precise claim in Connecticut

2016See United States v. Carter, 776 F.3d 1309, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to review claim of instructional error with respect to certain counts of indictment because counsel made only one objection regarding jury instructions on those counts, which was sustained, and, therefore, defendant waived right to appeal any other previously unchal- lenged aspect of jury instructions concerning those counts); United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1337 (11th Cir.) (‘‘[w]hen a party responds to a court’s pro- posed jury instructions with the words ‘the instruction is acceptable to us,’ such action

2016See United States v. Carter , 776 F.3d 1309 , 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to review claim of instructional error with respect to certain counts of indictment because counsel made only one objection regarding jury instructions on those counts, which was sustained, and, therefore, defendant waived right to appeal any other previously unchallenged aspect of jury instructions concerning those counts); United States v. Silvestri , 409 F.3d 1311 , 1337 (11th Cir.) ("[w]hen a party responds to a court's proposed jury instructions with the words 'the instruction is acceptable to us,' such action

2016See United States v. Carter, 776 F.3d 1309, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to review claim of instructional error with respect to certain counts of indictment because counsel made only one objection regarding jury instructions on those counts, which was sustained, and, therefore, defendant waived right to appeal any other previously unchal- lenged aspect of jury instructions concerning those counts); United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1337 (11th Cir.) (‘‘[w]hen a party responds to a court’s pro- posed jury instructions with the words ‘the instruction is acceptable to us,’ such action

2016See United States v. Carter , 776 F.3d 1309 , 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to review claim of instructional error with respect to certain counts of indictment because counsel made only one objection regarding jury instructions on those counts, which was sustained, and, therefore, defendant waived right to appeal any other previously unchallenged aspect of jury instructions concerning those counts); United States v. Silvestri , 409 F.3d 1311 , 1337 (11th Cir.) ("[w]hen a party responds to a court's proposed jury instructions with the words 'the instruction is acceptable to us,' such action

2006Rather, we have held that the extent to which a party with an interest in the property other than that of an owner is aggrieved depends upon the circumstances of each case, because the concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed to ensure that only those parties with a substantial and legitimate interest can appeal an order.” Primerica v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85, 93 , 558 A.2d 646 (1989).

2006Rather, we have held that the extent to which a party with an interest in the property other than that of an owner is aggrieved depends upon the circumstances of each case, because the concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed to ensure that only those parties with a substantial and legitimate interest can appeal an order.” Primerica v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85, 93 , 558 A.2d 646 (1989).

1928The precise claim now made by the defendant was made and overruled in Korb v. Bridgeport Gas Light Co., *488 91 Conn. 395 , 99 Atl. 1048 .

1928The precise claim now made by the defendant was made and overruled in Korb v. Bridgeport Gas Light Co., *488 91 Conn. 395 , 99 Atl. 1048 .

2025This court rejected this precise claim in Tor- res v. Commissioner of Correction, 175 Conn. App. 460 , Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction 471, 167 A.3d 1020 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 912 , 179 A.3d 1271 (2018).

2025This court rejected this precise claim in Tor- res v. Commissioner of Correction, 175 Conn. App. 460 , Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction 471, 167 A.3d 1020 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 912 , 179 A.3d 1271 (2018).

2025This court rejected this precise claim in Tor- res v. Commissioner of Correction, 175 Conn. App. 460 , Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction 471, 167 A.3d 1020 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 912 , 179 A.3d 1271 (2018).

2025This court rejected this precise claim in Tor- res v. Commissioner of Correction, 175 Conn. App. 460 , Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction 471, 167 A.3d 1020 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 912 , 179 A.3d 1271 (2018).

2024The leading case remains Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.

2024The leading case remains Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.

2022Each juror answered affirmatively. 11 As we discussed in more detail in part I of this opinion, in State v. Beall, supra, 61 Conn. App. 435 , this court stated, in reliance on our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694 , 737–38, 759 A.2d 995 (2000), that, ‘‘[if] there is no question that the jury’s finding necessarily satisfied the two requirements of § 53-202k, the court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding the elements of § 53-202k is harmless beyond a reason- able doubt.’’ 12 On appeal, the petitioner does not challenge the habeas court’s conclu- sion that she fa

2022Each juror answered affirmatively. 11 As we discussed in more detail in part I of this opinion, in State v. Beall, supra, 61 Conn. App. 435 , this court stated, in reliance on our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694 , 737–38, 759 A.2d 995 (2000), that, ‘‘[if] there is no question that the jury’s finding necessarily satisfied the two requirements of § 53-202k, the court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding the elements of § 53-202k is harmless beyond a reason- able doubt.’’ 12 On appeal, the petitioner does not challenge the habeas court’s conclu- sion that she fa

2021In fact, because nothing in the majority’s opinion in Hinds suggests that Brecht is the proper standard, and because the majority in Hinds explained that it analyzed the petitioner’s claim in that case under the Brecht standard only to respond to the arguments of the dissenting justices, it is more accurate to say that any discussion of the Brecht standard was dictum. 10 After this court released its decision in Hinds, in Epps v. Commissioner of Correction, 327 Conn. 482 , 175 A.3d 558 (2018), we permitted the respon- dent, whose petition for certification to appeal was pending at the time, ‘‘

2021In fact, because nothing in the majority’s opinion in Hinds suggests that Brecht is the proper standard, and because the majority in Hinds explained that it analyzed the petitioner’s claim in that case under the Brecht standard only to respond to the arguments of the dissenting justices, it is more accurate to say that any discussion of the Brecht standard was dictum. 10 After this court released its decision in Hinds, in Epps v. Commissioner of Correction, 327 Conn. 482 , 175 A.3d 558 (2018), we permitted the respon- dent, whose petition for certification to appeal was pending at the time, ‘‘

2019On appeal to this court, the petitioner contends that his cruel and unusual punishment claims should not have been denied on the basis of res judicata because (1) his motion to correct an illegal sentence was dis- missed rather than denied on its merits, and (2) it would be perverse to require that, ‘‘before seeking to correct an illegal sentence in the habeas court, a defendant either must raise the issue on direct appeal or file a motion pursuant to [Practice Book] § 43-22 with the trial court’’ (emphasis added); Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 38 , 779 A.2d 80 (2001); bu

2019On appeal to this court, the petitioner contends that his cruel and unusual punishment claims should not have been denied on the basis of res judicata because (1) his motion to correct an illegal sentence was dis- missed rather than denied on its merits, and (2) it would be perverse to require that, ‘‘before seeking to correct an illegal sentence in the habeas court, a defendant either must raise the issue on direct appeal or file a motion pursuant to [Practice Book] § 43-22 with the trial court’’ (emphasis added); Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 38 , 779 A.2d 80 (2001); bu

2016See United States v. Carter , 776 F.3d 1309 , 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to review claim of instructional error with respect to certain counts of indictment because counsel made only one objection regarding jury instructions on those counts, which was sustained, and, therefore, defendant waived right to appeal any other previously unchallenged aspect of jury instructions concerning those counts); United States v. Silvestri , 409 F.3d 1311 , 1337 (11th Cir.) ("[w]hen a party responds to a court's proposed jury instructions with the words 'the instruction is acceptable to us,' such action

2015In Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 93 Conn. App. 1 , 9 n.14, 887 A.2d 442 (2006), rev’d, 281 Conn. 553 , 916 A.2d 5 , aff’d after remand, 102 Conn. App. 863 , 927 A.2d 958 (2007), this court concluded that it is not proper to grant a variance ‘‘on the basis of the denial of reasonable use of the property.

2015In Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 93 Conn. App. 1 , 9 n.14, 887 A.2d 442 (2006), rev’d, 281 Conn. 553 , 916 A.2d 5 , aff’d after remand, 102 Conn. App. 863 , 927 A.2d 958 (2007), this court concluded that it is not proper to grant a variance ‘‘on the basis of the denial of reasonable use of the property.

2015In Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 93 Conn. App. 1 , 9 n.14, 887 A.2d 442 (2006), rev’d, 281 Conn. 553 , 916 A.2d 5 , aff’d after remand, 102 Conn. App. 863 , 927 A.2d 958 (2007), this court concluded that it is not proper to grant a variance ‘‘on the basis of the denial of reasonable use of the property.

2015In Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 93 Conn. App. 1 , 9 n.14, 887 A.2d 442 (2006), rev’d, 281 Conn. 553 , 916 A.2d 5 , aff’d after remand, 102 Conn. App. 863 , 927 A.2d 958 (2007), this court concluded that it is not proper to grant a variance ‘‘on the basis of the denial of reasonable use of the property.

2015As a threshold matter, we note that the determination of whether the substantial factor test has been satisfied is a question of fact. ‘‘[T]raditional concepts of proxi- mate cause furnish the appropriate analysis for determining causation in workers’ compensation cases. . . . [T]he test for determining whether particular con- duct is the proximate cause of an injury [is] whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Pro- metheus Pharmacy, 105 Conn. App. 669, 678 , 939 A.2d 591 (2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 294 Conn. 5

2015As a threshold matter, we note that the determination of whether the substantial factor test has been satisfied is a question of fact. ‘‘[T]raditional concepts of proxi- mate cause furnish the appropriate analysis for determining causation in workers’ compensation cases. . . . [T]he test for determining whether particular con- duct is the proximate cause of an injury [is] whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Pro- metheus Pharmacy, 105 Conn. App. 669, 678 , 939 A.2d 591 (2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 294 Conn. 5

2015In Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 93 Conn. App. 1 , 9 n.14, 887 A.2d 442 (2006), rev’d, 281 Conn. 553 , 916 A.2d 5 , aff’d after remand, 102 Conn. App. 863 , 927 A.2d 958 (2007), this court concluded that it is not proper to grant a variance ‘‘on the basis of the denial of reasonable use of the property.

2015In Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 93 Conn. App. 1 , 9 n.14, 887 A.2d 442 (2006), rev’d, 281 Conn. 553 , 916 A.2d 5 , aff’d after remand, 102 Conn. App. 863 , 927 A.2d 958 (2007), this court concluded that it is not proper to grant a variance ‘‘on the basis of the denial of reasonable use of the property.

2015As a threshold matter, we note that the determination of whether the substantial factor test has been satisfied is a question of fact. ‘‘[T]raditional concepts of proxi- mate cause furnish the appropriate analysis for determining causation in workers’ compensation cases. . . . [T]he test for determining whether particular con- duct is the proximate cause of an injury [is] whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Pro- metheus Pharmacy, 105 Conn. App. 669, 678 , 939 A.2d 591 (2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 294 Conn. 5

2015As a threshold matter, we note that the determination of whether the substantial factor test has been satisfied is a question of fact. ‘‘[T]raditional concepts of proxi- mate cause furnish the appropriate analysis for determining causation in workers’ compensation cases. . . . [T]he test for determining whether particular con- duct is the proximate cause of an injury [is] whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Pro- metheus Pharmacy, 105 Conn. App. 669, 678 , 939 A.2d 591 (2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 294 Conn. 5

2014Prior to addressing the defendant’s precise claim in this matter, it is instructive to review some recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the issues raised by the defendant. ‘‘In Crawford v. Washington, [ 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2014Prior to addressing the defendant’s precise claim in this matter, it is instructive to review some recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the issues raised by the defendant. ‘‘In Crawford v. Washington, [ 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2010In considering the defendant’s precise claim, we note that “the rules of evidence do not apply to probation proceedings.” State v. Quinones, 92 Conn. App. 389, 392 , 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 904 , 891 A.2d 4 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (d) (4).

2010In considering the defendant’s precise claim, we note that “the rules of evidence do not apply to probation proceedings.” State v. Quinones, 92 Conn. App. 389, 392 , 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 904 , 891 A.2d 4 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (d) (4).

2010In considering the defendant’s precise claim, we note that “the rules of evidence do not apply to probation proceedings.” State v. Quinones, 92 Conn. App. 389, 392 , 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 904 , 891 A.2d 4 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (d) (4).

2010In considering the defendant’s precise claim, we note that “the rules of evidence do not apply to probation proceedings.” State v. Quinones, 92 Conn. App. 389, 392 , 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 904 , 891 A.2d 4 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (d) (4).

2009It states in relevant part: “As the question of whether the conditions of employment are a substantial factor in bringing about an injury is one of fact . . . and considering that what constitutes a substantial factor will, therefore, vary with the circumstances of each case, an attempt to articulate a more precise standard may, in practice, be unnecessarily restrictive, and may inadvertently foreclose a claimant’s right to compensation.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 413 n.ll. 4 “It is well settled in workers’ compensation cases that the injured employee bears the burden of proof,

2009It states in relevant part: “As the question of whether the conditions of employment are a substantial factor in bringing about an injury is one of fact . . . and considering that what constitutes a substantial factor will, therefore, vary with the circumstances of each case, an attempt to articulate a more precise standard may, in practice, be unnecessarily restrictive, and may inadvertently foreclose a claimant’s right to compensation.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 413 n.ll. 4 “It is well settled in workers’ compensation cases that the injured employee bears the burden of proof,