generally are not required to make findings of fact in nonjury trials unless requested by one of the parties prior to entry of the judgment.”12 “Absent a showing to the contrary, we presume that the trial court made all required findings, even if the required findings are not specifically set out in the order.”13 As discussed above, the trial court heard testimony from both

2024Based on the record, we discern no abuse of discretion. 11 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of A. A., 253 Ga. App. 858, 862 (3) ( 560 SE2d 763 ) (2002). 7 As the Husband appears to concede, “trial courts generally are not required to make findings of fact in nonjury trials unless requested by one of the parties prior to entry of the judgment.”12 “Absent a showing to the contrary, we presume that the trial court made all required findings, even if the required findings are not specifically set out in the order.”13 As discussed above, the trial court heard testimony from both

1997But the precise instruction under consideration in the case sub judice was held to be a correct statement of the law and not to be argumentative in Ricks v. State, 178 Ga. App. 98, 101 (4) ( 341 SE2d 895 ).

1997But the precise instruction under consideration in the case sub judice was held to be a correct statement of the law and not to be argumentative in Ricks v. State, 178 Ga. App. 98, 101 (4) ( 341 SE2d 895 ).

1992Appellee contends that the Supreme Court in Kimble v. Kimble, 240 Ga. 100, 101 ( 239 SE2d 676 ) announced a new precise rule, to wit, that the psychiatrist-patient relationship exists only where the patient “went to the psychiatrist on [his] own volition for the purpose of *733 gaining professional psychiatric assistance.” Appellee’s assertion is incorrect.

1992Appellee contends that the Supreme Court in Kimble v. Kimble, 240 Ga. 100, 101 ( 239 SE2d 676 ) announced a new precise rule, to wit, that the psychiatrist-patient relationship exists only where the patient “went to the psychiatrist on [his] own volition for the purpose of *733 gaining professional psychiatric assistance.” Appellee’s assertion is incorrect.

1992Conversely, it would defy reason to hold the other defendants liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequences of their own carelessness....'" Similarly, the correct and guiding principle to decide this case was stated in Knight v. Lowrey, 228 Ga. 452, 456 ( 185 SE2d 915 ) (1971) (language on other issues overruled in Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453, 455 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975)): [I]t would defy reason to hold the [actor] liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequence of his own carelessness.

1992Conversely, it would defy reason to hold the other defendants liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequences of their own carelessness....'" Similarly, the correct and guiding principle to decide this case was stated in Knight v. Lowrey, 228 Ga. 452, 456 ( 185 SE2d 915 ) (1971) (language on other issues overruled in Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453, 455 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975)): [I]t would defy reason to hold the [actor] liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequence of his own carelessness.

1992The precise rule applicable in a case such as this was stated in Gay v. Piggly Wiggly, 183 Ga. App. 175, 179 ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987): "`It is true that [the original wrongdoer] could be held liable for the aggravation of the injury caused by the other defendants' negligence, but that liability is not the result of any concept of joint wrongs but is rather the product of the familiar rule that a wrongdoer is responsible for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his tortious act, including the negligent conduct of others.

1992The precise rule applicable in a case such as this was stated in Gay v. Piggly Wiggly, 183 Ga. App. 175, 179 ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987): "`It is true that [the original wrongdoer] could be held liable for the aggravation of the injury caused by the other defendants' negligence, but that liability is not the result of any concept of joint wrongs but is rather the product of the familiar rule that a wrongdoer is responsible for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his tortious act, including the negligent conduct of others.

1992Conversely, it would defy reason to hold the other defendants liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequences of their own carelessness....'" Similarly, the correct and guiding principle to decide this case was stated in Knight v. Lowrey, 228 Ga. 452, 456 ( 185 SE2d 915 ) (1971) (language on other issues overruled in Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453, 455 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975)): [I]t would defy reason to hold the [actor] liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequence of his own carelessness.

1992Conversely, it would defy reason to hold the other defendants liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequences of their own carelessness....'" Similarly, the correct and guiding principle to decide this case was stated in Knight v. Lowrey, 228 Ga. 452, 456 ( 185 SE2d 915 ) (1971) (language on other issues overruled in Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453, 455 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975)): [I]t would defy reason to hold the [actor] liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequence of his own carelessness.

1941See Short v. Dowling, 138 Ga. 834 ( 76 S. E. 359 ); Hancock v. Rogers, 140 Ga. 688 ( 79 S. E. 558 ); Scoggins v. State, 24 Ga. App. 110 ( 100 S. E. 18 ); Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509 ( 30 S. E. 858 , 42 L.

1941See Short v. Dowling, 138 Ga. 834 ( 76 S. E. 359 ); Hancock v. Rogers, 140 Ga. 688 ( 79 S. E. 558 ); Scoggins v. State, 24 Ga. App. 110 ( 100 S. E. 18 ); Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509 ( 30 S. E. 858 , 42 L.